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Croatia

Zagreb TV on 28 April reports a "statement" from the Office of the President regarding the proclamation by Serbia and Montenegro of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The statement says that while Serbia and Montenegro "may create a shared state and they may give it any name they fancy," Croatia will not recognize the FRY as long as it "fails to recognize the Republic of Croatia" and while the "ex-Yugoslav Army, this state's army of conquest," remains on the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia. The statement also asserts that the FRY "cannot be the legal successor of the old Yugloslavia" and must "meet all those conditions for international recognition that were applied to the other republics of the old Yugoslavia."

Poland

Warsaw Radio reports that "tens of thousands" of demonstrators participated in a march through Warsaw on 24 April organized by the independent self-governing trade union "Solidarity." Marian Krzaklewski, chairman of the National Board of Solidarity, and Maciej Jankowski, chairman of Mazowsze Region, led the demonstration. The protesters demanded "a solution to the problems of the mutual debts of enterprises," the presentation of a "clear industrial policy," reform of the banking system, fulfillment of "election promises," and the "inclusion of human and civil rights articles in the new constitution." Prime Minister Jan Olszewski and President Lech Walesa received the demonstrators and heard their demands. Walesa stated, "I want to take part on your side in all negotiations...I am on your side."

Yugoslavia

TANJUG reports that in a publicized letter to the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, acting federal secretary for national defense, termed the decision to call for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] a "hasty move" that is "unlikely to defuse the situation but, rather, will lead to further escalation of the conflict." Adzic states that the "JNA did not come to Bosnia-Hercegovina from abroad. It was born in Bosnia-Hercegovina where it has existed for 50 years as the common armed force of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats." Referring to the "recent agreement in Skopje on the continuation of talks on the JNA status in Bosnia-Hercegovina," Adzic ends his letter calling for intensification of "our talks so that we can arrive at mutually acceptable solutions."

EC Peace Conference To Resume 6 May

AU2804101492 Paris AFP in English 1004 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Brussels, April 28 (AFP)—The peace conference on Yugoslavia sponsored by the European Community will hold its 12th plenary session on May 6, the EC's current Portuguese Presidency said here on Tuesday [28 April].

The announcement came as the EC began a new round of secret talks in Lisbon in a bid to defuse heavy fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina between the republic's Serb, Moslem and Croat ethnic groups.

The EC said next week's talks would focus on the results from three working groups on economics, constitutional affairs and human rights.

The presidents of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro have been invited to the meeting—the 12th at presidential level since the peace conference began its work in September.

Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia have all declared their independence from the old Yugoslav republic. Of the four, only Macedonia has not been generally recognised as independent.

On Monday, Serbia and Montenegro declared that they had joined forces in a new, reduced Yugoslavia.

At the last session of the peace conference on April 1, the six republics agreed to lift all trade barriers among them.

CSCE Mission Leaves for Nagorno-Karabakh

AU2704125692 Prague CSTK in English 1808 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 23 (CSTK)—A group of six CSCE officials left today for the Transcaucasian region of Nagorno-Karabakh to investigate the possibility of sending CSCE observers to the war-torn region.

The group is headed by Sweden's Deputy Foreign Minister Mathias Mossberg, the director of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry's Department of European Security and Cooperation, Ivan Busniak, told CSTK. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, who heads the CSCE Council of Ministers, said he had sent personal messages to the presidents of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Busniak said the group will also meet with Armenian and Azeri representatives to discuss a CSCE-proposed international conference on Nagorno-Karabakh. Czechoslovakia, which currently chairs the CSCE, hopes the conference will open in the Belarussian capital of Minsk before June 7, when elections in Azerbaijan take place.

Joint Company Offers Heavy Water to China

LD2404210592 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1730 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Excerpts] The Polish-Russian Polstar Company in Gdynia has offered a Chinese firm [name indistinct] an unlimited amount of heavy water, a chemical compound used in the production of nuclear weapons and the construction of nuclear reactors.

An investigation into the matter is being carried out by the State Security Office with the cooperation of the Polish Atomic Agency. Journalists from the Television News and from ZYCIE WARSZAWY have carried out a joint investigation into this matter. [passage omitted]

The production of heavy water is enormously expensive. Experts say it is easier to buy it illegally than to produce it. Trade in heavy water is regulated by international conventions. Polish regulations are not very precise. As a result the illegal transfer of heavy water through Poland is not difficult to organize. [passage omitted]

The founding charter of this company states that Polstar is to be involved in, among other things, the mineral water trade. Customs officials have no possibility of telling it apart from heavy water. [passage omitted]

French, German Ministers Meet, Discuss Bosnia

LD2404202792 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1730 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Poland, France, and Germany have called on the Security Council to send UN peace forces to Bosnia-Hercegovina as quickly as possible. Foreign Ministers Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Roland Dumas, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher also called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council on this subject during their meeting in the French town of Tremolat.

Their first meeting took place eight months ago in Weimar and was of an informal character, just like today's meeting in Tremolat. Today the atmosphere matched the climate and the landscape of Aquitaine. Certainly one cannot speak of any Paris-Berlin-Warsaw axis being formed; however, one should treat the contacts of the three ministers as a coordination of stands and initiatives regarding the new order in Europe.

Such a joint initiative, launched before the Helsinki II summit, concerns the prospect of a joint security agreement for all countries of the CSCE. Ministers Dumas, Genscher, and Skubiszewski, on behalf of their governments, announced an appeal to the Security Council for the extension of the mandate of the UN's Blue Berets to Bosnia-Hercegovina. They gave their support to the CSCE mission in Nagorno-Karabakh, and called for measures to prevent a new round of bloodshed in Afghanistan.

Talks also included the matter of the European Union: Poland fully supports the Maastricht Treaty. France and Germany are unswerving in their support for the admission of Poland to EEC membership, but only after it has fulfilled specific economic conditions.

As Hans-Dietrich Genscher said, everyone who knows history will understand the meaning of the fact that it is these particular three countries, which are jointly building the European future. This building process cannot take place without Poland—such assertions were heard today several times over.

[Begin Skubiszewski recording] Poland holds a place of enormous strategic importance in Europe, and it is linked both with the role of Germany and that of France. There are some very important common interests here, which are of prime significance as far as the building of European unity is concerned. Of course, this unity is today being built by all European countries, but one can also contribute to this through either regional moves or moves within certain groups of countries. Here the Franco-German-Polish group has a leading character. [end recording]

Krzysztof Skubiszewski has invited his interlocutors to Poland next year for the next, the third to date, meeting of the French, German, and Polish heads of diplomacy.

Central European Cooperation Committee Formed

LD1704160392 Budapest MTI in English 1521 GMT 17 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, April 17 (MTI)—Removing obstacles from the way of economic cooperation and working to join the EC are the aims of the Central European Cooperation Committee (CECC), formed by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland today. The CECC founding document was signed by Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy, Hungarian International Economic Relations Minister Bela Kadar and Polish Foreign Economic Relations Minister Adam Glapinski here today.

The CECC is expected to open a new phase in the history of ties between Central European countries, the three ministers said at a press briefing after the signing. During the talks, the sides agreed to sign a Central European free trade agreement this year. Before that, however, they plan to meet in June, to discuss open problems related to the issue.

A full trade liberalization between the three countries is expected to be completed within 10 years. Talks are underway on various spheres, with negotiations on customs concessions starting next week. All three ministers regretted their countries are getting squeezed out from the former Soviet market. The main reason for that, they said, is that, despite earlier promises, the three countries cannot take part in Western aid projects.

Also, the sides discussed to what extent Czechoslovakia's concluding a free trade agreement with EFTA last month affects the three countries' ties. According to Dlouhy, the agreement with EFTA does not put Hungary and Poland at a disadvantage. The two countries are also expected to sign similar agreement with EFTA soon, he added.

Ministry Denies Recognizing New Yugoslavia

AU2904110492 Tirana ATA in English 0910 GMT 29 Apr 92

["Statement of the Foreign Ministry Spokesman"]

[Text] Tirana, April 29 (ATA)—The Belgrade TV channels broadcast the news that allegedly Albania, along some other states, has recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this regard, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry stated that the news spread by the Belgrade TV is completely false and not in conformity with the stand of the Albanian Government. He described this report as another effort of the Serbian Government to face the international public opinion with a fait accompli, precisely one day before the meeting of the commission of the CSCE senior officials which will examine among others also the question of the legitimacy of the participation of former-Yugoslavia in this process.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Albania is not against that the Serb and Montenegrin people themselves determine their future. But it can never endorse this solution imposed by the Serb communist circles. On this occasion, its spokesman confirmed once more the undeniable right of the Albanians for self-determination like other peoples of former Yugoslavia.

Kosovo Interparty Council Denies Yugoslav Claims

AU2804175492 Tirana ATA in English 0855 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Tirana, April 27 (ATA)—According to the reports from Pristina, on the occasion of the proclamation of the Constitution of the so-called Yugoslavia, the Coordinating Council of the Albanian Political Parties of Kosovo issued the following statement:

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the state unification of Serbia and Montenegro wish to be nominated, whose Constitution was proclaimed on April 27 by the so-called Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, belongs only to the two republics, Serbia and Montenegro. This has in no way to do with Kosova and the Albanians. They have neither been an accomplice in the fabrication of this state establishment, nor do they wish to have a hand in it or be included in it.

The political will of Kosovo and of the Albanians was expressed in the referendum for the independent and sovereign Kosovo. The results of this referendum speak of the foundamental political orientation of our parties, of all the Albanians, as well as of the majority of the Moslems, Turks, and others in Kosovo.

We consider baseless and refute any claim of the recomposed state for political inheritance and any other inheritance of hitherto Yugoslavia, because it is legitimately and equally inherited by all the previous federal units, that is by the Republic of Kosovo, too.

Kosovo Prime Minister Bukoshi Meets With Leaders

Discusses Cooperation With Meksi

AU2904092592 Tirana ATA in English 1801 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Tirana, April 28 (ATA)—On April 28 before noon, Dr. Aleksander Meksi, chairman of the government of the Republic of Albania received at the prime minister's office the prime minister of the Republic of Kosovo, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi.

In the course of talks, which were held in a fraternal and warm spirit, they discussed on common questions in the political and economic aspect and expressed their readiness to intensify cooperation in the future in all the fields. Mr. Meksi said in his speech that currently the Albanian issue can be raised to a new level and the more known the Albanian issue becomes in the international public opinion, the sooner it will be solved. Mr. Meksi also pointed out the significance of coordinating work in the future as a necessity to have concrete results of bilateral interest. Special attention was devoted to new ways and forms to strengthen cooperation in the economic fields.

On his part, Mr. Bujar Bukoshi pointed to the possibilities for intensifying the relations between the two governments and made concrete proposals to realize in practice the cooperation in the economic field.

The reception was also attended by the Foreign Minister Alfred Sarreqi and the minister of foreign trade and economic cooperation, Mr. Artan Hoxha, who aired their views on different problems of political and economic character.

Berisha Focuses on Albanian Issue

AU2904092992 Tirana ATA in English 1756 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Tirana, April 28 (ATA)—Today at 12.00, Sali Berisha, president of the Republic of Albania received at his seat the prime minister of the government of the Republic of Kosovo, Mr. Bujar Bukoshi.

After wishing him welcome to Albania, President Berisha concentrated on the current difficult situation that has swept over the Albanians in Kosovo in their territories in former Yugoslavia. We should defend our national and human rights of the Albanians, we must demand the right for self-determination of the Albanians in ex-Yugoslavia, and at the same time try to prevent the further dissemination of armed conflict, he said. From the positions of strength, relying on the principles of a fanatic, Milosevic aims at further expanding the conflict by implementing the oppressive policy and Apartheid against Albanian population beyond border. He grants himself the right of creating and abolishing states through violence in open opposition to the principles of Final Helsinki Act and UN Charter. But, Mr. Berisha

pointed out, he hopes and believes that European Community and the U.S.A. will not tolerate and accept such a thing.

It is a duty of our government, he said further on, to raise the voice to make known the Albanian issue in all the international levels.

On his part, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, expressing his pleasure over his visit to democratic Albania following the full victory of democracy and pluralism, said that the aim of his visit is to talk on our common issues to coordinate actions in the current situation in order to cope with the problems here and beyond the border. Albania is faced with difficulties, he said, but the situation in Kosovo is dangerous, something that menaces Albania, too.

The reception passed in a warm and fraternal atmosphere.

Berisha Receives World Bank Delegation

AU2904131392 Tirana ATA in English 0822 GMT 29 Apr 92

[Text] Tirana, April 29 (ATA)—On April 28, the President of the Republic Sali Berisha received at his seat the World Bank delegation headed by Mr. Kutlay Ebiri, representative of this bank for Albania. In course of the reception they discussed on the aid of the World Bank and other financial institutions for Albania. The president emphasized particularly the indispensability of ensuring financial sources for raw material, which is indispensable to start producing. Likewise, President Berisha laid the stress on the social assistance not only for the families of unemployed workers, but also for the peasants, who cannot afford living with the income they get.

The World Bank representative assured the president of the determination of this institution to help Albania. They promised President Berisha that they will work intensively to help Albania to successfully carry out the economic reform. The representatives of the World Bank laid the stress on the indispensability of adoption of a legislation suitable to draw foreign investments as well as the necessity of setting up joint ventures in various fields of economy.

Assembly Discusses 'Grave' Situation in Countryside

AU2804150092 Tirana ATA in English 0846 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Tirana, April 28 (ATA)—On April 27 afternoon, the People's Assembly continued its proceedings in plenary sitting.

At the beginning, the chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly Pjeter Arbnori read out some letters and petitions this Presidency has received from working collectives and military units, inhabitants of cities and villages, who put up their demands and worries on a series of issues. The chairman of the Presidency said that the problems raised by the people should be taken into consideration by the deputies in their activity, underscoring at the same time that they have been sent to the respective competent organs for solution.

Then a debate took place regarding the agenda of the People's Assembly, where various deputies voiced their opinions on the draft laws that should be given priority while examined.

The chairman of the Agricultural and Food Commission, the Deputy Petrit Kalakula read out a statement of this commission, which analyzes the grave situation, which agriculture and the countryside are currently in, aiming at the speeding up of measures to improve this situation. It draws the attention of the parliament and government on some important directions.

Later, it was passed onto the examination of the draft law "The Bank System in Albania," which was approved in principle.

The deputies discussed and approved article per article this draft law taking into consideration the changes proposed by the Commission of Economy, Finance and Social Assistance.

Agriculture Chairman Reads Statement

AU2904133092 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Statement by Petrit Kalakula, chairman of the Permanent Parliamentary Commission for Agriculture and Food in the People's Assembly in Tirana—live]

[Text] Honorable chairman, honorable deputies. In his meeting of 21 April 1992, the People's Assembly Commission for Agriculture and Food analyzed with much concern the grave situation in which agriculture and the countryside is at present and how to accelerate measures that should be taken to improve this situation. The commission considered it necessary to inform parliament and the government about what follows:

1. The countryside and the country's agriculture are in a state of complete paralysis. The reform for land privatization is at present suspended. In various districts of the country, the land is not being distributed according to law. The distribution is interrupted in many other areas, because the peasants are waiting to see what measures the new parliament and the democratic government will take. In many villages, there is a tendency to distribute the land according to old limits. Whereas many former landowners are exerting pressure against the peasants not to take the land given by the village's commission.

2. In the majority of former agricultural cooperatives, the valuation and the distribution of assets has not been completed and the peasants are left with no source of income. The distribution of assets is first obstructed by the fact that the majority of former agricultural cooperatives have to pay debts to the state. Moreover, in many of them we notice irregular actions and speculations from the chairman or other members of the evaluation

commissions that take the biggest part for themselves or their favorites and leave bones for the peasants.

3. The peasants have no machinery to work the land. The agricultural machinery enterprises are completely disorganized in most districts. In this situation, several tractor drivers are speculating at the expense of the peasants by not respecting the state charges.

4. As a result of widespread destruction, the irrigation systems and apparatus are seriously damaged in many areas of the country and are unusable.

5. The peasant has been left with no material base, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds. Even when the peasant can find them, he cannot afford to buy them at the very expensive prices at which they are sold. In this context, we should stress that the majority of peasants are dissatisfied with how the auction-sale of chemical fertilizer coming as aid from the United States is organized. Speculators are being favored and are becoming very rich.

6. The majority of agricultural enterprises are completely disorganized and are heading rapidly toward complete destruction. The occupation of the land of the agricultural enterprises by constructions erected without permission and planning authority has acquired great proportions and is beyond the control of the officials. This situation threatens to destroy hundreds and thousand hectares of land with catastrophic consequences for the peasantry and the whole of the country's economy. This situation has created tensions and insecurity among the country's rural population.

Proceeding from what we previously said, we ask the Assembly and government to take these priority measures:

1. To urgently reorganize the Land State Commission and relevant districts' commissions. The districts' commissions should be given full jurisdiction to execute their power by force in distributing land according to the law. The local state officials and law-enforcing officials, such as the police, Investigators' Office, Procurators' Office, and courts should be more responsibly committed to distributing land and obliging the people to observe the law.

2. The government should urgently compile amendments to improve the Land Law, in first place in respect of compensation for former landowners. Parliament should give priority to examining these amendments.

3. The Ministry of Agriculture should take urgent measures to reorganize the agricultural machinery enterprises, former Machine and Tractor Stations, which should not be privatized for a transitional period. These enterprises should be given priority in help with fuel and spare parts and be put under strict control to respect the state regulations and charges. The government should consider the possibility that this spring and perhaps until next autumn the peasants have their land worked free of charge or with very low charges.

4. By special decree, the government will donate the credits that the state had given to former agricultural cooperatives. This measure will accelerate the division of their property and will help the peasants to somewhat improve the grave economic situation they are in at present. The state officials in the districts and villages should intervene to accelerate this process and exert strict control to avoid various cases of abuse and speculation.

5. The government should take necessary measures to urgently help agriculture with machinery, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and also with credits to favor its reconstruction as soon as possible. It is to the benefit of the country's economy to sell peasants the chemical fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides with favorable and state-controlled prices for a transitional period of two years. In this framework, we should immediately annul the auction-sale of chemical fertilizers, resorting to a more acceptable way under the present economic conditions of our peasantry.

7. [as heard] The Ministry of Agriculture should take early measures to reorganize the Water Board Enterprises and to have the irrigation systems and apparatus ready for work.

8. The government should urgently suspend executing the law on enterprises and present the new law as soon as possible to put these enterprises on the road toward restructuring. The government should help to return the poultry farms and herds of cows in the agricultural enterprises to efficient operations again.

9. The government and the executive districts' committees should take measures and act resolutely to prohibit construction on land without permission and planning authority. For this reason, they should study the possibility of creating an urban police force or special groups having legal power to destroy the unauthorized buildings under construction regardless of the stage of building in which they might be.

10. The relevant state officials should strengthen the control and take strict measures in cases in which agricultural banks have acted unlawfully in granting credits, in contractual relations of the joint agriculture enterprises, and in setting the price for bread and other basket products for the peasants.

Zhelev, Agrarian Party on Liquidation Councils

AU2704134792 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 23 Apr 92 p 8

[Text] BTA—On 22 April, President Zhelyu Zhelev met with members of the Permanent Board of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-United [BZNS-United], who expressed unease that their specialists were being passed over during the formation of the liquidation councils under the Land Act. During the talks it was stressed that our agriculture's future lies with owners' cooperatives. The president was briefed on projects that can revive agricultural engineering. He declared that applying the Land Act needed the cooperation of all democratic forces, especially the potential contribution of specialists. The president emphasized that no ruling political force could afford the luxury of not maintaining contacts with the extraparliamentary parties because the reform requires broad support.

BSP Demands Speedier Restoration of Land Titles

AU2704114392 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Apr 92 p 6

["Resolution" of BSP Supreme Council; place and date not given: "BSP Recommends Accelerating Restoration of Ownership Titles to Farmland"]

[Text] The Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] supports a speedier restoration of ownership titles to agricultural land. The council recommends Socialists to join in initiative actions to defend the owners' interests before the municipal land commissions and the liquidation councils in order to accelerate the division of the property of the labor cooperative farms into shares.

This is stated in a resolution adopted by the BSP Supreme Council and BSP National Assembly deputies on the party's actions in connection with the application of the amendments and additions to the Land Act.

The BSP Supreme Council demands that the organs of power should rigorously put a stop to arbitrary mismanagement and wasting of the basic funds in agriculture. The party councils are recommended to select their approach according to the particular features of the districts, bearing in mind people's specific interests and seeking to cooperate with other parties, organizations, and the trade unions.

The BSP has always supported the restoration of ownership titles to agricultural land as a condition for the development of Bulgarian agriculture, the resolution states. All producers of agricultural produce, it continues, deserve support and encouragement from the state.

The BSP Supreme Council considers that the new version of the Land Act is clearly political in nature and is aimed at placing the economic structures in agriculture under the political control of the Union of Democratic Forces.

The resolution mentions the successful efforts of the Socialists in the National Assembly in the work on the law. They succeeded in preserving the results of the granting of land in 1946, established that labor and land holdings should be placed on an equal basis in dividing up the property of the labor cooperative farms into shares, made it possible for the owners to take over their property on a provisional basis, before the plans for dividing the land are completed, and ensured that a contribution of land to a prospective cooperative should not be a preliminary condition for its formation.

Despite the above, the document states that the adopted new version of the Land Act does not conform with the country's interests. The deputies of the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy [PSSD] have referred the most glaring violations to the Constitutional Court.

The BSP opposes the administrative-bureaucratic approach to forming the liquidation commissions and insists that the oblast administrators should appoint as members competent persons from among the landowners. The resolution further demands that the state organs should guarantee the right of free choice of the forms of management. The BSP supports the creation of cooperatives in agriculture in all their forms.

At the same time, the BSP Supreme Council proposes that the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy should introduce a bill on amendments and additions to this law, with a view to creating a better basis for the agrarian reform.

BSP Leader Videnov Views Opposition's Role

AU2704074592 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 17 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by Zhan Videnov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council: "In Opposition as in Opposition"]

[Text] Our society adopted two main objectives as irreversible—namely, parliamentary democracy and the market economy. Our public approach to political life, to the role of the ruling forces, and to the role of the opposition are based on these two principles.

For this reason, precisely, the main issue facing Bulgarian society today is the question of how to achieve the two aforementioned goals. The behavior of the ruling forces formally coincides with the two objectives in question. In reality, however, the policy of the bloc consisting of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]-Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] not only jeopardizes the future of the economic reform and of democracy as such, but also evokes a negative attitude to the

current changes among the broad strata of the population, inspiring them with feelings of helplessness and nostalgia for the past.

The six months of the SDS administration in alliance with the DPS demonstrated clearly enough that the original elan of the SDS political leaders stemmed solely from their insatiable greed for power. They are trying to prove to themselves that they are capable of ruling, that they must rule, and that no one is entitled to compete with them, or criticize them. Their actions and their lack of action have so far merely showed that they are firmly resolved to exercise power and that for them this is the only thing that counts. In trying to achieve this goal as an end in itself the new rulers already demonstrated their aggressive will for confrontation and their aspirations for political monopoly, as well as their tendency to shift responsibilty for the shortcomings of the government to the presumed "universal culprits." They also showed their cynical nihilism in dealing with the law and their striving for personal profit.

All this precisely creates an atmosphere in which the achievement of our nationwide goals is becoming increasingly uncertain and distant, it is turning into an unbearable burden. This general atmosphere is the logical result of the SDS model for the country's administration, which the present rulers are forcing upon us.

For this reason, precisely, the development of the Bulgarian Socialist Party's [BSP] line of behavior in the opposition should be based on unmasking the specific manifestation of all the vices that are characteristic of the SDS style of leadership in the major government institutions, rather than on a general criticism against the government.

The legislative power is functioning without any regard for the of crisis situation that affects our society. The SDS deputies are not concerned about what kind of legislation the country needs, but about which laws are likely to destroy the political enemy. The main purpose of the repressive laws is to place the people in a state of shock. The restorative and revanchist legislation, which is retrograde in the final account, does not create any lasting or promising legal basis for the reform. The recent amendments to the Land Law are nothing but an ideologically motivated adventure. These amendments have nothing to do with the real problems of the Bulgarian village today.

The government has no idea how to implement the reform. It is evidently unable to cope with the problems of structural reorganziation. The government has not and cannot have its own program of action because it is frantically sticking to excessively generalizing and thus ineffective recipes imported from abroad. The cabinet is ruling the country only in the sense of "strongly holding onto power," which means—strongly, but incompetently. The amazing lack of coordination between legislative and executive power shows the government's helplessness. For the time being this unfortunate lack of coordination can be overcome only with the ultimatums of the international financial institutions. The attempt to promote, along with the budget, which can be defined as the "budget of a programmed economic death," also "something like a program, something like a unique government declaration that has no peer in the whole world" is quite significant in this respect. Such a program can only serve as self-justification for the government's actions.

The shortcomings of the government are thriving and multiplying on a totally emasculated local government. Despite the fact that the municipal councils and mayors were democratically elected on the basis of direct local elections, local self-government has hardly developed. On the contrary, it is increasingly subject to the control of a central, bureaucratic dictatorship represented by the currently appointed oblast administrators and the all-powerful SDS local coordinating councils. Or can we say that the procedure of dismissing and appointing local managers on the basis of drawing lists and establishing so-called "tripartite" elimination commissions, and others, is serving the local interests?

Judicial power is actually once more merging with legislative and executive power. In total contradiction with the Constitution and by means of brutal methods, judicial power has inpractice been subordinated to the "principle" of political expediency. The ruling forces have purposefully re-politicized the judicial organs, while at the same time they are emasculating the judicial power, again for the sake of political reasons. Lawlessness is an established fact in Bulgaria today. The SDS, with brutal directness, imposed its "party assignment" to the "independent" judicial organ, instructing them resolutely to proceed with political trials, which seem to be an absolute necessity for all restorations. Hence, the attention of the judicial organs is diverted from the unprecedented wave of economic and common-law crimes, as well as from the tasks of protecting public order and the citizens' personal safety. There is nothing to be surprised about if the cases of chaotic self-justice are increasing, if the black market, corruption, and disregard for the law are widely spreading in our country.

The results of this policy are eloquently demonstrated by the statistics on the increase in prices and on the growth of the unemployement rate. Under the existing conditions of legal insecurity, while the legislative activities of the National Assembly are directed toward repressive and restorative laws, it is inevitable that the reform should stagnate. The crisis situation that affects our country is deteriorating as a result of this. The main reason for this state of affairs is the current administration model imposed by the SDS.

We shall not accept and we can never accept such a model of administration!

This model is genetically deficient as a result of fruitless internal contradictions. It is allegedly based on the Constitution (to which it repeatedly refers), however, it

is applied by rulers who have imposed their own presence on the political scene after rejecting and denigrating the country's basic law. The methods of ruling our country require national stability, however, they are actually implemented only in a confrontational, authoritarian, and aggressive manner.

The SDS model of administration is totally unfit for the solution of the real problems of our society. The effect of the individual elements of power in implementing the really necessary changes (such as the restructuring and re-orientation of our economy, for example), are chaotic, uncoordinated, and totally ineffective. The "political cement" of anticommunism subjugates the so-called "independent" administrative institutions and deprives them of their identity.

This, precisely, permits the "fourth estate" to replace the other three branches of power, either individually or collectively, and to distract public attention with the help of daily radio and television programs on phony sensations and imaginery problems which only serve to conceal the truly crucial issues facing our country.

The model in question cannot be improved. It is the result of political trends embodied by the SDS and its most reactionary leaders over the last two years. Irrespective of the changes that it is bound to undergo, the model is incapable of promoting a natural and peaceful transition from one type of society to another, because it is not based on the people's sovereign right to make their own choice.

All efforts to impose such a model in its various forms and varieties is a waste of time, obstructs real change, and signifies a betrayal of the socially consolidating national goals of the transition. For this reason, it is of vital importance for our country today and in the future to prevent this trend from going too far beyond repair and from being unduly prolonged, which would be to our country's great disadvantage.

All this requires a new mode of behavior from the BSP.

Our behavior should pursue a definite and unmistakable goal today, and especially as of the beginning of the political spring campaign, in implementing our "1992 Program." This goal should more precisely define the image and style of the BSP as an opposition party and make it more distinguished, more specific, and more varied. This should not happen for the sake of "revolutionary pathos," but for the sake of a clearly defined and positive future program that we, as a party in opposition, feel obliged to submit to our public.

This particular goal can only be the prompt and full political elimination and overcoming of the retrograde political trend in the country's public life that is embodied in the SDS. This is evidently a long-term goal that is not only limited to promoting radical changes in the government institutions through elections.

The long-term opposition goal of the BSP defined in this manner is not so much aimed at the institutions of power as such. It is rather directed against the "source" that inspires the authoritarian and bureaucratic trends, namely against the SDS.

It is evidently a question of pursuing a twofold, but uniform goal. One aspect of the goal is to explain the hopelessness of the path along which the SDS is leading the country, to maintain a vigilant social consciousness, to stimulate the people's will for change, and to provide an unmistakable, accurate, and sharply critical reaction to all inevitable distortions in the current administrative model. The other aspect is the requirement of developing a realistic alternative to the present model of administration through daily political activities. Therefore, we determine our long-term political behavior as an "opposition alternative."

It is a difficult path, along which we are forced to proceed surrounded by an atmosphere of hostile propaganda, working under the constant pressure of insufficient financial resources, and under the permanent threat of repressions implemented through the state machinery. Nevertheless, the opportunities for the BSP of asserting itself as a democratic and socially oriented political organization of nationwide importance are real and should be used.

The BSP is capable of and should by all means develop into a universally recognized exponent of a pragmatic, economic policy based on the priorities of the people's individual interests and their simultaneous integration with nationwide public interests. This is our social alternative to the economic crisis, directed against the economic inaction of those in power, and not against the mechanisms of the market economy. This objective coincides with our chief social trend—namely a socially oriented economic adjustment of the market economy.

The BSP can and should assert itself as an organization of substantial political importance that protects national values, and, above all, the Bulgarian people's sovereign right to choose its own goals and methods of achieving these values. This is our patriotic alternative as opposed to the nihilistic approach to our national economic security, an alternative that is not directed against anyone's human rights.

The BSP can and should have the self-awareness of the fundamental exponent and promoter of the opposition's behavior and actions. This is our political alternative as opposed to the attempts to impose a two-party model that is harmful for Bulgaria. This objective also coincides with our chief political goal—the BSP's participation in asserting Bulgaria's left wing and in establishing a new civic society.

What does this actually mean?

The alternative spirit of opposition against the legislative power requires permanent questions about violations of parliamentary standards and about attempts on the part

of the rulers to evade the Constitution. We should unequivocally point out that the parliamentary opposition must abstain from any trends of constructive cooperation and should not participate in any actions of the majority until the latter decisively changes its behavior. We should emphasize that our presence in parliament also means that we are standing "outside parliament" at the same time. We are sitting in parliament because the National Assembly is the most powerful instrument of the opposition, among other things, and because we are the only opposition force in parliament. These arguments should be the more convincing the more resolutely we reject the illusory concept about the opposition's role as a so-called "constructive corrective" described in the SDS model of administration. The important thing today is not to engage in a theoretical dispute on the question of whether we should be "a parliamentary or a mass party," but to seek the unity of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary action that is likely to make the opposition alternative more articulate, more effective and more convincing.

Our opposition alternative to the central executive power, despite all its possible disguises (such as "structural" changes, "new faces," cabinets composed of "experts," so-called "coalition governments," "votes," "resignations," and so forth) is determined by the understanding about the genetic defectiveness, the total incompetence, inapplicability, and irreparability of the administration model imposed by the SDS. The BSP is not in a position to assume responsibility for the results of such fruitless manipulations because the more rapidly that long, but not endless kaleidoscope of fake innovations turns around, the more understandable and plausible the actions of the BSP opposition are likely to appear. Our parliamentary and public activities must be directed against the government both on a central and local scale, because the government's actions and passivity most clearly reveal the absurdity of the SDS administrative model, which is incompatible with the real needs of the people.

Our behavior as regards the judicial power should be freed of inertia and delusions. The judicial power should be permanently concerned about the real problems of crime, about the horrendous legal chaos resulting from the "creative law-making activities" of the SDS, about the specific manifestations of the expanding arbitrary actions in the administration, which also includes persecution for political reasons.

The stands and participation of the BSP in local government, which exerts the most direct influence upon the motivation of behavior toward the organs of power as a whole, forms the most natural basis for the activities of any opposition regarding both opposition and administrative activities.

This fact also determines the great importance of permanent contacts on regional problems between members of the BSP Supreme Council and BSP deputies, on the one hand, and members of local municipal BSP councils as well socialist councillors, on the other hand, contacts which should reach every local BSP organization.

The BSP Supreme Council intends to announce its specific plans and actions on these questions in the near future.

It is time to manifest a pragmatic approach to the challenges of everyday life and provide the correct and appropriate response. Let us find this response in common, with the participation of the Socialists and their organizations, let us listen to numerous different opinions, and let us accept them together as our own political line, let us implement this line together under the complicated conditions of the current realities.

Marinov Named Chief of Defense Minister's Office

AU2704134392 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 23 Apr 92 p 1

[Emil Zdravkov report]

[Text] Under an order signed by the minister of defense on 20 April, Colonel Engineer Marin Marinov is appointed chief of the minister's military office. This office includes three advisers—on the ground forces, Air Force, and Navy. Col. Marinov, who is 50 years old, comes from Plovdiv; he is married, with two children. He has passed through all the grades of the military hierarchy, from platoon commander to chief of staff of a tank regiment. He has successively held posts ranging from lecturer to head of the training department of the Military Academy. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy.

Bobovdol Parties, Officials Protest to Government

AU2704080392 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 22 Apr 92 p 2

["DUMA PRESS" report]

[Text] The municipal leadership of Bobovdol, with the support of all the town's political parties, has presented a long list of problems to the government, insisting that the cabinet should issue a statement on the serious situation facing this mining town by 10 May.

Despite our efforts, we cannot control the increasing social tension among the municipality's workers and inhabitants, the mayor of Bobovdol and the local leaders of the Union of Democratic Forces, Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, Bulgarian Socialist Party, Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, and Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (United) state in a declaration addressed to the government, Ministry of Finance, and the administrator of Sofia Oblast.

The government should develop the Babino-2 Mine, guarantee other production activities in order to create new jobs for women in the municipality, and not permit the dismissal of women employed by the mines of the

Bobovdol Joint Stock Company—these are some of the demands made by the people of Bobovdol. They demand an immediate solution to the problem regarding the purchase of housing by miners at the old prices, concerning which the municipal administration has received over 800 applications to date.

Because it is quite unable to find the money itself, the municipality is obliged to ask the government to complete the civil engineering work on rerouting the Bobovdol River, which presents a danger to the houses of the town's residents. The mayor and the political forces demand that the municipality should be given 10 leva for every tonne of coal produced by the Bobovdol mines. The administration and political forces in the town declare that failure to resolve the problems in a timely way will cause a social explosion, for which the municipality cannot accept responsibility.

Purge of DEMOKRATSIYA Staff Explained

AU2704103592 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 21 Apr 92 p 1

[Editorial by Encho Mutafov, editor in chief of DEMOKRATSIYA: "Below the Crossbar"]

[Text] The two years that preceded the victorious elections of 1991 were a period of verbal attacks and an era of ideological confrontation. Our task was to unmask the communist ideology, the system that resulted from it, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] (communists), which was the guarantor of both. The months that followed the elections should have been a period of action. It it is no longer sufficient to point out shortcomings, but it is necessary to take actions aimed at a thorough change of the system. Despite the fact that such actions were somewhat delayed, they are already in progress, they are expected to accelerate, and we shall see their positive results.

The ideological denouncement of the past system was characterized by an angry and highly emotional mood. The practical action of changing the system, on the other hand, is a hard everyday chore. In the first stage we experienced precedent feelings of emotional upsurge, while in the second phase we are confronted with precedent clashes. The change of the system requires the introduction of democratic rules. Every day you hear the screams of Socialists complaining that you have stepped on their toes. The change of the system requires the removal of people who were appointed to high ranking posts on the grounds of their party affiliation, rather than for their professional qualifications. Again, you can hear them scream. To change the system means to free our nation from people who are involved in communist crimes. Let them scream some more.

In order to appease their emotional distress, the homo-Socialists are describing the measures aimed at changing the system as "witch-hunts" and actions of "blue [SDS] totalitarianism." When their jaws almost begin to split with spiteful invectives, they have recourse to the ultimate insult, which today is the word bolshevism—a term that used to inspire them with intoxicating delight in the past. The communist daily DUMA even called us "communists" on one occasion, something that made us laugh throughout a whole afternoon. According to them, the activities aimed at changing the system are allegedly unprofessional and nothing but repressive measures of political persecution. We are convinced of the opposite: Namely, that the good-for-nothings of history and the destroyers of the nation's life should be removed. Why is this so? I can answer with two questions in turn: On what grounds were all those diplomats, economic managers, high-ranking military officers, and policemen appointed in your communist era? Considering that they were appointed for political reasons, why should they now be treated as professionals?

We can assure our present-day squealers that the measures applied in changing the system could be justifiably inspired by political motivations, like their own activities used to be. We are entitled to that, after our society was destroyed by those disgusting communist-fascist rules over the last 45 years. Nevertheless, we intend to proceed in a more natural manner. What does this natural approach consist of?

It simply consists of lifting the crossbar. This is all.

As soon as the crossbar is lifted, the good-for-nothings, all those who were appointed to their posts according to criteria that had nothing to do with the job and professional competence, are automatically eliminated. It is no problem for Stoyan Ganev to find out who was posted abroad and for what reason he was appointed to that post, and who is sitting in a comfortable chair at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at home. The same applies to the other ministers, such as Mr. Sokolov and Mr. Ludzhev, and to Mr. Tatarchev, the chief prosecutor. Changes in the cabinet are the topical news. Is it necessary to explain why?

This applies to all levels of our public life. Lifting the crossbar is a fundamental principle of change. Without this principle, it is impossible to advance, even by one step. The reason why the steps have been somewhat slow, so far, is that the crossbar was only lifted slightly, or not at all. It should be lifted to a higher level.

The crossbar was also lifted in the newspaper you are now reading. Everyone was aware that quite a few nondescript people were working for this newspaper, which also influenced its whole image. The editor in chief was an individual who had difficulties in coping with his editorial tasks, let alone more sophisticated activities. One can hardly remember an authoritative article written by him as editor in chief. He was attracted by posts that it is even indecent to mention in this place. Journalists of this kind, who worked for DEMOKRATSIYA, sought employment with other print media without even considering how they could

leave DEMOKRATSIYA for a job with a pro-communist paper. Such butterflies of journalism would never think of asking themselves such a question. Their political convictions are so superficial that they change them like handkerchiefs. In view of the new policy promoted at DEMOKRATSIYA and confronted with the higher criteria, several journalists felt uncomfortable. They realized that they did not possess the qualifications for the higher requirements facing them. Some promptly went on "leave," while others resigned in an honorable manner, and only the most incompetent ones made a great noise.

We do not pay any attention to this. We came here not in order to please the gossips and plotters inside and outside the newspaper, but to accomplish something. Success can only be achieved with the help of competent people.

Apart from this, I would once more like to answer the question posed with great concern: "What happened to DEMOKRATSIYA?" with two questions: Why is this question not asked by our supporters and readers, but by the concerned communists? Perhaps because our newspaper worries them? Why is this question put into circulation at certain specific moments, and especially today, at a time when the communists and their "independent" allies would do better to worry about their political failures? Why did no one ask the question when DEMOKRATSIYA's situation was really unstable? Why did no one ask Yordan Vasilev [one of DEMOKRATSIYA's former chief editors], who was unceremoniously thrown out, for an interview, while the simpleton Volen Siderov was shown off like a dancing bear at all newspaper headquarters, even at DUMA's? For nearly two months I kept silent about this matter, because I thought that it was an expression of good manners to do so. Today, however, I think that it is appropriate to raise the question. The crossbar requires it.

I am discussing all these questions also for another reason, in order to explain to the DEMOKRATSIYA readers one more thing—namely, the reason why we are not paying any attention to the constantly recurring question. We know perfectly well why the question recurs! You realize what kind of people are behind the question, and who serves them. They are the same people who scream about "blue totalitarianism" and "witch-hunts."

DEMOKRATSIYA will not be an exception to the general rules of our nation's life. Our newspaper is not only an exponent of the change. It is part of the total style of change. The crossbar and the people below and above it are the symbols of this style.

Future of Small Nuclear Research Reactor in Doubt

AU2704073792 Sofia VECHERNI NOVINI in Bulgarian 17 Apr 92 p 2

[Zara Encheva article: "Big Question Hangs Over Small Reactor"]

[Text] For the past two and a half years, the IRT-2000 research reactor at the Institute for Nuclear Research and the Nuclear Power Industry of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences has been inactive. It is merely being maintained in a safe condition, and this is a matter of concern for the Bulgarian taxpayer because the state has lost over $2 million during this period. If the reactor is dismantled, the costs will exceed 20 million leva. If it is reconstructed in accordance with the design project that has been submitted to the Inspectorate for the Safe Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, it can be put back in operation within two or three months at a cost of 150,000 leva.

In the view of the scientists of the Bulgarian Nuclear Association, the delay in reaching a decision is inadmissible. The Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and the Council of Ministers have the right to make this decision. The scientists appeal for a new, realistic assessment to be made of the risks and benefits of this installation. Commissions of experts and a special governmental commission have reached decisions in favor of the reactor, but there is a decision made by the Executive Committee of Sofia People's Council in January 1991 on the physical destruction of the reactor that has been submitted to the Council of Ministers. Because of the negative view expressed by a group of specialists from the Scientific Institute for Nuclear Medicine, Radiobiology, and Radiation Hygiene, the Ministry of Health hesitates to give its blessing to the reconstruction project.

In 1990 the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna came out with a viewpoint that "it is possible to bring the reactor into conformance with the normative requirements for nuclear and radiation safety" and that "the reactor can operate safely because of its design principles and low power (2 megawatts or less)."

According to the viewpoint of the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, given in response to a request from the Council of Ministers, the decision submitted by the former mayor of Sofia Aleksandur Karakachanov is supported by materials that contain negative assessments, whereas "there are two sides to the coin."

The opponents, most of all Prof. Ivan Uzunov of Sofia University and Senior Scientific Officer Milena Khristova of the former Medical Academy, stand by the thesis that in the event of a hypothetical accident (a plane crashing on the reactor or sabotage) the population within a 13 km radius of the five-megawatt reactor would receive an impermissible excessive irradiation from the radioactive products discharged into the atmosphere. Now Professor Uzunov says: If no five-megawatt project existed, none of this would be the case; at two megawatts the results will perhaps be far more optimistic.

Let us imagine the most serious accident situation—a breach in the 2.5-meter-thick concrete body of the reactor, with a leakage of cooling water. The maximum temperature in such an accident is 500 degrees, whereas the melting point of the aluminum sheathing is 600

degrees. Even if the nuclear fuel core melts down and all the gases escape, within a 400 to 1,200 meter-radius this will not cause the maximum permitted dosages for the thyroid gland to be exceeded.

I would agree that the risk is not very great, Professor Uzunov says, but I am not convinced of the benefit.

Republican oncologist Prof. Marin Mushmov insists on reestablishing production of the iridium wire that the small reactor used to produce, because importing this wire costs $18,000.

The reactor is capable of producing radioisotopes for medical use valued at over $500,000 per year (technetium, iodine-131, and so on). These are also imported. According to an announcement by Senior Scientific Officer Khristo Raychev, Bulgarian technetium is used at three clinics and has been approved by a commission. We are ready to sell it at a price almost equivalent to imported aspirin, he claims.

Senior Scientific Officer Nataliya Yaneva of the Inspectorate for the Safe Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes insists that a country with one of the largest nuclear power plants cannot exist without a research reactor. In her view, we cannot slam on the brakes just for its own sake—just to show off, and the enmity that has existed for years between individual establishments should not be allowed to affect this important matter.

The reactor was formerly used for training purposes and for pure and applied scientific tasks by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Medical Academy, Agricultural Academy, the universities of Sofia, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, economic enterprises in the pharmaceutical and energy industry fields, for geological research, and so on. As Senior Scientific Officer Apostolov maintains, it is a fact that the reactor did not work sufficiently efficiently, but we will be making a mistake if we destroy it.

The specialists conclude that we must make the position clear to the population. The people who live near large power plants in other country are clearly at risk. In Lyon, for example, a 3,500-megawatt reactor is operating in the vicinity of a housing complex. Throughout the world, 325 research reactors are in operation in 54 large towns (Chicago, Boston, Buenos, Aires, etc.). Moscow alone has 12 such reactors.

German Foreign Minister Genscher Visits Prague

AU2704104192 Prague CSTK in English 1459 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 24 (CSTK)—German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will pay a brief working visit to Czechoslovakia April 28.

Genscher will discuss with his Czechoslovak counterpart, Jiri Dienstbier, the current situation in the Transcaucasian region of Nagorno-Karabakh and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Their talks will focus on planned activities within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), according to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry's Press Department Head, Zdenek Zikmund.

Zikmund said the two ministers will also discuss relations between Central and East European countries, and between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).

Hails Cooperation

LD2804174392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Excerpts] German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher arrived in Prague today on a short working visit. Olga Jerabkova reports on the purpose of this visit:

[Jerabkova] The meeting of Ministers Genscher and Dienstbier in the Cernin Palace was very brief and informal. In the course of their working lunch the two ministers discussed topical issues of European politics and the immediate tasks within the Helsinki process. [passage omitted]

Today's brief visit of Hans-Dietrich Genscher was most probably his last to Prague in his present post. This was also confirmed by his words at the end of the briefing in the Cernin Palace:

[Begin Genscher recording, in German fading to Czech translation] I have visited my colleague and friend Dienstbier in his post of CSCE chairman. He holds this post at a very important period for the future of Europe. CSCE member states handed over this post to Czechoslovakia with great trust and hope, and above all with trust, to the hands of the Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs. I should like to take this opportunity to thank my colleague and friend in two ways: First, for the responsible manner in which he asserted in the parliament the ratification of the Czechoslovak-German treaty; and second, for the truly good cooperation that we have had from the very first day. Our first meeting in the posts of ministers of foreign affairs gave us the opportunity to cut through the iron curtain. And this is something one never forgets. I wish Jiri Dienstbier all the best and I wish him success in his present and future post of CSFR minister of foreign affairs [as heard]. [end recording]

Dienstbier on Genscher Resignation

AU2904112092 Prague CSTK in English 1829 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 27 (CSTK)—"One whole era is ending with the departure of the longest-serving foreign minister in the world (Hans-Dietrich Genscher)", Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier said in a statement today.

He called Genscher "an untiring creator of Europe's architecture" who succeeded in carrying through "goals he had rather dreamed of than set. The unification of Germany and the fall of the iron curtain will always remain linked with his name", Dienstbier said.

"We will never forget the energy he had to exert and the adversity he had to surmount to push through the Czechoslovak-German treaty, to overcome the dark past and open up our (Czechoslovak-German) relations to the future in the uniting Europe", Dienstbier said.

In the statement presented to CSTK by Zdenek Zikmund, director of the Foreign Ministry Press Department, Dienstbier said he believes Genscher "as a deputy and the most popular German politician will yet for a long time use his authority to contribute to a positive development of international relations."

Havel Returns From Asian Tour, Stops in India

LD2904090192 Prague CSTK in English 0648 GMT 29 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 29 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today returned from his week-long tour of Japan and South Korea.

Last night, he made a stopover in New Delhi where he met at the airport with Indian Foreign Ministry Secretary Jyotindra Nath Dixit.

Czechoslovak Presidential Assistant Alexandr Vondra told CSTK that Dixit repeated an invitation for Havel to pay a visit to India.

Havel regretted he failed to visit the country in the current election term. He said it will be possible for a Czechoslovak president to do so after the June 5-6 parliamentary elections.

Havel assured the Indian side that changes taking place in Czechoslovakia since the fall of communist regime in November 1989 will not cool the two countries' traditionally good relations.

Staff Reduced at Embassy in Tripoli

LD2804151192 Prague CSTK in English 1216 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 28 (CSTK)—Four members of Czechoslovakia's embassy staff in the Libyan capital of Tripoli will leave the country by the end of this week.

The cutback is in response to a Libyan request on April 15 that Czechoslovakia reduce "substantially" its diplomatic staff in Tripoli. The same day Czechoslovakia asked the Libyan Embassy to cut the number of its diplomats in Prague as part of U.N.-imposed sanctions against Libya for refusing to hand over two suspects in the 1988 terrorist attack on a Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland.

The Czechoslovak Embassy in Tripoli will continue its regular functions.

According to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, the approximately 600 Czechoslovak citizens in Libya are all well.

'Indifferent' Japanese Investment Attitude Viewed

AU2804113692 Prague CSTK in English 1059 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 27 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy said in today's Czech daily "MLADA FRONTA DNES" that an indifferent attitude by Japanese business people towards investment in Czechoslovakia is mainly due to a lack of information on the country's economic reform in Japan.

Dlouhy said the lack of information is caused to a certain extent by Czechoslovakia. "If we really want foreign investment, let's stop just pretending that maybe we want it, while at same time implementing our economic reform and being strong... and radical. Let us acknowledge openly we need to accumulate big capital which, within a short period of time, we cannot get from domestic resources," said Dlouhy.

Dlouhy who gave an interview to the paper on the way from Tokyo to Seoul is accompanying Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel on a current Asian tour.

Dlouhy said the visit to Japan "was aimed mainly to present Czechoslovakia as a country with a stable economy which expects foreign, i.e. also Japanese, investment (to come to the country)."

In the economic and political daily "HOSPODARSKE NOVINY," Dlouhy said the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry has shown interest in supporting Japanese businessmen who want to invest in the Czechoslovak arms industry conversion into civilian production.

Foreign Ministry Official Views Ukrainian Policy

AU2704081092 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Apr 92 p 5

[Igor Cibula article: "Above All, Relations with Our Neighbors"]

[Text] "Ukraine considers itself to be a great European country, and it is difficult not to take this fact into consideration," Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasuk said when we spoke about the current situation and the prospects of relations between Ukraine and the CSFR. He ranked the CSFR among the countries in which Ukraine's diplomacy has a primary interest, since Kiev gives relations with neighboring countries the greatest importance. In this connection, he said that the Ukrainian ambassador in Prague, Roman Lubkilskiy, is prepared to hand over his letter of accreditation to President Havel, despite the fact that as yet the Czechoslovak side has not asked Ukraine for the same [agrement] for the CSFR ambassador in Kiev. In the opinion of circles close to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Czechoslovakia is proceeding cautiously when developing relations with Ukraine. This may be because of the CSFR's concern about Russia, which delivers crude oil and other raw materials to the CSFR. It must be said though that in Kiev they noticed the Slovak interest in cooperation and understand it as a part and parcel of the European regional policy.

Budapest, in contrast to Prague, does not pay any regard to Moscow, and this is why Kiev appreciates its relations with Hungary as the warmest ones. Maybe, it is also because the Hungarian Government was the first of the neighboring countries to recognize independent Ukraine. Seen in the context of a large Hungarian minority and historical links to Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, Ukrainian representatives have regard for the visit by the Hungarian president in 1990 and the many documents and multilateral agreements they concluded with Hungary. According to Boris Tarasuk, despite the fact that Ukraine's interest in integrating in European structures was not fully understood in European capitals—for which Russian diplomacy is partly responsible—Kiev intends to continue exerting efforts in this direction. Membership in European communities is not Ukraine's objective at present, but the Ukraine is interested in joining the Council of Europe, and in the NATO Council it wants to contribute to the stability of the military situation on this continent. Certainly, Ukraine's membership in NATO is out of question—mainly with respect to Russia—but this does not exclude its integration in the system of collective security in Europe. Ukraine wants to reach the status of a non- nuclear and neutral country, and it relates the size of its Army to its position within the system of European collective security and the guarantees it will receive from them. Boris Tarasuk stressed that this is why he considers all speculations about the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to be premature.

A particularly interesting view is the opinion of the adviser from the information department of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Andrey Veselovski: "Ukraine is not known in the world as a country. We must eliminate this negative image of Ukraine so that it might integrate in the international community as an equal country." In this respect, Ukrainian diplomacy is highly interested in countries with a large number of Ukrainian immigrants, such as Canada, the United States, Argentina, and Israel.

Air Transport Agreement Signed With Philippines

LD2604132492 Prague CSTK in English 1105 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 24 (CSTK)—An agreement on air transport between the governments of Czechoslovakia and

the Philippines was signed here Thursday, the Czechoslovak Transport Ministry informed CSTK today.

An agreement has been considered since 1975, but only recent political and economical changes in Czechoslovakia have made it possible to conclude it.

Klaus Claims Success in Controlling Inflation

AU2904111792 Prague CSTK in English 2015 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Text] Bratislava April 27 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Finance Minister and Chairman of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Vaclav Klaus today said inflation in Czechoslovakia is one or even two digits lower than in the neighbouring postcommunist countries.

"Czechoslovakia is the first postcommunist country to succeed in halting inflation," Klaus told a meeting of citizens in Martin, Central Slovakia.

He said that for already sixteen months the exchange rate of the Czechoslovak crown has been stable and there is no reason to change it in the months to come.

On Czechoslovakia's arms exports, which are arousing criticism both at home and abroad, Klaus said that Czechoslovakia's foreign policy must be advantageous above all for the country itself. Ideas about "not selling a single cartridge to anybody" are being forced upon us "by those countries which export countries worldwide," he said. [sentence as receieved]

Klaus's ODS, which consistently tops public opinion polls before the June elections with about 19 percent voter support, expanded its activity from the Czech Republic to Slovakia in February 1992.

Parliament Passes Law on Commodity Exchanges

AU2704123992 Prague CSTK in English 1259 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 23 (CSTK)—The Czechoslovak parliament today passed in a unanimous vote a bill on commodity exchanges.

Commodity exchanges, which were abolished in Czechoslovakia in 1952, will be restored as private non-profit state-supervised institutions to provide for trade in commodities. Through their activities they can only earn means for their own operation.

The strict state control of commodity exchanges is linked to the fact that these institutions will set, on the basis of market mechanisms, general prices of certain commodities, particularly of farm products.

All business operations at commodity exchanges will be based on the commercial code.

Also approved in parliament today was an agreement between Czechoslovakia and Austria on easing customs procedure on border crossings in railway, road and water transport, which was signed in Vienna June 17, 1991.

Parliament Approves Allocation of Surplus 1991 Budget

LD2804211592 Prague CSTK in English 1926 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 28 (CSTK)—The Czechoslovak Parliament today approved a government proposal for the allocation of the 1991 federal budget surplus totalling 6,389 million crowns (over 212 million USD).

On April 21, the proposal was approved by the House of the People but rejected by the House of Nations where it was voted down mainly by deputies of Slovak opposition parties. They also voted against it today.

Of the surplus, 2,276 million crowns (over 75 million USD) will be used to partly cover last year's deficits in the budgets of the Czech and Slovak Republics (10,800 million and 10,200 million crowns respectively), with 1,342 million crowns going to the Czech and 934 million crowns to the Slovak Republic.

2,000 million crowns are designated to cover the insolvency of the state-owned Czechoslovak Railway Company (CSD).

The parliament also approved today a bill on investment companies and investment funds setting rules for the establishment and activity of these financial institutions.

Pithart Sees Political, Social Goals Attained

LD2804162192 Prague CSTK in English 1451 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Prague April 28 (CSTK)—Czech Premier Petr Pithart today said that in the period following the fall of communist rule (in late 1989), the Czech government has accomplished its task in both the political and economic spheres.

"I believe the steps taken (by the government) in the process of restoring democracy and in the economic transformation are irreversible", Pithart said. He was speaking to the deputies of the Czech National Council (parliament) at the opening of their 35th session.

Commenting on a report on the implementation of the government programme, Pithart blamed the constitutional system inherited from the former communist regime for shortcomings in the government's operation. Under this system, the premier is responsible for the whole government but does not have the right to name or recall ministers, he stressed.

The report said the government considered keeping the social peace one of the most important factors in the successful fulfilment of its programme.

Thanks to the stress laid on an active employment policy, the number of jobless people in the Czech republic in March was about 195,000, only 3.7 per cent

of the labour force. In the course of 1991 and until March 1992, labour offices found jobs for almost 290,000 people, the report said.

The growth of the average wage by 16.3 per cent in 1991 lead neither to an inflationary rise in prices nor to social unrest, according to the report.

It also noted that the share of private business in retail trade turnover rose from 10 to 40 per cent in the course of 1991. The retail trade turnover in 1991 was 4.4 per cent lower than in 1990.

In spite of last year's budget deficit of 10,800 million crowns (360 million dollars), the basic goals of the 1991 budget were fulfilled, the report said.

It pointed out that a total of 2,953 enterprises have been included in the "large privatisation", 1,703 of them in its first and 1,250 in its second wave. Projects for the privatisation of 1,100 enterprises worth 190,000 million crowns (6,330 USD) were approved by April 15, the report said.

In the Czech republic, stock worth 140,000 million crowns (4,700 million USD) is earmarked for the opening wave of privatisation in which thousands of state-owned companies are to be privatised by the sale of coupons to individuals. The first wave is due to begin May 18.

Influence of Atomic Energy Commission in Question

AU2404191392 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 22 Apr 92 p 2

[Jan Jelinek commentary: "Nuclear Division of Powers"]

[Text] Last year the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission decided that the V-1 nuclear power station at Jaslovske Bohunice must be closed by the year 1995 because of the obsolescence of its safety technology. This was bad news for the Slovak power industry, and considerations instantaneously appeared about a fundamental reconstruction of the power station that would allow it to operate throughout its projected service life, that is, approximately until 2006. However, there exists no experience with a similar reconstruction as no country using reactors of the same type has as yet ventured upon such a project. No wonder that representatives of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission—who have become appropriately tough after the experience of Chernobyl—are not pleased. Ultimately though, it should be they who have the last word when it comes to giving the green light to the operation of the reconstructed power station. Whether they really have the last word is written in the stars. Recent voices from Slovakia suggesting that the activity of the Federal Atomic Commission be divided between the republics surely have not escaped astrologists' attention. Likewise, they must have noticed that yesterday the Slovak Government approved the program of reconstruction.

Political Parties for 1992 Election Viewed

AU2704072192 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 21 Apr 92 p 9

[Unattributed report: "Parties, Movements, and Coalitions for the Parliamentary Elections in 1992"]

[Text] 1. Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)

A political party that upholds the democratic right wing, Western political conservatism, and principles of economic liberalism in the program "The Road To a Free Society." In 1992, this party concluded a coalition agreement with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDS) and in March, the nationwide ODA conference adopted an agreement on the LDS' integration into the ODA. Jan Kalvoda is its chairman. The ODA runs in all Czech Republic electoral regions.

2. Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia

This party was established in November 1989 from the Democratic Club. The party considers itself to be a party of the center, subscribing to principles of humanity and morally clean democracy, according to F. D. Roosevelt's model "The New Deal." Chairman: Jan Kukacka.

3. Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (CSSD)

The CSSD was established on 7 April 1878 as a Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party within the Austrian Social Democratic Party. The party was dissolved in 1938 and revived in 1945, and it merged with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after February 1948. The party was reestablished as a separate political party on 19 November 1989. It is a left-of-center political party. It supports the marriage between the economic program and the program of social securities, protection of employees, transition to a social market system, and preservation of the unity of the state. The party is running in all Czech Republic electoral regions.

4. Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS)

The Movement was established on 1 April 1990. It is a political movement striving for self-governing and the equal standing of Moravia and Silesia, and a land setup of the Czech Republic. The chairman is Jan Krycer. The Movement is participating in all of the CSFR electoral regions.

5. Movement of Senior Citizens for Social Guarantees

The Movement was established in February 1990. It is oriented toward the optimal protection and social security of the people in the pre-pension and pension age groups. The chairman is Josef Konicek. The Movement is running in Czech Republic electoral regions.

6. Coalition for the Freedom of Expression-the Slovak Republican Union

This group is participating in all of the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

7. Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)

The Movement was established in March 1991 at a meeting of the Public Against Violence [VPN] Council, with a platform striving for the renewal of the VPN's original character. At a VPN extraordinary republican congress in April 1991, the VPN-For a Democratic Slovakia split off, and on 3 May 1991 it was registered under its present name. It is a liberal political movement of the center that subscribes to the motto "A Chance for Slovakia." Its objective is to improve the economic and social situation in the Slovak Republic and to push for a constitutional setup on a confederative basis. The chairman is Vladimir Meciar. The HZDS is running in all Slovak Republic electoral regions.

8. Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)

By a decision of the then Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia-The Party of the Democratic Left, the party has borne its present name since 1 February 1991. Later, the party ended its activity in the Federation of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia-the Party of the Democratic Left. It is a leftist party subscribing to a socially and ecologically oriented market economy and respect for human and civil rights. Peter Weiss is its chairman. The party is taking part in all Slovak Republic electoral regions.

9. Party of Labor and Security (SPJ)

This party was registered in Slovakia in March 1992. It considers itself to be a party of the unemployed and poorest strata. It runs, above all, in the Slovak Republic.

10. National Social Party-Czechoslovak National Socialist Party

It was established in September 1990 as a current within the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. It rejects any links to the left- or extreme right-wing parties. It favors a union setup for Czechoslovakia. It stresses freedom of enterprise. Chairman: Cestmir Cejka. The party is running in all the Czech Republic electoral regions.

11. Movement for the Liberation of Slovakia (HzOS)

This movement was registered in September 1990. It tries to assert the right of the Slovak nation to declare independence and establish a sovereign state. Chairman: Frantisek Kollar. The Movement runs in all Slovak Republic electoral regions.

12. Party of Freedom-Party of National Unification (SS-SNS)

This party was established as a new entity in April 1992 after a merger between the Party of National Unification of the Slovaks and the Party of Freedom. It prefers a solution to the constitutional setup that would add up and fairly divide the property of the republic. Chairman: Silvester Minarovic. The party is running in all Slovak Republic electoral regions.

13. Democrats '92 for a Common State (D92)

The D92 constituting congress was held on 28 March 1992. It is a political movement acting across the federation. It is in favor, above all, of the preservation of the common state, integration within modern Europe, and a fast transition toward a market—and socially fair—economy. The D92 runs in all the Czech Republic electoral regions.

14. Party of the Republican and National Democratic Unity

The party was established in March 1992. It strives for the preservation of the common state on a union principle, strong economy, and the complete debolshevization of society. It is in all the Czech Republic electoral regions.

15. Coalition of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement-Coexistence-Hungarian People's Party (MKDH-ESWS-MLS)

This party favors democracy and supports the rights of ethnic minorities and the preservation of their identity. It favors a common state. The party is headed by Miklos Duray.

16. The Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH)

The SKDH split off from the Christian Democratic Movement in March 1992. It strives to spiritually rejuvenate Slovakia, to complete the sovereignty of Slovakia, and to achieve its international recognition. It favors full economic development. The chairman is Jan Klepac. The SKDH runs in all the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

17. Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL)

The Czechoslovak People's Party was established by a merger of several Catholic parties in September 1918. In 1938, it was dissolved and renewed in 1945 as a party of the National Front. The KDU submitted a request for registration in June 1991. Both parties merged at a congress in March 1992. The party upholds the right center and pushes for a responsible social policy toward the weak. Chairman: Josef Lux. The KDU-CSL is running in all of the Czech Republic's electoral regions.

18. Union of Communists of Slovakia

This party supports the ideas of socialism, but it does not consider itself to be a successor to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia or the Communist Party of Slovakia. It intends to protect, above all, the rights of the working people. It supports a federation based on equality. Chairman: Juraj Janosovsky. The party is participating in all of the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

19. Party of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs, Tradesmen, and Farmers

The party was established at the initiative of the Association of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs. Its place is right of

center. Rudolf Baranek is its chairman. The party runs in all the Czech Republic electoral regions.

20. Vacant

21. Movement for Social Justice

The Movement was established in 1991, and it has been registered since February 1991 as a federal party. It is leftist oriented and considers the so-called employees' ownership system the best privatization method. The chairman is Michal Lakatos. It is taking part in all of the CSFR electoral regions, except Central Slovakia.

22. Liberal Social Union (LSU)

The Union was registered as a political movement with collective membership in December 1991. It is made up of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Agrarian Party, and the Green Party. The Union presents itself as an organization of democratic forces of the center, which intends to protect, above all, the interests of the middle and lower classes. It supports a socially fair society, it rejects the so-called shock therapy in the economy, and it favors self-governing democracy and an active attitude toward ecology. Frantisek Trnka is its chairman. The Union is running in all Czech Republic electoral regions.

23. The Green Party

This is a Slovak republican organization of the federal Green Party (which runs within the LSU in the Czech Republic). It has its candidates in all four Slovak Republic electoral regions.

24. Civic Movement (OH)

The Movement was established at an extraordinary republican congress of the Civic Forum in February 1991 as one of the two collective members of the Civic Forum. In April 1991, at a constituent congress, the Movement adopted its policy statement and program. It is a liberal, civic, and social movement striving, above all, for a common state whose jurisdictions would be well- defined and for the transition to a market economy, while respecting social interests and ecological requirements. The chairman of the council is Jiri Dienstbier. The OH is running in all of the Czech Republic electoral districts.

25. Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)

The Movement was established on 30 January 1989 on the basis of the appeal by the Civic Initiative to establish Christian democratic clubs. The constituting congress was held in February 1990. As an all-peoples ecumenical political movement, its strives to create a spiritually sound, fair, and economically prosperous society. The chairman is Jan Carnogursky. The KDH runs in all the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

26. Civic Democratic Union (ODU)

This is a liberal conservative right-of-center party that split off from the Public Against Violence movement. The party's priorities are the solution of the constitutional setup, the position of Slovakia within the federation, and quick economic reform. Its chairman is Martin Porubjak. The party is active in all of the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

27. Romany Congress of the CSFR

It was established in March 1992. It is a voluntary association whose objective is to unify the Romanies and to push for their right to a dignified life. Jan Farkas is the president.

28. Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia

This radical rightist group registered in 1990. It demands guarantees against any form of dictatorship, an end to the devastation of the national economy, and a thorough purging of political life. Chairman: Miroslav Sladek. The party is running in all CSFR electoral regions.

29. National Liberals

This right-of-center party registered in March 1990. The party favors an independent Slovakia. Katarina Horvathova is the chairwomen. The party is active in all CSFR electoral regions.

30. The Green Party in Slovakia

This party was established in June 1991. It considers itself to be leftist oriented and favors a looser union of the two republics in a common state. It supports ecologically stable development in the country. Peter Sabo is its chairman. The party is active in all of the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

31. Club on Nonaligned Activists (KAN)

The club was established in 1968, but its activity was stopped in the same year. It was reestablished in 1990. It is a movement with a democratic rightist program. It supports the principles of a market economy and demands a radical purging of society through a so-called debolshevization. The chairman of the Central Council is Bohdan Dvorak. The KAN runs in all the Czech Republic electoral regions.

32. Romany Civic Initiative (ROI)

This party has been active since 1989. It is right-oriented. It supports the development of private enterprise, and a union model of the state. Chairman: Emil Scuka. The ROI is active in all CSFR electoral regions.

33. Left Block-Coalition of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Democratic Left of the CSFR

A coalition agreement for the parliamentary elections was signed on 30 April 1992.

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)

This party is leftist. Creating a democratic, humane, and socially fair society, a transition to a social market economy, and a realistic foreign policy corresponding to the historical interests of the CSFR are its proclaimed objectives. Jiri Svoboda is its chairman.

Democratic Left

This nonpartisan political movement of left-oriented citizens was registered in the spring of 1990. It subscribes to democratic socialism in the spirit of the Socialist International. Lotar Ondruch is the chairman of the nationwide coordination committee. The coalition runs in all Czech Republic electoral regions.

34. Social Democratic Party in Slovakia (SDSS)

The party was established in December 1918. Its activities were ordered stopped in 1948, but reinstated in January 1990. It wants to be a modern leftist party and contribute to the human and European dimension of Slovak politics. It strives for political stability in Slovakia as an economically and socially developed republic. Alexander Dubcek is its chairman. The party is running in all Slovak Republic electoral regions.

35. Communist Party of Slovakia '91

This leftist party's constituting congress was held in June 1991. It subscribes to ideas of Marxism-Leninism and those of communism, and it wants to represent and defend the interests of workers, farmers, working intelligentsia, and—above all—the unemployed. Julius Fejes is the chairman of the Central Committee. The party runs in all the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

36. Coalition of the Democratic Party (DS) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS)

Democratic Party

This party was established on the territory of liberated eastern Slovakia in 1944. After February 1948, the party was dissolved. At an extraordinary congress of the Party of Slovak Revival, in which some DS members were active, the party assumed the name Democratic Party in December 1989. The party considers itself to be rightist and tries to speak mainly to entrepreneurs and the intelligentsia. It supports a common state composed of two republics united by a treaty. Jan Holcik is its chairman. The party ran independently in the last elections, but now is in a coalition with the ODS in all of the Slovak Republic electoral regions. (The ODS: See the Coalition of the Civic Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party)

37. Slovak National Party (SNS)

The party was established in December 1989. It stands on a position of radicalism, and pushes mainly for Slovakia's independence. It favors softening the negative impact of economic reform on the population. Jozef Prokes is its chairman. The SNS is running in all of the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

38. Party of Beer Aficionados

The party was established in January 1990. Ivo Dvorak is its chairman. The party has submitted lists of candidates in all of the Czech Republic electoral regions.

39. Slovak People's Party

This party is the successor to the party established by A. Hlinka in 1905. It was registered in April 1990. It strives for Slovakia's state sovereignty and international recognition. Jozef Prokop is its chairman. The party is active in all of the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

40. Hungarian Civic Party (MOS)

This party was established from the political movement called the Hungarian Independent Initiative (NMI). In January 1992, it changed into the MOS. It pays attention to liberal Hungarians living in the CSFR. It supports radical social changes and wants to orient itself toward the middle class strata of entrepreneurs and the private sector in agriculture. Laszlo Nagy is its chairman. It is running in all of the Slovak Republic electoral regions.

41. The Independent Initiative (NEI)

The NEI has a liberal humane orientation. It was established as the Independent Erotic Initiative in 1990. At a congress in December 1991, it changed its name in the Czech Republic to "The Independent Initiative." Chairman: Miroslav Mitlohner. The party is running in all of the Czech Republic electoral regions.

42. Coalition of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Christian Democratic Party (KDS)

Civic Democratic Party

Like the OH, the party split from the Civic Forum in 1991. At a constituting congress in April 1991, the statutes and a program called "A Road to Prosperity" were adopted. It is a rightist party upholding realism and pragmatism. A fast economic transformation and support for private enterprise are at the center of its interests. The party also favors a common state—a federation with reasonably defined jurisdictions. Vaclav Klaus is its chairman.

Christian Democratic Party

The basis for its establishment was an unofficial and ecumenically oriented Christian group established in the mid-eighties. This group became a party in 1989. It supports rapid economic reform and a unified state administered on a territorial principle. Vaclav Benda is its chairman. The ODS-KDS coalition is active in all of the Czech Republic electoral regions.

Editorial note: The description of the parties and movements is based on their own proclaimed goals. The list portrays the situation as of 16 April.

The Central Electoral Commission has reserved the right to decide whether five political entities will participate in the elections.

Foreign Affairs Spokesman Praises FRY Stand

LD2804140792 Budapest MTI in English 1211 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, April 28 (MTI)—Hungary welcomes the new Yugoslavia's readiness to take part in the Yugoslavia peace conference in Brussels and to continue meeting the obligations undertaken by its predecessor in the UN, the CSCE and other international organizations, foreign affairs spokesman Janos Herman told the press today at a regular press briefing.

According to Herman's report, Belgrade's Ambassador in Hungary Rudi Sova handed a memorandum to Hungarian foreign ministry officials on Monday. The memorandum informs Hungary that the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will continue holding the rights and meeting the obligations of its predecessor and will respect the autonomy of the other south Slav republics.

Answering a question, Herman said Hungary's ambassador in Belgrade did not attend the new republic's declaration ceremony because of the many unclarified circumstances, including the issue of succession, and because Belgrade's troops are still carrying out military action on other countries, territory.

A document adopted by the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (DCVH) on Saturday also seeks a peaceful settlement to the Yugoslav conflict. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry views the document's autonomy concept as a modern, constructive idea and proposes the Yugoslavia peace conference minority affairs commission to take it as a basis for discussion.

Hungary's interests require peace along the southern borders, that south Slav states settle their conflicts and that the country maintain balanced, good-neighbourly ties with Serbia. To achieve these aims, it is indispensable to guarantee full rights to minorities living there.

A clause on rights guaranteed to the German minority in Romania within a recently signed German-Romanian treaty is expected to benefit Hungarian-Romanian relations as well, Herman said.

In a three-day series of Hungarian-Romanian talks starting here today, the sides plan to work out an inter-governmental agreement on a mutual return of citizens violating the other's border and staying there illegally.

In another development, Hungary established diplomatic ties with the eighth CIS member, the Kyrgyz Republic.

Answering a question about German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's resignation, Herman said, "very few people had an understanding of Europe like he had, and very few people receive the understanding from Europe he received."

Genscher's resignation, however he added, is not expected to affect German-Hungarian ties.

Enforcement of UN Resolutions on Yugoslavia Urged

LD2904091492 Budapest MTI in English 0712 GMT 29 Apr 92

[Text] New York, April 29 (MTI)—Contributing to the Tuesday session of the UN Security Council which dealt with experience in the UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia, Hungarian Ambassador Andre Erdos emphatically urged the resolutions of the world organization to be enforced. On Wednesday, the Security Council is to discuss a French proposal for sending delegates to the region to examine the chance of stationing UN troops in Bosnia.

The UN resolution that refugees should be allowed to return to their homes should be enforced, the Hungarian ambassador said. The forceful relocations and attempts at changing the ethnic composition of the population are unacceptable, he said.

On Tuesday, the ambassador called attention to a recent statement of the new Yugoslav confederation, in which Belgrade declared that it would "assume the former Yugoslavia's rights and duties concerning Krajina." Since the area, now under UN control, has been occupied from Croatia, the statement reflects that Serbia does not recognize Croatia's territorial integrity, the Hungarian diplomat said.

Committee To Examine Environmental Issues of Dam

LD2704213992 Budapest MTI in English 1701 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, April 27 (MTI)—European leaders agree with a Hungarian proposal to create a trilateral committee to examine environmental concerns of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydropower dam system, Hungarian minister in charge of the dam told parliament today.

Madl said Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, French President Francois Mitterand, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and EC Commission President Frans Andriessen agreed to the suggestion.

However the leaders said that Czechoslovakia and Hungary should refrain from unilateral action during the six-month investigation by the Czechoslovak-EC-Hungarian committee.

The EC commission said they will head the committee if the two sides jointly request it and refrain from unilateral action during that time.

Last week, however, Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa refused to suspend construction of the power plant. Czechoslovakia plans on implementing version 'C' which will rechannel the Danube River by October.

Madl asked parliament to form a committee for addressing earlier resolutions on the issue.

New Border-Crossing Stations To Open

AU2704123892 Budapest MTI in English 1133 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, 24 April (MTI)—In its Thursday session, the Hungarian Government decided that this year Hungary would open eleven border-crossing points along its borders with Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Czechoslovakia, and apply for a $100 million World Bank loan to develop its market of consumer articles, government spokesman Balazs Laszlo told the press on Friday morning.

According to the World Tourism Organization (WTO), Hungary is the fifth biggest recipient country in the world. The existing border stations, however, are unable to cope with this traffic, and new border crossing-points should also be opened towards the new republics that emerged along Hungary's southern border. This is why the government worked out a scheme for the construction of new border stations, first of all along the motorways.

This year, the following eleven border stations are to open:

Slovenia:

Felsoszolnok—Martinje: for passers-by and cyclists of the two countries,

Tornyiszentmiklos—Pince: for the two countries' citizens,

Croatia:

Beremend—Baranjska Petrovo Selo: for citizens and, to a limited extent, trucks of the two countries,

Serbia:

Tiszasziget—Dala: for the two countries' citizens,

Romania:

Mehkerek—Salonta: citizens of the two countries,

Battonya—Turnu: citizens of the two countries,

Czechoslovakia:

Letkes—Salka: citizens of the two countries,

Pacin—Velki Kamen: citizens of the two countries,

Satoraljaujhely—Slovenske Nove Mesto: passers-by and cyclists of the two countries,

Ukraine:

Lonya—Zvonkojo: citizens of the two countries,

Barabas—Koszini: citizens of the two countries.

The government spokesman added that under the scheme in 1993 Hungary would open another five border-crossing points, and continue the modernization of the its border stations.

'Positive' Outlook on Free Trade With Turkey

LD2804090592 Budapest MTI in English 0718 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, April 28 (MTI)—Hungary is considering a Turkish proposal for free trade between the two countries, and the outlook is positive, Peter Balas, a senior official of the Hungarian Ministry of International Economic Relations (MIER), told MTI.

The proposal was made during the visit to Ankara of Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky in January this year.

The ministry is considering the agreement proposed by Ankara, but no conclusion is likely in the first half of this year, Balas said. The official denied the information stemming from Ankara that Czechoslovakia and Turkey would sign a free trade agreement as early as in May. Although the issue was raised when Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland founded the Central European Cooperation Committee in Budapest on April 17, neither the Czechoslovak nor the Polish side indicated that they would soon conclude a free trade agreement with Turkey, Balas said.

The three countries are scheduled to conclude a Central European free trade agreement in the middle of 1992. A similar agreement with the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries may be signed late this year. With the association agreement concluded with the European Community entering into force in March, a free trade zone comprising almost the whole continent would emerge. Turkey, however, is not affiliated to any integration organization, so a separate free trade agreement with it would be beneficial to both countries.

Prime Minister Antall Speaks at MDF Forum

AU2804123792 Budapest MTI in English 1817 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest 24 Apr (MTI)—"The Hungarian Democratic Forum has, since 1989, embodied traditional Hungarian centre policies, and has never detoured from this path", Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), stressed at a reception hosted in Budapest on Friday by the HDF presidium for foreign correspondents accredited to Hungary.

Antall evaluated the past two years of his government. He stressed he is extremely aware of the serious difficulties, and that not everything has been successfully solved in the course of transformation.

Among the results achieved in home policy, Antall mentioned that in spite of all the "tribal debates", party structures have been strengthened, and fundamental laws pertaining to the state and political spheres, as well as the greater part of those laws governing the economic and financial spheres have been passed. Antall mentioned the results attained in privatization and the building up of foreign currency reserves, however, he

also noted that the budget revenues had not developed according to the extent desired.

In answer to a question, Antall said: This is not a uniquely Hungarian problem, and we shall find a suitable solution to it.

Discussing the relation between the HDF and the press, Antall stressed his party did not, and does not, have any sort of hostile feeling towards the press.

Antall on Need for 'Firmness' in Democracy

LD2604220892 Budapest MTI in English 1907 GMT 25 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, April 25 (MTI)—Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), stressed the need for a firmness in parliamentary democracy, in a speech made at the national meeting of local presidents of the HDF, held in Budapest on Saturday.

Analyzing the past two years of the governing party, Antall appreciated the importance of having been able to create a national centre with the historical parties at the start of the change in system, thus the representatives of the former state party were ousted from government once and for all.

"The national, liberal and Christian democratic tendencies of the HDF together made it a majority, ruling party. Therefore, those who wish to bring one tendency to the foreground are undermining the strength of the HDF. We must open up towards people who show sympathy for us, and we must win over the wide groups of the Hungarian professionals, the employees and the entrepreneurs. We must begin to create a firm and open HDF that rests on principled bases," HDF President Antall stressed.

Antall also evaluated the demonstration that was organized in Budapest on Saturday by Jozsef Torgyan, president of the Independent Smallholders' Party. Antall said the surfacing of dissatisfaction among the average people, who genuinely feel the difficulties of transformation is natural, and their manifestation of this should not be taken in the wrong sense. The same applies with respect to the participation of the elderly people, who joined the demonstration in view of their bonds for their lost properties. Responsibility falls on those politicians who are familiar with the government's possibilities for action, and its activity, yet use the people for demagogical aims, said Jozsef Antall.

Finance Minister on Deficit, Loan Prospects

LD2804124192 Budapest MTI in English 0958 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, April 28 (MTI)—Hungarian Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa and the President of the National Bank of Hungary Peter Akos Bod yesterday signed an agreement on a 200 million U.S. dollars [USD] World Bank loan for privatization and the restructuring of the economy. Kupa and Bod are currently in Washington for the regular meeting of the World Bank and the IMF.

The loan has a grace period of five years, and maturity of 15 years. The interest rate is variable, and will be regularly adjusted to the World Bank lending rate which is currently 7.25 per cent.

Other forthcoming agreements are a 100 million USD loan for the development of the Hungarian market, and one for the development of the Hungarian banking and financial system.

In a press statement Finance Minister Kupa admitted that an excessive budget deficit would have adverse affects, especially on the chances of securing further foreign loans.

He said that this danger would not materialise if the budget deficit remained below 5 per cent of the GDP [gross domestic product] (Hungary's GDP last year was 2,350 billion forints). Kupa added that the central budget deficit would probably work out at 3.5-4 per cent of the GDP this year, as against the originally planned 1.9 per cent.

Statistics Show Decrease in Industrial Output

AU2404155292 Budapest MTI in English 1207 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, 23 April (MTI-ECONEWS)—Hungary's industrial production was 25.5 percent lower in the first two months of this year than in the same period a year earlier, according to the latest and most complete Central Statistical Office report.

Large industrial companies currently have 45 percent fewer orders from the domestic market for the first quarter of this year than a year ago. Orders from foreign markets are 55 percent down for the same period.

Details are to be published later this week.

Politicians Question Walesa's Stand on Communists

AU2904153892 Warsaw NOWY SWIAT in Polish 23 Apr 92 p 2

["PG" report: "Why All The President's Bows Toward Communists?"]

[Text] Lech Walesa's reinstatement of the "thick line" policy, his contacts with the All-Polish Trade Union Accord [OPZZ], and his promotion of people linked to the communist system such as Piotr Kolodziejczyk on the one hand and, on the other hand, his demand for the dismissal of Defense Minister Parys and his talk of a "suspension of democracy" and threat of leading the people should the need arise have made us wonder what the motives behind such a conduct are. Therefore, we asked politicians to tell us what they think is happening to the president.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski (Center Accord leader): According to Lech Walesa, the postcommunist forces are still in power, and the president has always wanted to be backed by a genuine, not fictitious, balance of forces, a balance which, by the way, he viewed on a world scale. That was his view after 13 December 1981. For him, Poland is a place where various interests, primarily Russian and American ones, clash with each other. Lech Walesa has perceived this in all its brutal clarity, without any intelligentsia reserve, and without any historical hindsight. People burdened with knowledge and a feeling of tradition have a somewhat distorted view of reality, but these two factors have never burdened Walesa. Thanks to his psychology, he has been able to acquaint himself with situations faster. He never wanted any revolutionary changes, especially because he could see that things were heading in the right direction and that the Soviet Union was collapsing. He also saw domestic matters very clearly, such as the weakness of the workers and the uncertainty of the politicians.

Lech Walesa came to the conclusion relatively quickly that the communist set-up was strong. However, the last elections convinced him that the former opposition is weak. He drew conclusions from this. He decided on continuation rather than a breakthrough. That is why Jan Krzysztof Bielecki appeared on the political scene. Later, when Walesa realized his authority was weak and that most of his political entourage was taking his ideas seriously, especially the idea of decommunization, he concluded that one must also establish relations with the communist politicans instead of antagonizing them.

Stefan Niesiolowski (chairman of the Parliamentary Club of the Christian-National Union): I do not think the president is supporting the communists. That is an observation taken out of context. There are many other statements and actions by the president in which he emphasizes the need for political pluralism, for example before the elections. To say that he supports the communists seems to me to be based on a rather biased analysis, and not a very appropriate one at that.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke (chairman of the Union of Real Politics): I think Mr. Walesa is displaying his own instict, as usual. He senses that the political balance is being upset to the disadvantage of the left wing, which I think is true. One sign of this upset balance is the fact that so-called communists have been blamed for all the wrongdoing in the recent past. Therefore the president is trying to strengthen his standing among the left wing, which, by the way, is not proving too successful.

However, the president's commitments, such as the ones concluded at the roundtable talks, are a different matter, something we do not know about. The information trickling through to politicians may suggest that there is a certain amount of influence by the secret services on Mr. Walesa, but the probability of that is not very great. He has displayed resilience to that kind of pressure and situation several times. Yet another matter is who out of the president's immediate entourage has influence on the president, and what kind of influence. I have in mind Mr. Mieczyslaw Wachowski in particular.

Walesa To Make Files on Parys Case Available

LD2604221192 Warsaw PAP in English 2007 GMT 26 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 26—President Lech Walesa announced that he would make all files of his chancellery, the office of national security, and personal files of ministers Mieczyslaw Wachowski and Jerzy Milewski available to the Sejm committee investigating the case of Defense Minister Jan Parys, who claimed a few weeks ago that certain politicians were trying to use the Army for "political games."

The announcement came in a statement made tonight for the Panorama TV news bulletin.

Walesa added he was himself ready to testify before the committee.

"Order must reign in this country, every person must obey the law and democracy. The president wants to be the first to demonstrate this," Walesa said.

He said he had no doubts about the impartiality of the Sejm committee appointed on Saturday [25 April].

Earlier the prime minister appointed a special government committee to investigate the Parys case, but Walesa claimed that this committee was directly involved in the case and as such could not be impartial. "When the prime minister identified himself with the minister's mistakes, it means that he is involved and cannot handle it," Walesa said.

Officials Speak on Defense Minister Affair

AU2704065292 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 17 Apr 92 pp 2, 3

[Interviews with Piotr Wierzbicki, editor of NOWY SWIAT; Zdzislaw Najder, chief of the prime minister's

team of advisors; Czeslaw Bielecki, editor of the former REDUTA Army daily; Andrzej Drzycimski, presidential spokesman; Bronislaw Komorowski, former defense vice minister; Jerzy Milewski, chief of the Office of National Security; Interior Minister Antoni Macierewicz; Jerzy Giedroyc, editor of KULTURA; Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, and Defense Minister Jan Parys; by a group of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC staffers; place and date not given: "Would it Have Been Better if Minister Parys had Stayed Quiet?"]

[Text] Piotr Wierzbicki, editor in chief of NOWY SWIAT:

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Yours is the only paper that writes about the danger of a coup d'etat. Is yours the only paper to tell the truth, while others are silent? Perhaps you are just looking for a sensation?

[Wierzbicki] Following Jan Parys's statements we received information about a draft document on martial law produced by the Office of National Security. It is not the production of such a document that alarmed me, for every country has such plans in case of a threat. What made me view this plan with alarm was the things that President Walesa has said over the past two months. He has said several times that he is considering a temporary suspension of democracy, in other words a temporary suspension of Parliament. I heard him say so with my own ears. Such a thing could only succeed with the use of force. Therefore, the president revealed a course of action, admittedly one possible course of action out of many, that is totally unacceptable. Solidarity was not created to see this kind of thing happening. The state has the right to defend itself. I would like to be certain that the communists of yesterday or today will never be involved in such an operation, but after my contacts with Minister Wachowski I am not certain.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Does this document come from reliable sources?

[Wierzbicki] No one, not even Jerzy Milewski, has denied that the martial law plan is genuine. The only question that was raised is whether or not the plan was produced by the Office of National Security, and whether or not it is meant to be the subject of further debate.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What do you think of the fact that the press kept quiet about this?

[Wierzbicki] I am not surprised, after all, most of the papers are in fact post-communist. Parys undertook a bold operation in order to decommunize the Army, therefore he is an enemy of the old order. But GAZETA WYBORCZA considers decommunization to be a danger to Poland and an obstacle along the road to Europe, therefore it has presented him as an irresponsible minister who ought to be replaced. That is also why Adam Michnik, normally so sensitive to democracy, is quiet. I think he is making a mistake. If a coup d'etat were to take place, he too would be silenced.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] You used to be an avid supporter of Walesa, but today you are warning of a coup. Is this not the end of a certain road?

[Wierzbicki] I have not lost faith in Walesa. I view a coup just like Walesa does, one of several possible scenarios. One can call it a rescue measure, just like Walesa does. I hope my newspaper's activity will enable the president to give up these unfortunate ideas. It is also wrong to say that Walesa's entourage has influenced him. Wachowski found himself by Walesa's side only when Walesa had found a place for him. I hope Walesa abandons his present role and gets rid of Wachowski as well.

Zdzislaw Najder, head of the prime minister's team of advisers:

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What have you to say about the Parys affair?

[Najder] I am surprised. Neither the press nor the politicians have made a sufficient effort to establish exactly what Minister Parys said. The confusion started with the 13 April evening "Panorama" news program, which cited words that Minister Parys had never uttered.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] You mean the claims made by "Panorama" that there was an attempt to stage a coup d'etat?

[Najder] And overthrow democracy. After that, the editor in chief of a serious newspaper, RZECZPOSPOLITA, issued a judgment against Minister Parys without checking whether the words attributed to him were actually spoken by him.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Nevertheless, Minister Parys's enunciations may have raised emotions?

[Najder] I do not think anyone thinks Minister Parys should have kept his observations to himself, even if he did observe irregularities. Sometimes it seems as if journalists are not eager to establish whether or not someone is telling the truth. Now people are complaining that Minister Parys's enunciations have caused political turmoil.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Deputy Onyszkiewicz thinks his enunciations may harm Poland's credibility.

[Najder] On the contrary, it is better to speak the truth.

Czeslaw Bielecki, member of Accord Above Divisions, editor of the REDUTA army newspaper during martial law:

Jan Parys is one of the most capable ministers in Jan Olszewski's government. Under the Mazowiecki government he built up the Central Planning Office's military department, so he is acquainted with the economic problems that lie within the defense minister's scope. In a word, Defense Minister Parys is the right man in the right place.

On the other hand, I think employees of the Presidential Chancellery have misinterpreted the role of the head of the Armed Forces. Only the defense minister makes direct decisions about the Army. It is worth quoting an example from the Second Republic. Marshal Pilsudski, wishing to have direct control over the Army, assumed the post of chief inspector of training. By so doing he moved lower down in the hierarchy, but in his new position he had greater influence over the Army.

It is very bad that civilians who were defense vice ministers until recently—Komorowski and Onyszkiewicz—have involved themselves in a political dispute. Their enunciations were dictated by a political power game, not by the country's defense considerations.

Andrzej Drzycimski, presidential spokesman:

Let us not scorn constitutional matters. The Constitution and the law on compulsory military service clearly state that the president has an instrument at his disposal in the shape of the Office of National Security. This institution, attached to the president, is headed by an official who executes the president's commands. In this connection, if the president wants to meet an officer or soldier, he may do so personally, as head of the Armed Forces, or via a person representing him. Such a person, representing the president in contacts with the Army, is Minister Jerzy Milewski. I could also be such a person. Let me stress that the president has the constitutional duty to maintain contact with the Army. I do not want to delve into personnel matters. I think it is a lack of legal precision that has brought about the present confusion. One should also remember that it is thanks to President Walesa that Mr. Parys became defense minister.

Bronislaw Komorowski, former vice minister of national defense:

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] You were vice minister of national defense for two years. What would be your reaction if the prime minister or president spoke to one of your proteges behind your back?

[Komorowski] That is a hypothetical situation. Nothing like that ever happened when I was vice minister. Neither Mazowiecki, nor Bielecki, nor people in the Presidential Chancellery ever did anything like that.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What do you think of the Office of National Security's plans concerning martial law?

[Komorowski] It is the Office's duty to draw up such a document. It was irresponsible, to say the least, for NOWY SWIAT to publish it without providing evidence of any actual intention of introducing martial law.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] If Minister Parys were to be dismissed and the government reformed, would you accept the post of defense minister?

[Komorowski] That would depend on many factors, and right now it is out of the question. I am quite happy as Sejm deputy for the time being, and despite the fact that I have been drawn into this strange business, I am trying to continue my series of meetings with Polish Army cadres. Yesterday I was in Pila, and today I am visiting a unit in Zegrze. The main topic of these meetings, but not the only one, is the law on pensions. It is the soldiers themselves who invite me, and I hope they will not give NOWY SWIAT any excuse to claim that I am preparing another offensive on Kaunas or Kiev.

Jerzy Milewski, chief of the Office of National Security:

According to the present Constitution, the Polish president is the chief of the Armed Forces and chairman of the National Security Council, otherwise known as the National Defense Committee, which is the competent body in matters of defense and state security. This places on the president an enormous amount of responsibility for the Armed Forces and national security. Unfortunately, the legislation fails to define the president's executive powers that would enable him to exert influence on the matters for which he is responsible. Therefore there is an urgent need to define the powers of the president, as well as of Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and National Security Council in matters of defense and state security. The new constitution must contain a definition of these powers. I also think the president should be made supreme commander of all forces. For this purpose it is necessary to expand his powers concerning military personnel, organization, and training. In these matters, the chief of the General Staff should be answerable to the president. On the other hand, a civilian defense minister, answerable to the prime minister, should control the life of the Army, plan its development, supervise material supplies, and pursue general defense policy in peacetime. The minister should consult both the prime minister and the president before making important decisions.

Antoni Macierewicz, interior minister:

I think this affair has been blown out of all proportion to its significance.

Jerzy Giedroyc, editor of KULTURA:

Minister Jan Parys was the first civilian minister of national defense. He commenced the implementation of reforms and personnel changes very energetically. There is no doubt that many of these reforms were necessary and justified, but they have been implemented in a tactless and thoughtless manner, and that is what has caused the disputes and aggravation. Apart from that, they were never discussed beforehand with the president, or even with the prime minister who, engrossed in the complicated situation of his government, based on very shaky party coalitions, shunned concrete decisions in the expectation that time itself would resolve the issue. And now the affair of alleged attempts to use the Army for political purposes or even for a coup d'etat has erupted. Minister Parys voiced these accusations at his news conference, at which he aimed, in an ambiguous manner, very general accusations against people close to the

president. His remarks were not agreed with anyone beforehand. But the prime minister, instead of resolving the issue at once and drawing the necessary conclusion, i.e. either investigating the minister's accusations or dismissing him from office, gave him two weeks' leave, said he would appoint a committee to investigate the affair, and went off to the United States. In the meantime, Defense Vice Minister Radek Sikorski is trying to raise this issue to an international level in Rome. All this makes the authorities look extremely irresponsible. These people do not realize that affairs like this undermine the world's confidence in Poland and make our country look like some South American republic.

Prime Minister Jan Olszewski:

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Why did you shun Minister Jan Parys's revelations?

[Olszewski] I value Jan Parys very highly for his dedicated work in the Defense Ministry and in his service for Poland, the kind of service that I and anyone else not oppressed with the psychological heritage of communism understand. I am sure that if Minister Parys considered it justified to issue the General Staff with such a stern warning about the actions of certain politicians, he must have had reasons to do so. What I am concerned about is the fact that he did this in the presence of television reporters, as a result of which the matter has been inflated and some papers have presented it as a preparation for a coup d'etat. This is a so-called press story, having little in common with what Jan Parys actually said.

Because of all the clamor caused by this issue, I asked Minister Parys to take a vacation, and at the same time I appointed a special committee, which includes the chairmen of the Sejm and Senate Defense Committees, to investigate all the circumstances. The committee's findings will be made public as far as military secrets permit.

Nevertheless I can already say that the total ambiguity of the powers of the Office of National Security, which is a part of the Presidential Chancellery, and its attitude toward the tasks and powers of the Defense Ministry leadership, will cause certain difficulties in resolving the affair. I think it is necessary to resolve this issue quickly by means of suitable legislation.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Is Minister Parys's probable dismissal the price to be paid in order to settle the conflict between the government and Belvedere?

[Olszewski] That is just speculation. There are no conflicts. There are difficult talks sometimes, but that is an entirely different matter. If there were any conflicts, the dismissal of this or that minister would not make much difference.

Minister Parys is on vacation, and until the committee has completed its work, the minister's deputy is in charge of the Defense Ministry. Jan Parys has loyally placed his post at my disposal, but I will reach a final decision only when I have received the committee's report.

Defense Minister Jan Parys:

In consideration of the commencement of work by the Sejm committee appointed by the prime minister, I will refrain from making any statements to the press until the committee has completed its work.

Parys To Return to Work by 'End of This Month'

LD2804203392 Warsaw PAP in English 1934 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 28—Minister of National Defence Jan Parys will return to work from his vacation by the end of this month, head of the Council of Ministers Office (URM) Wojciech Wlodarczyk announced on Tuesday [28 April].

Parys was given a fortnight leave by Prime Minister Jan Olszewski on April 7 following his public announcement that some politicians were trying to use the Army for political games to "overthrow democracy in Poland." It is believed that the report of the governmental commission did not confirm any attempt to abolish democracy.

The report of the special governmental commission on the results of its investigation into the case of Parys was to have been published on Tuesday. Asked about more details Wlodarczyk, who was heading the commission, said that his commission was limited by the fact that it was a governmental one.

"We could not talk to Sejm (lower house) deputies or officials from the president's office," Wlodarczyk claimed and said that the parliamentary commission to investigate the Parys case, set at the request of the president, has such powers.

Chairman of the Sejm commission for the Parys case Deputy Aleksander Bentkowski announced, according to Wlodarczyk, that he was going to get acquainted with the report of the government team before setting directions for further action.

Wlodarczyk said Premier Olszewski read the report of his commission very carefully.

Solidarity Demonstrators Meet Olszewski, Walesa

LD2404223792 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Excerpts] Tens of thousands of demonstrators marched through the center of Warsaw today. The demonstration was organized by the Agreement of the Enterprise's Committees of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union [NSZZ] Solidarity, the so-called Net [Siec]. The demonstration was led by Marian Krzaklewski, chairman of the National Board of Solidarity, and also by Maciej Jankowski, chairman of Mazowsze Region.

The organizers of the demonstration claim that it was not strictly a political demonstration but primarily an economic one. The main demands of the protesters are: a solution to the problems of the mutual debts of enterprises; the elaboration and presentation of a clear industrial policy; reform of the banking system; implementation of election promises; and the inclusion of human and civil rights articles in the new constitution. Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski was among those who spoke at the beginning of the demonstration. [passage omitted]

The demonstration then moved toward the Council of Ministers building where Prime Minster Jan Olszewski received the demonstrators. The prime minister was given the demands prepared by the organizers of the demonstration and he promised a meeting with Solidarity's delegation on 4 May.

President Lech Walesa met with the demonstrators in front of the Belvedere Palace.

[Begin Walesa recording] I want to take part on your side in all negotiations, to see what happens with your just demands. So encourage me, I am on your side. I want to fulfill everything. I am too weak because I do not feel you behind me. In a word, I do not feel you. That is why in our talks on these demands to which I can put my name I will keep an eye, so that you will not be fooled, so that the demands will be implemented. I wish to apologize to you, I wish to apologize that it takes so long, but if each of you were in my position I wonder if you could show better results. I welcome you. My chair is vacant, I will give it away any time. [loud cheers in the background] I did not come here to make a fortune; I came to serve you and I will never forget that. [end recording]

Solidarity Members Stage Wloclawek Demonstration

LD2504031992 Warsaw PAP in English 2349 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 24—The inter-factory strike committee in Wloclawek (central Poland), which had started four days ago a sit-in in the city townhall, announced Friday [24 April] afternoon that no committment was made on its part concerning the protesters leaving the building. Head of the office of the Council of Ministers Wojciech Wlodarczyk admitted Friday he had been considering crushing the strike by force but relinquished the idea after the protesters promised on Thursday [23 April] to stop their strike. Wlodarczyk added he was also told not to use force in dispersing protesters after a Thursday phone conversation between Prime Minister Jan Olszewski and Solidarity Union Chairman Marian Krzaklewski who promised to help to end the strike.

Meanwhile, a demonstration of members of the Solidarity 80 union marched on Friday through Wloclawek downtown carrying a coffin as a symbol of "the dying Polish industry and agriculture." The protesters handed over to the governor of the province a petition in which they demanded the authorities to counteract the unemployment, degradation of industry and agriculture, decay of both the education and health care systems and dismissals of the provincial authorities. The demonstration was also attended by representatives of the OPZZ, Committee for Defence of Unemployed and Deputies from the Democratic Left Alliance.

Party Leaders Form Small Coalition Council

LD2604173792 Warsaw PAP in English 1609 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 24—Tadeusz Mazowiecki of the Democratic Union (UD), Donald Tusk of the Liberal Democrats (KLD) and Tomasz Bankowski of the Polish Economic Programme (PPG) who met in the Sejm building on Friday [24 April] resolved to set up a joint council of the three parties they are leaders of.

They acknowledged that their coalition is a solid fact. The council's task will be to coordinate the activities of the parties and their parliamentary floor groups.

Leader of KLD Donald Tusk ruled out the possibility of having any more talks on the re-shuffle of the Jan Olszewski's cabinet. He also said that the small coalition parties do not reject an idea of holding talks with the political parties "which—taking into account their several-week efforts—are worth talking with".

Tusk blamed Jan Olszewski's unwillingness to accomplish coalition talks for the fiasco of grand coalition negotiations. "The small coalition does not intend to overthrow his government. I think, Premier Olszewski himself has done enough to undermine his own position," the KLD leader said.

Asked about the chances of resuming talks on the grand coalition, UD leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki said that the issue... is over".

Leader of the Centre Alliance Party (PC) Jaroslaw Kaczynski told REUTER's on Friday that a strong government supported by a strong coalition has to be formed. He voiced his concern over the fiasco of the grand coalition talks.

Geremek Meets Press on Prime Minister's Speech

LD2504031192 Warsaw PAP in English 2330 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 24—Chairman of the Democratic Union parliamentary floor group Bronislaw Geremek said, at a press conference held in the Sejm on Friday [24 April], that controversies that came up during the negotiations on formation of a grand coalition did not deal with the division of posts, however they might be perceived as such for the government members appeared to be interested only in defence of their own posts. According to Geremek, the Friday prime minister speech of "aggressive" and accusatory character was one of the

main causes of the impasse in the Sejm work on the constitutional tribunal verdicts and made deeper the hiatus between the Parliament and the government. In Geremek's opinion, only the small coalition might turn to be the base for a pro-reform faction, which would be able to gain the majority in the Parliament and to give the origin to a strong political arrangement. "Such a pro-reform coalition should be formed in cooperation with the president", he added. Making critical remarks on the Friday demonstration staged in front of the Sejm building, Geremek emphasized that every social movement which finds street demonstration the best solution is admitting his weakness.

Balazs Stresses Stable Majority Coalition in Sejm

LD2504004792 Warsaw PAP in English 2223 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 24—Minister Without Portfolio Artur Balazs, responsible for contacts between the government and political organizations, offered Friday [24 April] his resignation to Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, announced Minister Balazs's press spokesman Krzysztof Oksiuta. "Minister Balazs motivated his decision by essential differences in opinion that have recently appeared between him and the premier over the issues related to the attempted broadening of the government and Parliament coalition and the government reshuffle", said Krzysztof Oksiuta. "Minister Balazs treats this resignation as a private decision taken after notifying the leadership of the Polish Peasant Party-Solidarity to which he belongs", added the minister's spokesman. Minister Balazs told the newsmen that he did not see any possibility of the government's functioning without a stable majority coalition in the Sejm. Asked whether he was satisfied with his several months' work in the government, Balazs said that "the final effect was a proof that he could not be satisfied with what he had done as the government and parliamentary coalition failed to be formed."

Compromise Bill on Constitution Presented to Sejm

LD2404213992 Warsaw PAP in English 1232 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 23—A bill on the procedure of drafting and adopting Poland's new constitution is a compromise between postulates of Sejm deputies and the president, Deputy Hanna Suchocka of the Democratic Union stressed presenting it in the Sejm Thursday [23 April] in the presence of President Lech Walesa.

The bill, prepared by the Sejm Legislative Committee states that a draft of the new constitution should be adopted by the National Assembly (the Sejm and the Senate) and next be ratified in a nationwide referendum. Thus, the fate of the new constitution would be decided by the majority of people taking part in the vote.

The draft of the new constitution would be prepared by the National Assembly's Constitutional Committee, to be made up of Sejm deputies and senators while representatives of the president, the government and the constitutional tribunal would be entitled to forward motions.

The drafts should be submitted to the constitutional committee within six months of its establishment. They can be submitted by the president, fifty-six members of the National Assembly or the Committee itself, the bill on the procedure of drafting a new constitition proposes.

Projected Parliamentary Election Code Discussed

AU2704090792 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 21 Apr 92 p 2

[Jan Forowicz report: "What Nowotarski Proposes"]

[Text] A draft parliamentary election code, produced by Bartlomiej Nowotarski, a legal expert in the Democratic Union Parliamentary Club, and adopted by the firm majority of the deputies in this Club, calls for a mixed system of electing deputies. The code governing the last elections provided a system of proportional representation, with a so-called national supplementary list, whereas the new code would provide a combination of the simple majority and proportional representation systems.

In a Sejm consisting of 360 deputies, 115 would be elected in single-seat constituencies by a simple majority of votes, and the remaining 345 would be elected according to the proportional system. This means that each voter would cast two votes to the Sejm, one for a particular candidate according to the simple majority system, and one for a particular party, on a party list. Here, the order of candidates on the list would be determined by the party, so that the party would decide which candidate acquires the seat.

Only those election committees whose lists of candidates achieve at least 5 percent of overall votes would take part in the distribution of seats.

On ballot papers in election districts (simple majority system), we would put an X next to whosee name we think is the best candidate. The ballot papers in regions (proportional representation system), would be different from the ones at the last election. They would merely list parties, and we would put an X next to the name of the party we are voting for.

The country would be divided into 115 constituencies, each of which would return one deputy to the Sejm, and several dozen regions, each of which would return between eight and 15 deputies from the parties with the largest number of votes.

Minister Signs Religious Instruction Decree

AU2704080092 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Apr 92 pp 1, 2

["idx, md"-signed report: "Instruction in Religion, Ethics in Public Schools"]

[Excerpt] On 14 April Minister of National Education Andrzej Stelmachowski signed a decree on organizing religious instruction in public schools. The document was prepared in consultation with representatives of 13 churches and religious associations. Representatives of 10 churches agreed on the text of a prayer that is to be recited by pupils before and after their classes.

Tadeusz Pilch, deputy minister of national education, said: "I think that teachers of religion will be wise enough to propagate the principle of tolerance. If that were not the case, I would be very disappointed and convinced that what the ministry had done was not completely correct."

The Ministry of Education believes that it is in a position to protect pupils from intolerance. The ministry is of the opinion that prayer may also be a lesson in respecting other faiths and convictions.

Deputy Minister Tadeusz Pilch told ZYCIE that "the ministry is in a position to alter several controversial points in the decree if that is what a majority wishes."

Asked whether the ministry intends to take account of protests, including the demonstration staged by students and teachers outside the Ministry of National Education on 13 April, he said that only Minister Stelmachowski could answer questions that are as specific as that.

Privately, ministry officials are unsure about the minister's decision was right, but they have been stressing that they cannot speak out against the minister.

"I would not get involved in a battle over grades being included on performance reports, but there are people who wanted their inclusion," said Pilch, adding that the appearance of religion-ethics on performance reports (it will come second after conduct) is only "a gesture of respect toward the pre-war tradition."

Within the ministry itself, there are differences of opinion about the age at which children can begin to be taught ethics.

Miroslaw Sawicki, director of the General Education Department, believes that children should first have acquired some experience of life. So, classes in this subject should begin in the eighth grade or in secondary schools, which would be even better. On the other hand, Deputy Minister Pilch believes that charges that ethics classes for younger pupils could be a way of indoctrinating children are demagogic. Parents, above all, shape their children's world outlook from the time of their birth.

The ministry still cannot give a precise figure for the cost of introducing ethics in schools. That is a question of the number children that will wish to attend the classes in September. Pilch estimates that it will cost about 1 percent of the ministry's budget and believes that it is worth spending that money on "shaping young people's values." [passage omitted]

Olszewski Says Farmers Union Protests Unlawful

LD2504143492 Warsaw PAP in English 1924 GMT 23 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 23—Prime Minister Jan Olszewski unequivocally assessed the protest action staged by Farmers' Samoobrona (Self-Defence) Union as unlawful, the Agriculture Ministry announced on Thursday [23 April].

The fact that these actions are unlawful rules out the possibility of normal negotiations, the ministry spokesman added.

A group of Samoobrona Farmer Unionists continued their sit-in in the building of the Agriculture Ministry ignoring immediate and systemic efforts undertaken by the ministry to bring about debt reductions for indebted farms, the spokesman complained.

The Samoobrona Union negatively assessed the draft of a law on the creation of a fund for restructuring agriculture and cancelling farmers' debts. The draft was presented to all farmers' unions and is to be examined by the council of ministers on April 28. Samoobrona leader Andrzej Lepper charged that it offered no guarantees for solving the debt problem. "Agriculture must be relieved from debt immediately, and not by long-term action," he declared.

Samoobrona intends to continue its protest action in the ministry. There are 11 persons on hunger strike among the protesters.

Agriculture Minister Addresses Protesting Farmers

LD2504010592 Warsaw PAP in English 2227 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 24—The minister of agriculture, Gabriel Janowski, told protesting farmers sitting in at his ministry that nobody could create an ideal banking or credit system for Polish agriculture in three months as the farmers were demanding. Janowski told the presidium of "Self-Defence" (a farming trade union) that a draft "Law on the Fund for Restructuring and Removing Debt From Agriculture" had been passed to the cabinet and that the ministry had done everything possible to solve the problems of agriculture. "Self-Defence" leader Andrzej Leppper said that unless there was an immediate stop to punitive financial measures being taken against indebted farmers, and unless there were credits forthcoming to renew production, the protest would continue.

Surveys Reveal Popularity of Government

AU2904154092 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 Apr 92 p 2

[Renate Wrobel report: "Reduced Trust"]

[Text] Thirty-two percent of Poles trust the Olszewski government, according to surveys. Some 33 percent actually approve of its activity, and 46 percent do not.

Fifty percent of respondents thought the government has no chance to extricate the country out of the crisis, and 33 percent thought it does have such a chance. Never since November 1989 has there been such a pessimistic view of the ruling government's capabilities. Surveys commissioned by RZECZPOSPOLITA and carried out by the Social Survey Institute in January, February, and March all indicated that most people think the government will fall.

Even so, it is generally thought that the government has too little power. In January, over half of respondents spoke out in favor of stronger powers for the government. However, these views do not necessarily apply to the Olszewski government alone, but to the executive authorities in general, for surveys under previous prime ministers have yielded similar results.

The government's program (the provisions of socioeconomic policy must still be considered a government program, even though the Sejm has rejected them) is generally considered incapable of improving standards of living. Implementing it would not put an end to the wave of strikes, or halt unemployment, or boost the value of the zloty, say the respondents.

Only 25 percent of the respondents approved of the government's economic program, and 33 percent disapproved of it. Those who disapprove probably bear the government a grudge for abandoning the Balcerowicz plan. Let us recall that when the Olszewski government came into power, 60 percent of respondents said in a survey that they expected the new government to abandon the economic programs of previous governments.

The Olszewski government started life with worse assessments than its predecessors, especially the Mazowiecki government. However, one should remember that no other government in the past two years has functioned to the accompaniment of such negative social moods, and these moods were negative before the Olszewski government even had a chance to make an impression on people.

The figures speak for themselves. Over 60 percent of the adult population thinks that Poland's affairs are heading in the wrong direction and that society is tense and worried; over 70 percent thinks the material living conditions are bad; almost 50 percent think the political situation is bad; and from 75 to 96 percent, depending on the survey, think the economic situation is bad. A considerable proportion of respondents fear the situation could deteriorate in all spheres, and almost 70 percent think no one has any control over the development of the situation in Poland.

Sociologists claim that society's pessimism has increased three-fold since January last year. With such low indicators, the slow-down in the decline of moods observed in recent months does not raise hopes but merely indicates a stagnation of bad moods.

Survey Claims Television Manipulated by Communists

AU2704080692 Warsaw NOWY SWIAT in Polish 21 Apr 92 p 2

[Zbigniew Lipinski report: "The Recommunization of Television: A Report on Manipulation"]

[Text] "Television is clearly dominated by people who earned their literary laurels during the communist era and who have preserved their political preferences, and by people linked to the Security Service," concludes a "Report on the State of Television After 100 Days of the Olszewski Government" produced by the Repair and Development Movement.

This document is based on the results of a survey concerning programming policy, the credibility of information, cultural patterns, and political orientation.

The outcome of the survey confirms what Janusz Zaorski [head of radio and television] said in January about television is undergoing a recommunization, illustrated by the frequent presence on the television screen by, among others, Zygmunt Kaluzynski, Zygmunt Broniarek, Krzysztof Wojna, Krystyna Loska, and Olga Lipinska. The respondents also mentioned the frequent appearance of Kwasniewski and Miller from the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland, and also underlined the unusual preference shown toward Democratic Union politicians, especially Kuron, Geremek,and Malachowski. Programs with these people were broadcast on channels with the highest number of viewers, and were unusually long, for instance the "Tableau" program with Kuron was 90 minutes long and a film about Geremek 30 minutes long.

The respondents in the survey accuse television of political bias. First prize in this category goes to Editor Galazka of "One Hundred Questions" and Editor Maldis of "The Event of the Week." The respondents point out that "Event of the Week" is dominated by representatives of the left-wing press, from TRYBUNA to GAZETA WYBORCZA (six persons), whilst only one or two persons represent the Centrist or rightwing orientation, mainly Maciej Letowski and Stanislaw Michalkiewicz. Curent affairs programs like "News" ["Wiadomosci"), "Teleexpress" or "Panorama" also illustrate left-wing political leanings. Krzysztof Leski, who presented the latest "Wiadomosci," displays his political views in a particularly blatant manner. The respondents

also included in this category Editor Turowski's "An Hour of Openness," which some of them labeled "An Hour of Vaseline." Many respondents claimed that statements by Prime Minister Olszewski were being omitted or pushed aside in the television news, or that his statements were sometimes cut short by interlocutors, for example Witold Gadomski of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, who, in a televised talk with Olszewski, actually had the last word. Such practices were never applied when Mazowiecki or Bielecki were prime ministers.

The report discusses a manipulation of time and information. The popular "Case For a Reporter" and "Transcript" have been moved past 2200 hours. These programs are quite often "accompanied" by fine American films on the second program. The same thing was done with "Teleconference" in which Interior Minister Antoni Maciereiwcz appeared. It was screened at exactly the same time as an episode of "The Strauss Family."

Another type of manipulation discussed in the report concerns information. For example, news programs have suggested that the Holy Father took part in an anticommunist plot. On the other hand, remarks by Defense Minister Jan Parys and related events have been omitted. Criticism at home and abroad of the Balcerowicz program is also being omitted. News are presented mainly from the United States, Russia, Israel, and the Middle east, and news from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the former GDR are omitted. Television prefers news about the Democratic Union and Liberal-Democratic Congress to news about the Christian-National Union and Center Accord. The report indicates that general domestic events are pushed aside by foreign news.

The respondents noted a lack of programs of a nationalistic-patriotic nature, an absence of great Polish figures and suitable ethical standard. Instead, television broadcasts silly western films and serials, and often scoffs at patriotic and Christian values.

Nevertheless, the respondents did welcome some new programs as being compatible with the new democracy, for example Editor Walendziak's "Without Anasthetic," Semka's "Reflex," Jaworowicz's "Case for a Reporter," and Jeczymek and Zaryn's programs about decommunization.

The report concludes: "The general pattern of changes in television has been perceived as far from satisfactory, especially because one notices at every turn a manipulation of air time, an excessive coverage of left-wing politicians and groups, and maximum opportunities for these left-wing figures to air their views without any attention being given to the actual quality of the programs."

KPN Leader Warns of Russian Expansionism

LD2604194492 Warsaw PAP in English 2030 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Warsaw, April 24—Leszek Moczulski, leader of the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), warned that Ukrainian independence and with it Europes chances of averting Russian expansionism, depended on how Poland behaved.

He said that cooperation between Poland and the Ukraine was the key to European security both in geopolitical and civilisational terms.

Moczulski was giving a lecture at Warsaw University entitled "Poland and the Ukraine in the Europe of Tomorrow", which was organised by the KPN and the Polish-Ukrainian Association.

"Ukraines chances of independence depend on how Poland behaves", said Moczulski and added that "if Ukraine is taken over by Moscow, then Moscow's expansion to the West will begin. If the first dam, which is Ukraine, bursts, then the wave will overflow the West".

Daily Claims Russians Intent on Staying

AU2704081392 Warsaw NOWY SWIAT in Polish 21 Apr 92 pp 1, 2

["t"-signed report: "They Will Never Leave"]

[Text] The Russians have managed to negotiate an agreement that allows them to remain in Poland forever. Polish-Russian companies operating on privileged terms are to be established in Soviet bases. These companies can form an ideal infrastructure for sabotage and espionage operations. The Polish Foreign Ministry leadership is favorably disposed toward the interests of the Soviet Army. Minister Parys is opposed to the draft agreement.

Following the latest round of Polish-Russian talks on the withdrawal of units belonging to the Northern Group of Forces in Poland, public opinion has received a vague account of the individual points contained in the working agreement. These points indicate that Russians have succeeded in realizing the provisions of the so-called Falin plan, which envisages that Soviet Army forces will remain in Poland forever.

We have learned that Minister Parys opposed the working draft, which provides for, among other things, the formation of Polish-Russian companies using Soviet military assets on our territory. This means that Soviet military units will be transformed into enterprises. We should add that those enterprises will operate on preferential terms, which amounts to Poland paying them a contribution, the only difference being that it will do so indirectly.

As a result, Soviet officers will don suits and become entrepreneurs. General Dubynin stands every chance of becoming the Iacocca of Central Europe within a few

years. However, if the political situation changes, what could be simpler than swapping those suits for uniforms once again?

However, assuming that that kind of reversal will not occur, it does not require much effort to realize that alongside the pursuit of economic activity, the Russian companies will be to engage in espionage under almost ideal conditions. It is not difficult to predict how this will be received by Western countries and how it will impede our admission to internal structures. There is even a danger that we might remain a Russian "half-colony."

The first indication that the talks were taking an unfavorable turn for Poland was a statement by General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, Polish Government plenipotentiary for the presence and withdrawal from Poland of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces. He said that the president might not be satisfied with the outcome and it could put a question mark over the trip that the president is expected to make to Moscow, where he is meant to sign a Polish-Soviet treaty on the withdrawal of the former USSR forces from Poland. General Ostrowski denied making the statement, which does not alter the fact that he made it.

We managed to obtain the following statement from a high-ranking official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"On 26 October of last year, an agreement was concluded in Moscow that does not envisage the withdrawal of all combat units from Poland by 15 November 1992. From 16 November until the end of 1993, 6,000 troops should remain on Polish territory (their number will decline over time) and their job will be to service the transit of troops evacuating Germany. That job is a piece of propaganda fiction. Polish railroads will service the evacuation transit without any assistance from Soviet forces. In exceptional cases, a liaison group consisting of a couple, at most a couple of dozen officers would suffice. That is why I think that there are reasons other than those that have been officially given for maintaining the contingent. The presence of even a few units on the territory of a foreign state is a political fact that gives one the right to look into the affairs of that state.

"So, the question that has to be asked is whether the Russians want to withdraw at all. Currently, they control several hundred thousand hectares of Polish territory, including airfields and a naval base at Swinoujscie. Poland's raison d'etat can be summed up concisely: To control one's own territory and not pay anything for it. Right now the Foreign Ministry leadership seems to be heading in completely the opposite direction, in accordance with the stance of the Soviet Army, which is now manifesting itself as an independent political entity whose interests may be, but need not be, convergent with those of the CIS authorities.

"At the outset of talks with the Polish authorities, the aspirations of this political entity, involving the industrial-military complex of the former USSR, included two contrasting variants:

—A maximal variant, summed up in the expression "let's pull out in such a way that we can stay";

—A minimal variant, involving the payment of contributions by Poland so that the military cadres can start a new life in their own country.

"The present draft agreement marks the beginning of the implementation of a variant broader than the maximal one which the Russians initially called for. We are supposed to pay contributions in the form of tax concessions for the firms created out of military units, and the territory these units control will continue to be controlled by them. What is more, the present variant is very convenient propaganda-wise. Society might not be pleased if it were made known that we are paying the Russians several trillion zlotys as contributions, but it might accept news that we are according preferential terms to mixed enterprises. The losses to Poland would be the same in either case, but of course no one would tell society that."

Fota Meets Byelarus Official, Signs Accord

AU2804145892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1355 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/4/1992—On Tuesday, April 28, Romanian Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan received the president of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the Byelarus Republic, V.V. Radkyevich.

During the interview, showed Constantin Fota, Romanian minister of trade and tourism, who attended the interview, the current stage was surveyed of bilateral economic relations and the importance was underscored of the two documents that were signed during the visit—a long-term economic accord and a protocol on commercial exchanges in 1992. [sentence as received] In consideration of the potential of Romania and of the Byelarus Republic, sectors were identified where relations may develop, such as exchanges of commodities and consumer goods, petrochemistry and machine building.

An accord on commercial and economic relations and technical scientific cooperation between the governments of Romania and the Byelarus Republic, as well as a protocol on trade and payments in 1992 were signed in Bucharest on Tuesday, April 28.

They provide for mutual granting of the most-favored-nation clause and stipulate that payments are to be effected in convertible currency, as well as in any other form in the international commercial and baking practice, according to the contracts to be concluded by economic agents, with the application of world prices.

The two documents were signed for Romania by Constantin Fota, minister of trade and tourism, and for the Republic of Byelarus, by Vladimir Valeryanovich Radkyevich, president of the State Committee for foreign economic relations.

The guest expressed the wish of the Republic of Byelarus to develop cooperation with Romania considering that to have grown "more and more necessary" after Byelarus' exit from the USSR.

FSN Announces Stance on Stolojan Report

AU2404152492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0728 GMT 24 Apr 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 24/4/1992—The meeting between mass media representatives and the Executive Bureau of the National Salvation Front [FSN] held on Thursday, April 23 focused on the report Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan presented to the joint session of the Parliament's two chambers.

Ionel Blaga, head of the Central Control Commission of the National Salvation Front, appreciated that the measures in the report represented an indisputable necessity for the economy and reform. He specified, however, that the National Salvation Front could not make thorough appreciations because it hadn't yet had information about the future dimensions of the situation. In Mr. Blaga's opinion, a higher unemployment rate would be better than a strong inflation, bringing the argument that unemployment would affect only a part of the population while inflation would affect the entire country. Ionel Blaga said that when they had exact information about the prime minister's report they would see if it had coincidences with the "Future Today" programme of the National Salvation Front and the future attitude of the majority party would be decided.

The journalists present at the meeting asked a series of questions.

In connection with the National Salvation Front's stand on ex-King Michael's arrival in the country, Bogdan Niculescu Duvaz, secretary of the Organisational Department of the National Salvation Front, said that "there should be no opinion when persons or personalities enter or leave the country." The ex-king's first visit was made without the officials' visa, it was illegal, while now this formality has been met, too, Bogdan Niculescu Duvaz specified in conclusion.

PNT-cd's Coposu Interviewed on CD Issues

AU2704070892 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 16 Apr 92 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Corneliu Coposu, president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, by Roxana Badralexi; place and date not given: "The Convention Will Go Ahead"]

[Text] [Badralexi] Mr. Coposu, will there be another split in the Democratic Convention [CD] if the proposals of the National Liberal Party [PNL] do not take concrete shape?

[Coposu] It is a fact that this Democratic Convention was set up for the period of the local elections. However, the impact it had on public opinion convinced us that it has to continue. This is why we are promoting the prolongation of the opposition's solidarity commitment in the light of the coming general elections. I do not see why and on what basis the CD should be restructured. It is clear that the capital that has been won should not be squandered because of emotions, misunderstandings, or even ambitions. We have opted and continue to opt for the preservation of the CD. Even if it is going to be abandoned by some formations, it will go ahead and I think it will be more successful than in the local elections. As for making the Convention limited to the historic parties or re-discussing the participation conditions, so far we have taken no steps nor have we accepted any other viewpoint than the one we have voiced. Fore sure, we do not agree with the elimination from the Convention of such political formations as the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] or the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] as was suggested within the framework of restructuring this electoral alliance for the local elections.

[Badralexi] Do you believe that the PNL will withdraw if its conditions are not respected?

[Coposu] No one in the Convention is entitled to set conditions! We are a freely established alliance for a tangible purpose on which everybody agreed. Thus the setting of conditions in order to continue our cooperation can be ruled out!

[Badralexi] So, does what the liberals say, namely that the three historic parties carry the greatest weight in the Convention, lack any real basis?

[Coposu] One cannot say that the others carry less weight! For instance, the Civic Alliance enjoys great support, especially among intellectuals, while the Association of Former Political Detainees total a few hundred followers. One cannot view these political formations as being of lesser importance. As a matter of fact, I do not think that the time has come for confronting doctrines or for electoral competition between the opposition parties. I believe that at this point it is vital for the opposition to show solidarity in order to eradicate crypto-communism. We have the future ahead in which we can confront each other in front of the people and attract the public to one or the other doctrine of the various parties. This is the time to show solidarity. Therefore, I believe that it would be patriotic and pragmatic to disregard any ambitions and any subjective arguments. When things begin to normalize, there will also be room for presenting the political alternatives of each party.

[Badralexi] Do you think that this moment of crisis will be overcome?

[Coposu] I think so because the liberals are intelligent people and they realize that any departure from the alternative offered by the democratic opposition risks pushing the formations that would break away into the opposite camp. And the consequences would be devastating. Actually, they are not only intelligent but also good patriots who will place the country's interests above their own.

[Badralexi] Do you plan an immediate talk with Mr. Campeanu?

[Coposu] Sure. We are close to each other also because of our former cooperation and because of the time we spent in prison together, as well as because of our clandestine activity during communism. Therefore, we have the opportunity to examine the current situation in a relaxed and objective manner. I believe in the prolongation of the Convention's solidarity.

[Badralexi] On another line of thought, there were speculations in connection with the statement made to our paper by Mr. Ion Diaconescu on a possible cooperation—after the elections—with a certain wing of the FSN. How would you comment on this possibility?

[Coposu] Given the confusing situation Romanian society is going through, one cannot expect electoral options to determine a monolithic government based on the program of a single party. For many years to come we will probably be "punished" in having national unity governments. Certainly, these governments will be formed on the basis of a minimum platform to which those entering the competition for a kaleidoscopic government will adjust. However, one cannot announce a program that just depends on the development of events. As was expected and as I forecast as early as June 1990, the National Salvation Front [FSN] is obviously falling apart and I think that there is no stopping it. The FSN splinter formations will have the opportunity to shake off the ballast that created this formation's disastrous image at home and abroad. If these elements are removed, which are harmful to the prestige of this formation that held the majority until recently, and if the reestablishment of groups takes place in accordance with such criteria as ethics, honesty, and professional competence, then viable formations are likely to emerge from this Front, which rallied all sorts of elements. Up to its split, the FSN was not a political party, but a conglomerate of pragmatic interests. Precisely due to these interests and the very doubtful conditions under which the Front was set up, unqualified people reached the very top of this formation, lending it the deplorable image I was talking about. For the time being, however, the question of post-electoral alliances is not being posed. The problem of clarifications within both the CD and the FSN is what is in question now. The possibility for government alliances can be discussed only after the elections.

[Badralexi] If you were a fortune-teller, would you think that cooperation between your party and a reformed wing of the Front, the one led by Roman, for instance, would be possible?

[Coposu] First, I do not yet note any reforming wing. Second, this would have nothing to do with predictions, but rather with guesswork. None of the formulas can be eliminated, but this is a question that will be decided by the future. Our objectives are clear: to eradicate crypto-communism and start to normalize public activity on the basis of democratic concepts.

Magureanu Comments on Accusations, SRI

AU2804085392 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 23 Apr 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, by Ralu Filip; place and date not given: "A Moral Therapy Is Necessary"]

[Text] [Filip] In a previous interview you said you had not been a Securitate [former Romanian secret police] officer. Yet, press published your file later, according to which you were a captain of the Foreign Information Department [DIE] for several months in 1972.

[Magureanu] Back in 1972, when DIE hired me along with other persons with a similar education level, we were all given military ranks according to our years of

service. Some of these persons are still employees of the current DIE, and no one could ever accuse them of having participated in repressive actions. After seven months—after my military service ended—I parted for good with DIE and the Securitate, while the others remained there.

[Filip] But can one do one's military training while having the rank of a captain?

[Magureanu] According to our original agreement, I was to remain in that unit after having received my military training. The rank of a captain was offered to tempt one not to leave.

[Filip] Could one say that DIE was a repressive unit violating human rights?

[Magureanu] As it is generally known, only certain strictly partitioned and also secret units undertook repressive actions in this country and abroad. The unit I belonged to was in no way one of them, which can be proved by documents and witnesses. Thirdly, both the law regulating the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] and Constitution state that only those persons are incompatible [with offices in SRI], who committed abuses or who violated natural rights of people. That is not the case with me....

[Filip] The press recently published a letter of a group of SRI officers, accusing you—among other things—of involvement in the political life of the country, like—for instance—the miners' incursion in September 1991.

[Magureanu] There is no material evidence—there could not be any—concerning our involvement in the miners' incursion in September 1991. All those events were completely alien to us, and—moreover—I still believe that the miners' incursion could have been avoided if those governing the country would have cared more. We have documents to prove that we signaled in due time that events in the Jiu Valley could degenerate. As I told Parliament about this, my position was interpreted as SRI's interference with politics, which—of course—is an outrageous interpretation. The essence of our assessment was that the true motive of the miners' incursion was the difficult economic situation of the Jiu Valley people.

[Filip] The letter I mentioned also said that you gave leading offices to discredited persons coming from the old Securitate machinery.

[Magureanu] We consider the letter you mentioned an abhorrent forgery. Regarding this allegation, all I can say is that we tried to promote only people with no dark spots in their history. Of course, we can ask ourselves to what extent we managed to do this, and we will subsequently examine this issue. However, the way in which this anonymous letter was conceived makes it doubtful from the very beginning. I refuse to believe that such a letter was conceived by active staff members of the SRI, so it can only be just another element of the campaign that is being waged against our institution. Concerning the people named in that letter, they have all been suggested to us as good experts and top professionals.

[Filip] What could you tell us about the informers' files?

[Magureanu] We think that a moral therapy is necessary now, which could also be achieved by publishing the files of the former Securitate informers. This is a necessary step.

[Filip] When will it be made?

[Magureanu] Ask the Parliament, as the decision lies with that body!

Spiroiu Discusses Arms Manufacturing Potential

AU2804145692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1204 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/4/1992—Romania boasts a defense industry which can manufacture a substantial part of the armament and combat outfit the Armed Forces need, stated Romanian Defense Minister Niculae Spiroiu in an interview with ARMATA ROMANA weekly. He mentioned that Romania endeavors to equip its armed forces, more exactly to maintain them on a par with well evaluated requirements in keeping with scientific coordinates. Most of the combat gear the Romanian Armed Forces operate has been supplied by the national industry.

In the new conditions of the market economy this industry must be thoroughly re-evaluated. Some of the combat equipment, like infantry and artillery armament, armored cars, part of the aircraft and battle ships, communications equipment and others are manufactured in the country. Others have to be imported or manufactured in cooperation foreign firms specialized in armament production. Now as well as in the future.

The defense minister specifies that the future concerns of the Romanian armament industry are: modernization—which pursues the increase of the performance and reliability of the existing technology; relaunching of interrupted programmes and launching of new ones, with armored cars, armament, ammunition and aircraft; studies for the conversion of exceeding capacities.

Preliminary Census Results Show 22.75 Million

AU2904095692 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 29 Apr 92

[Text] Romania's population numbered 22,749,000 people on 7 January 1992, which is 1,189,000 more than on 5 January 1977. These figures are contained by a report on the population and living quarters census taken on 7 January 1992, which was examined during yesterday's meeting attended by Mr. Dan Mircea Popescu, the minister of labor and social protection.

A news conference on this issue is to be held today at 0830 GMT. A communique on the preliminary results of the census will also be issued.

Muslim, Croat Arrive Late; Conference Delayed

LD2704222292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2121 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Text] Lisbon, April 27 (TANJUG)—The Peace Conference on Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) has been postponed until Tuesday because the delegations of the Muslim and the Croatian communities in the BiH failed to arrive on time.

Only the delegation of the Serbs in the BiH, headed by Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) for the BiH, arrived promptly on Monday to Lisbon for the seventh round of the E.C.-sponsored conference.

The Muslim delegation arrived only later on Monday but without leader of the (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the BiH presidency president, Alija Izetbegovic. He stayed behind because of the situation in the BiH, the republic which the E.C. recognized on April 6. The arrival of the Croat delegation was expected later on Monday night. Conference President Jose Cutilheiro of Portugal made use of the situation and held separate talks with the two delegations that have arrived in Portugal—Serbia and Muslim. Cutilheiro, as learned, was trying to bring Izetbegovic to Lisbon. Izetbegovic's presence at the conference was also requested on Monday afternoon by president of the Conference on Yugoslavia, Lord Peter Carrington, who was, himself, to participate in the work of the Conference on the BiH. The Conference in Lisbon is to discuss the question of constitutional order of the BiH which was the chief cause of inter-ethnic conflicts in this republic. At previous meetings, accord was reached for the BiH to be organized as a community of three entities, based on the ethnic principle, but also taking into consideration the economic, geographic and other principles.

New Attacks Launched on Sarajevo

LD2804210792 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Excerpt] Just before 2200, an artillery attack was launched on a new suburb of Mojmilo, Sarajevo, near the Mojmilo sports center, from positions held by Serb territorial units. According to reports, more than 10 shells have fallen on that part of the town so far. Here is what our correspondent, Slavko Rako, said about events in Sarajevo today:

[Rako] The president of Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, has this evening left Sarajevo for Lisbon in an EC aircraft. In line with a Presidency decision, Alija Izetbegovic will negotiate in Lisbon in his capacity as the president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency and not as the chairman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]. Circles close to the SDA confrmed today that Alija Izetbegovic's party membership is due to be frozen in the next few days, in order to clear ambiguities arising from his status.

Miljenko Brkic, acting chairman of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], told a news conference held in the international press center today that he has information saying pressure would be put on Alija Izetbegovic to act as a party leader in Lisbon. Mr. Brkic expressed regret that the representative of the Croat people in the Presidency is not going to Lisbon as a member of the state delegation. As far as the HDZ is concerned, Mr. Brkic said that in peace there can only be states and aggressors, and as far as internal organization is concerned, talks must be held in Bosnia-Hercegovina in teams of experts within the framework of systemic institutions [sentence as heard].

Serb territorial units are today attacking the village of Ustikolina between the towns of Foca and Gorazde. The commander of the Ustikolina barracks has surrendered the barracks to terrorists, together with Muslim refugees from Foca, who were hiding in the barracks. Seven refugees were immediately killed and the rest were taken to a camp in Foca. The Bosnia-Hercegovina Territorial Defense Headquarters today revealed the names of many slaughtered and murdered Muslims in Foca. The Bosnia-Hercegovina Ministry for Internal Affairs has said that Bosanska Krupa is still under attack and Serb terrorists shot at a column carrying humanitarian aid.

The Sarajevo security center said that four shells were fired on the Zeljeznicar football stadium this afternoon and that a column of 50 trucks with Serbian and Montenegrin registration plates, which—according to reports—are ready to plunder territories occupied by Serbs, are at the approaches to Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

'Ecological Sabotage' Attempt in Eastern Bosnia

LD2804174692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1647 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Belgrade, Apr 28 (TANJUG)—A sabotage on a pipeline connecting a waste water storage and the alumina factory in Birac outside Zvornik in eastern Bosnia, as was said at today's news conference at the republican government of Serbia, was an ecological sabotage attempt that could have jeopardized the living environment in Serbia as well as in broader areas in the Balkans.

Minister for the Protection of Living Environment of Serbia Dr Pavle Todorovic pointed out that the situation was not alarming and that it ws under control although an exact level of jeopardy has been unknown as yet. He said that the latest measurements showed that water from the river Drina was good drinking water and that nothing suggested that this situation could be complicated.

The sabotage, as was learnt by the Ministry, was performed at 11.00 P.M. (21:00 GMT) on Monday by terrorists, members of the Moslem paramilitary "Green Berets," who at the time were controlling this part of the Zvornik municipality. The leak of alumina waste waters was stopped by 8.00 A.M. (06:00 GMT) on Tuesday, and the Sapna, left tributary to the Drina, near which the sabotage

was carried out, is virtually a dead river in its lowest reach of a few kilometres. Todorovic added that the dead fish were seen also in the Drina outside Loznica.

The Zvornik Dam, upstream the mouth of the Sapna, had immediately upon learning about the disaster begun to let water out in larger amounts, thus raising the Drina level by half a metre and diluting the concentrated detrimental matter. Among the substances contained in alumina waste waters, caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) is the most dangerous, and its content in the water of the Drina now rose to 1.5 from 0.3 grams per cubic metre of water. Caustic soda pollutes ground waters for longer periods. The alumina waste water silt also contains other harmful substances, the presence of which is being controlled.

Moslem extremists, since the outbreak of armed conflicts in Bosnia-Hercegovina have several times committed terrorist jihad-style actions.

Three weeks ago, ethnic armed conflicts broke out in Bosnia-Hercegovina after a consensus on the republic's future state and legal organization failed to have been reached by the Republic's three constituent peoples: Moslems (44 per cent of the republic's population), Serbs (32 per cent) and Croats (17 per cent).

Shelling 'Systematically Destroying' Mostar

AU2904075492 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 29 Apr 92

[Text] Mostar has suffered the most difficult night in its existence. The armed formations that call themselves the Yugoslav Peoples' Army shelled the (?entire town) [words indistinct] from all available artillery weapons from midnight until the early morning hours.

General Perisic's army was systematically destroying the town. We have learned in the Mostar health center that many people were wounded. Many houses, apartment blocks, and commercial premises, are burning. Throughout the night, many Mostar residents were telephoning us, appealing to the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency and the Government not to (?allow) [words indistinct].

Thousands of Grenades, Shells Fired at Citluk

AU2804141892 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Mile Pavlovic report from Citluk]

[Excerpt] Since the Yugoslav Army opened mortar and canon fire from its strongholds around Mostar and on the left bank of Neretva on the east and southeast parts of Citluk Commune at approximately 1300 [1100 GMT] yesterday, more than 2,000 shells and grenades fell on Svetlici, (?Prekrice), Dobro Selo, Biletic Polje, Krusevo, Krivodol, and other villages.

In this (?criminal) attack by the Yugoslav Army, which lasted almost an entire night, [words indistinct] Ivica Parasic, a brave defender of Citluk, perished, while some fighters sustained light injuries. [passage omitted]

Kupres, Tomislavgrad Attacked

LD2804155292 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Early this morning the aggressor launched a combined artillery and infantry attack on positions of the Croatian Defense Council in the wider area of Kupres. The attack was answered with two bunkers and one army vehicle being destroyed and more than 25 attackers killed. Due to repeated attacks, a general alert was sounded in Tomislavgrad at 0720 GMT and lasted until 0900 GMT. In that attack, long-range artillery was fired on villages in the wider area of Tomislavgrad. Croatian defense units of Kupres also successfully replied to the attack, silencing the army artillery.

Serbian Territorials Attack Bosanski Brod

AU2804192892 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] As our correspondent has reported, a fierce attack on the Bosanski Brod commune, including mortar fire and infantry troops, has been continuing for two hours from the direction of Lijesce, where Serbian Territorials are located. According to the latest information, obtained by our correspondent at the Bosanski Brod crisis headquarters, the Brod defenders are successfully resisting the attack. Loud explosions can be heard in Slavonski Brod where measures of general danger have been implemented.

Serbs Attack Ustikolina

AU2804192492 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Semso Tucakovic report]

[Text] This 22nd day of the war in the Foca region is not calm. Paramilitary formations of the Serbian Democratic Party, Seselj forces, and volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro are attacking Ustikolina, a small town on the road between Foca and Gorazde. The town is being shot at by mortars and machine guns and not even the [word indistinct] (?Emil)-Beg Mosque, the oldest such building in Bosnia-Hercegovina has been spared. All Muslims have fled from Ustikolina, Njuhe, Filipovici, Mrdjenovici, Odzak, (?Sjenin), Danicici, and other villages. About 2,000 people who lost everything this morning are setting off toward Gorazde and the slopes of the Jahorina mountain. Abandoned cattle are roaming in and around the villages and there is no one to be seen in the fields and meadows.

Poorly armed Territorial Defense forces have been deployed at the positions facing the aggressor on the other side, who has been equipped from Army depots and is using mortars, guns, and armored vehicles. With these weapons they are burning everything in the villages

of the (?Foca) region. Dozens of houses in the regions of Godijeno, (?Dragostada), Brod, and Ustikolina are on fire. In Foca itself, the old town [word indistinct] and several buildings, property of the Islamic Community have been destroyed.

General astonishment was caused by the crime perpetrated by Serbian Democratic Party and Chetnik paramilitary forces in the villages of Paunci, where they killed a large number of people, mostly women and old men. Today's statement by the Second Army District Command spokesman that Ustikolina has in fact been attacked by Green Berets was received in Foca with astonishment. That is an absolute untruth. There are no Green Berets in this region, something one can see for himself. The Foca Commune area is being defended by the Territorial Defense of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Ustikolina is being shelled by Seselj forces, Serbian and Montengrin volunteers, and the so-called Serbian Guard. All this is obviously being endorsed by the command of the units of [words indistinct]. This has been confirmed by the crime Chetniks committed in a Yugoslav People's Army facility near Ustikolina the evening before last. Chetniks freely entered the facility and immediately killed several ethnic Muslim civilians who had sought refugee there.

The Foca Territorial Defense Headquarters interpret the disinformation issued by the Second Army District as a way to prepare the ground for handing over the weapons depot in Ustikolina, which belongs to the Territorial Defense of the Drina Valley communes, to the Serbian Democratic Party paramilitary forces.

Presidential Statement on Not Recognizing FRY

LD2804200392 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Statement issued by Office of President of the Republic]

[Text] Following the proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], the Republic of Croatia maintains that Serbia and Montenegro may create a shared state and they may give it any name they fancy. However, the Republic of Croatia will not recognize this FRY as long as this FRY fails to recognize the Republic of Croatia and as long as the ex-Yugoslav Army, this state's army of conquest, remains on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Republic of Croatia.

The Republic of Croatia maintains that the proclamation of the FRY confirms the previous de facto gap in the state, international, legal, and political continuity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Hence, the FRY cannot be the legal successor of the old Yugoslavia. This status can only be assumed by all the newly-formed states on the former Yugoslavia's soil.

The FRY must meet all those conditions for international recognition that were applied to the other republics of the old Yugoslavia. This, in effect, means that the FRY must recognize the wholeness [cjelovitost] and territorial integrity of all the newly-created states on the former Yugoslavia's soil, the impossibility of changing borders by force, and its obligation to respect human, civil, ethnic, and minority rights in line with the Hague agreement.

Accusation of Abuse of UN Emblem Rejected

LD2804183392 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Zdravko Tomas, vice president of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, has sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali. The letter stresses the following points:

The Government of the Republic of Croatia will continue to meet the obligations it has taken on in order to enable the UN peace force to operate as quickly and efficiently as possible. Due to the constant aggression committed by the army of occupation against Croatian towns, and due to its killing of civilians as well as the systematic terror the non-Serbian population in occupied territores is being subjected to, the government demands that the peace forces should quickly assume their responsibility and curb such crimes.

We welcomed with satisfaction your statement that the authorities in Belgrade should launch a comprehensive investigation into the expulsion of the non-Serbian population from the occupied areas, particularly from Eastern Slavonia. We are nevertheless pointing out that just demanding an investigation is not an adequate reaction. We were particularly surprised by the part of your statement in which you say that in recent weeks members of both warring sides in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina have been sporting UN markings on their vehicles and uniforms and that this abuse of UN markings is irresponsible and dangerous and if this practice continues the sincerity of the commitment of all parties to cooperation with the UN Protection Force will be seriously called into question.

We resolutely protest such an accusation. The Croatian Government has been advocating the deployment of peace forces and fully supporting them. It is still supporting them. In the wake of the 3 January truce, the Croatian side has not been demolishing towns, killing civilians, and driving people out of their homes. Nor is it abusing the UN emblems. We are kindly asking you to launch an inquiry in order to identify the sources of the untrue allegation that the Croatian army has abused the world organization's emblems by using them on its vehicles.

Government Records Show 210,000 Refugees Arrive

LD2804172392 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Excerpt] According to records of the Croatian Government Office for Refugees, 210,000 refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina have arrived in Croatia so far. [passage omitted]

Zadar Area Under Artillery Attack

LD2804142292 Zagreb Radio Croatia in English 1205 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Posedarje and Slivnica near Zadar came under artillery fire at six this morning from Serb divisions in Islam, Kasic and Podgradina. More than 200 shells were fired on these two villages during the attack. Also this morning 30-odd shells were fired from the airbase at Zemunik Donji towards Croatian Army positions in Zemunik. Croatian units in Zadar's first defense lines also came under small arms fire from the directions of Musakstan and Murvica. Latest news from Zadar says that attacks in the area have continued, although Croatian Army officers appealed at least 40 times to UN liaison officers for an end to be brought to the offensive. Croatian forces did eventually respond to the attack.

The villages of Rupal and Policnik have also come under heavy mortar and artillery fire, and loud explosions could also be heard in Zadar itself. Four Croatian soldiers were wounded in attacks from Podgradina and Zeleni Hrast.

Serbian Krajina Leader Views Creation of FRY

LD2804202592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1834 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Vrgin Most, 28 Apr (TANJUG)—The creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a common state of

Serbia and Montenegro, has put an end to clashes that could have spread to Serbia and then to Europe. I believe that the world will realize this, Mile Paspalj, president of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, said in a statement for local radio in Banija and Kordun, Radio Voice of Petrova Gora.

The fact that we are territorially separated does not mean that we are cut off from Yugoslavia, Paspalj said. In observing federal laws on the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the road to the world is open to us.

In order to create a law-governed state, the Republic of Serbian Krajina will have to tackle internal organization by strengthening statehood and raising the work of all state bodies to a higher level that will enable us "to say clearly with whom we shall leave at the appropriate moment," Paspalj said.

Although the people in the Republic of Serbian Krajina voted in a plebiscite to remain in Yugoslavia, we will call another plebiscite under UN patronage if necessary, Paspalj said.

Serbs Accuse Army of Impeding Peacekeeping

LD2804162892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1509 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Knin, April 28 (TANJUG) —The political-security situation in the Republic of Serb-Krajina (RSK), within the administrative borders of Croatia, is particularly complicated because the Croatian Army is persistently trying to hinder the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces, the government of the RSK assessed.

"Croatian armed formations are trying to thwart the arrival of the UN peace-keeping forces by consistently staging attacks on the positions of the defenders of Krajina and then accusing them of violating the cease-fire," RSK Information Minister Dusan Acimovic told journalists today, following a two-day government session.

RSK territory is under the protection of the UN-peace-keeping forces. This republic was proclaimed late last year by Serbs in Croatia in areas where they are the majority population in answer to a decision of the Croatian Government to secede from Yugoslavia and reduce the Serbian people in secessionist Croatia to a national minority.

The RSK government also blamed former Krajina leader Milan Babic for further complicating the political-security situation in the republic because of an "imprudent decision to form a so-called Serb Army, recruited among people of questionable moral and human qualities," as set out.

Assessing Babic's move as "crazy" and as a direct blow to the Serbian people in RSK and its citizens, the statement underscored that the current Krajina government does not stand behind this army nor any of its state organs.

The RSK assembly at a session on February 16, dismissed Milan Babic from the post of president of the Republic of Serb Krajina because of his refusal to accept the UN peace plan, however he does not recognize this decision.

The RSK government also sharply condemned the forming of the so- called "Government of National Salvation" headed by Babic.

The Krajina government formed a news agency called "KRAJINA," the statement set out.

Serbian Krajina Bans Paramilitary Formations

LD2804101992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2111 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Text] Knin, 27 Apr (TANJUG)—Discussing the political and security situation at this evening's session held in Knin, the Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina adopted a decision banning paramilitary formations on its territory. Dusan Ecimovic, minister of information in the Krajina Government, announced this decision this evening on Knin radio.

The cause of this decision is considered to be the formation of the Serbian army and its first regiment, Petar Mrkonjic, which took place 15 days ago in Kosovo [village] near Knin. We later learned that the government of national salvation, whose formation was at the time advocated by Mirko Jovic with Milan Babic's support and consent, was formed then as well.

According to the Krajina Ministry of Internal Affairs, at sessions of the so-called government of national salvation, secret lists were prepared of members of the present government who were to be murdered, Minister Ecimovic said this evening. Knin radio listeners were told that Babic's supporters who work in institutions and bodies of the Krajina Republic planned to exert pressure on certain municipal bodies.

Ecimovic also said the following: "Milan Babic planned to discredit the new government by legalizing the so-called government of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, thus denying the integrity of the Republic of Serbian Krajina." As Ecimovic stressed, Babic presented his stands and obvious political platform to UN Protection Force representatives in the contacts he had with them in his capacity as chairman of the municipality.

Ecimovic added that Babic had claimed that the new government was illegal, that it had gained power by a military coup, and that the Republic of Serbia had carried out a mutiny in the Krajina Ministry of Internal Affairs and brought in and formed its own mercenary units. He further claimed, among other things, that the Yugoslav People's Army wants to subvert the peace plan.

On the other hand, the Krajina Government considers that "by the formation of the units of the Serbian Guard, Milan Babic wants to hinder the entire project for the defense of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which is

adapted to the conditions of the presence of the peace forces, and thus bring into question Cyrus Vance's plan.

This evening, Ecimovic said that "the core of Babic's paramilitary forces are being formed in Lika and elsewhere," and that the Krajina police, i.e. the police station in Vrhovine, has already been attacked. The Krajina Ministry of Internal Affairs has information about the attackers, some of whom have been arrested, while others are in hiding. The government has charged the Ministry of Internal Affairs and legislative bodies with launching the activities for which they are authorized, Minister Ecimovic stressed.

Serb Leader Denies Accusations

LD2804184792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1813 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Knin, April 28 (TANJUG)—Milan Babic, the former leader of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), denied today information set out by the Krajina government that he has formed paramilitary formations and a government of national salvation in the RSK.

"It is fraud and a lie that I am forming some kind of paramilitary organizations and that I am the organizer of a government of national salvation", Babic said at a news conference of the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina in Knin, the center of the RSK. Babic has recently become the leader of this party.

The RSK was proclaimed late last year in Serb regions within the administrative borders of breakaway Croatia

The RSK government in today's statement accused Babic of "forming a so-called Serb Army, recruited among people of questionable moral and human qualities" and that he was organizing a government of national salvation, thus threatening the political-security situation in the republic.

Babic underscored that his party "is using only political and democratic means in a struggle for power," accusing the present Krajina government of being "a quasi-democratic set".

Possibility of U.S. Involvement in Region Viewed

AU2904135492 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 92 p 14

[Jurij Gustincic commentary: "Dress Rehearsal"]

[Text] Those who are trying to figure out why the Americans are subtly trying to take over Germany's supremacy on the former Yugoslav territory need look no further than the Pentagon's draft on the tasks of American policy in the coming period. It was published last month by the NEW YORK TIMES. The document was not denied, but it was stated that the President and secretary of state would adopt a position after further study of the matter.

The draft states, as one of the aims, the prevention of the emergence of a rival. The United States should not allow "potential rivals" to take on "greater roles." Since that can no longer apply to Russia and China, it must mean Japan and... Germany. From that point of view, it was high time Washington got involved in leading Western policy toward our part of Europe. No matter how hard Western Europe, under Genscher's leadership, tried, we cannot honestly say that the end of the war is anywhere in sight. After the attack on Sarajevo, we can even speak of the danger of the war spreading.

The possible American preoccupation with the problem of someone else taking on too much initiative is, however, only a tiny fraction of the truth that faces diplomatic factors, whether they like it or not. The initiatives by Germans, Europe, America itself, and the UN secretary-general, have all contributed to the international operation, that is bringing the blue helmets here. But the operation has not even started yet and there are already new, unpleasant realizations emerging.

Let us leave aside the fact that neither the blue helmets, nor Lord Carrington, can count on absolute popularity anywhere in these parts. That is understandable, because the role of those who have to take a middle position is always a thankless one, no matter how much everybody agrees with it at the start. That was the case in the Middle East and that will be the case with Cambodia. The Americans have other reasons for taking the most prominent position during this election, and therefore vulnerable, year.

Do you remember what everyone said when it was announced that General Nambiar's headquarters were to be in Sarajevo? That it was a wise decision, because, although he would have no mandate for intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina, his presence would keep war away from that region. What do we see? Attackers coldbloodedly fire shells at the nearby TV station. They could not care less who is sitting in the peacekeeper's headquarters, and whether they live or die! They do not care what happens to that EC observers' helicopter.

A deeper understanding of the problem, which is probably emerging, will have to bring about the realization that this UN operation is far from sufficient, and there will be no solution without direct involvement of Western forces, which will necessarily include the Americans. This way or that, if the Americans have indeed decided to be the world's policeman in the "new world order" then this is their chance for a dress rehearsal!

Diplomatic Relations Established With Israel

AU2804152292 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Vojko Plevel report from Jerusalem]

[Excerpt] Slovenia is paving its way to the Middle East with a balanced policy that we have been missing in the former Yugoslavia since 1967. This was most convincingly proved by the fact that 10 days ago Slovenia was almost simultaneously recognized by the key states in this part of the world: Israel, where Foreign Minister Dimtrij Rupel arrived yesterday for a visit, and Egypt, where Rupel will travel tomorrow.

A short celebration that accompanied the signing of the protocol on establishing diplomatic relations was held in the Israeli Foreign Ministry this morning. They agreed that the two sides will try to implement this protocol as soon as possible.

The ceremony provoked considerable interest among domestic and the numerous foreign journalists in Jerusalem, as Slovenia is the first former Yugoslav republic to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Regarding Croatia, which Israel has also already recognized, this is not planned yet. For the time being, Israel is still studying the request for the recognition of the new Yugoslavia that was proclaimed yesterday. The Israeli hosts and journalists were, therefore, understandably most interested in the Slovene position regarding this action. Minister Rupel presented the country's main objection as being the unacceptability of the new Yugoslavia's efforts to seize the successor's rights to the former Yugoslavia.

Israel promised Slovenia its full support in its efforts to join the UN and the international financial organizations. The Israeli side also spoke in favor of intensifying mutual scientific, technical, and economic cooperation which, for the time being, is still most developed in tourism and, with resumption of the regular Adria Airways flights to Tel Aviv, traffic and communications. [passage omitted]

Army Unable To Sustain Prolonged Bosnian War

92BA0802A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Apr 92 pp 20, 21, 22

[Article by Teodor Gersak: "A Strong Man With Limited Power"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] In spite of all the methods of political maneuvering and extortion by political terrorism, and its intensification and growth, paranoid Serbian leader Milosevic and his General Adzic are most afraid of a war in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]. With a military conflict in B-H, what was once the Federal Army would collapse once and for all, and Milosevic's Greater Serbia would also vanish from the scene for all time; moreover, it would even be reduced to a Belgrade pashadom.

A possible war in B-H would have two determining characteristics that the war in Croatia does not have. The first is that a war in B-H, in fact, could not be limited to the territory of that central republic, but would instead spread to Serbia and the broader region. The second is that the nucleus of the military conflict in B-H this time would not be the dispute between Croats and Serbs, but rather between Serbs and Muslims, even though the disagreements between Croats and Serbs in B-H would be the occasion for the broader conflict. It is precisely for this reason that it would not be possible territorially and ethnically to limit it to the Muslims who live in B-H, since then the entire so-called green transversal, which runs from the Cazin Muslim area through most of B-H, the Sandzak, Kosovo, western and northern Macedonia to the Albanian hinterlands and through Bulgaria to Turkey, would rise up.

The beginning of a civil war in Serbia would have unforeseeable consequences for all of the Balkans; it would destabilize all important European regions; and the question also arises of how Bulgaria and Greece, which would be completely cut off for transportation and would be blocked by land, would act with respect to the border areas to which they still have rights according to the peace agreement from the Balkan wars, and how Turkey, as a new regional great power and an ideological ally of the Yugoslav Muslims, would act; and there is also the question of how Muslim states around the world would react. A war in B-H is too big a mouthful, not just for Serbia, but also the EC, since it also indirectly affects certain American geopolitical and geostrategic interests in Southern Europe. Undoubtedly, if someone initiated it, they would stop it by force.

Of course, this is the method of rational thought. If we look at all this from an irrational point of view, however, then we have to ask ourselves first of all the question of who would be in the front lines of a war for a Greater Serbia, when the army is characterized by a high degree of collapse and disorganization, and then the question of how a third war would even be financed, since the federal money which was used to finance the wars in Slovenia and Croatia has been virtually exhausted.

The Army Is Not Capable of Waging Yet Another War

This assertion is true, in spite of the fact that the denouement of the Yugoslav crisis is shifting to B-H. Even though Milosevic's militant Serbs and the Yugoslav generals will try to keep B-H in their own sphere of influence at any cost, since it is an area that Greater Serbian policy does not intend to give up without international pressure. A war for B-H is not only the most irrational method of achieving political goals, but it is also not even possible any longer, because the army is simply no longer capable of it. This does not mean that there are no casualties in B-H. They will be caused by sabotage-terrorist activity, ethnic unrest, massacres, etc. Of course, in a technical sense it is not a war, although the consequences are almost as bad. The astounding

demonstrations of power and the enormous concentrations of forces in B-H, with occasional artillery and missile bombardment, give a completely different picture. That is not the case, however. Even in the first two wars the former Federal Army did not achieve the Greater Serbian goals that had been established, and instead had to withdraw; thus, it cannot even survive a third war.

Most reporters who try to analyze the further outcome of the events in B-H proceeed primarily from the quantitative factors of the situation in the "Yugoslav Army," and if we review them, the data are truly frightening. In additional to quantitative indicators, however, one should also analyze the actual military capabilities of the collapsing army, and, from this standpoint, its further utilization in B-H. It is only in this way that we can obtain a real picture of its effectiveness.

There cannot be good music if an orchestra is headed by a poor conductor, and even less if there is no conductor at all. The tones of the instruments can be accumulated, but until the orchestra gets organized and gets in tune—and the first condition for this is that trained musicians be hired for the instruments—there will not be any music. And that is exactly the situation now of the orchestra that we call the "Yugoslav Army," which has been brought onto the territory of B-H. It has enough weapons to equip nine corps, but there are no musicians; the ones who are there are so demoralized and terrified that it is questionable whether they are even ready to fight at all.

The consequences of the wars in Slovenia and Croatia have been catastrophic for the army as well, even though the Yugoslav generals perhaps do not want to admit this. Such confusion prevails in the army on the territory of B-H that it is not even capable of starting a third war, much less surviving it. They are also aware of this themselves, and that is why they are acting differently in B-H, and even becoming advocates of peace. They have started to think seriously about their future.

Army forces have been brought into B-H from all the places from which the army has retreated and fled. It came here with an organizational and combat structure that was appropriate for the zones where it was before, but without a restructured mobilization and logistical system, and with the question of rear support completely unsettled, since the units relied materially upon the areas where they were before. This is already a sufficient reason why the units that could be withdrawn peacefully to B-H cannot be used successfully even from the standpoint of military technology unless they are first reorganized. Several units that were withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia have been left without command personnel, and especially without soldiers, which means that in addition to the unresolved logistical issues, they are also unusable from the standpoint of personnel manning. Even the units brought into B-H that have been partially manned by reservists are not adequately equipped, since the men have been gathered for them from all parts of B-H. We must be aware that these units were previously manned by reservists from Slovenia and Croatia, and that in order to man them they needed about 700 military specialties, which now do not even exist in B-H, or are very rare.

The structure and organization of these units are also completely inappropriate for engaging in the kind of conflict without a front that would be characteristic of B-H if it occurred. If the ethnic balance were to be disrupted in B-H, there would be fighting throughout high-rise apartments, factories, hotels, army courtyards, etc.—in short, it would be a conflict that would require police tactics, for which these units are not even trained and organized, and consequently they would be virtually unusable. Only military police battalions and certain antisaboteur and antiterrorist units are trained for such operations, but even though an attempt has been made since the war in Croatia to assemble soldiers with this specialty, at most they are capable of putting together a military force comparable to four battalions. Training new units of this type takes at least 12 months, and is also extremely demanding, and above all, extremely expensive.

The units that have been deployed in combat zones in B-H so far, which are the Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Sarajevo corps, are each a story in themselves. The Banja Luka and Tuzla corps suffered heavy losses and humiliation in the war in Croatia; certain tactical-operational units are at most 60-percent manned, and they still include many Serbs who are no longer prepared to fight, while there are fewer and fewer at home who are still willing to respond to being called up for the reserves. In the case of the Tuzla corps there is also an additional problem, in that it is based in an area where a primarily Muslim population is living, while the Sarajevo corps's reserves consist primarily of the Muslim and Croatian population, so that they are not even hoping to mobilize most of its units, and instead would rather bring them here from Montenegro and Serbia.

All this already allows one to anticipate that it is necessary to carry out a reorganization of the army in B-H, and that is why they are also establishing a new, second Sarajevo army. Nevertheless, in order for it to reach a minimum level of organization at the corps level, it needs at least nine or 10 months; in order to equip battalions at least minimally, it needs at least three months, and in order to equip the brigades, it needs at least six months; these periods, however, are valid only under the condition that there would be a normal influx of personnel to perform military service, and that the response for going into the reserves for retraining would be normal.

Neither the first condition nor the second has been met, however. Only some of the young men from the rural areas of Serbia are responding to enlistment for performing military service; young men from Montenegro are responding rather satisfactorily; but they are very rarely coming from B-H, while there is no one at all from

anywhere else, and there are too few volunteers. That is why soldiers are being kept in military service much longer than they should have been, contrary to all the criteria and legal foundations.

With respect to the manning of military units, the biggest problem for the "Yugoslav Army" is the response from B-H, since the legal authorities have resisted the army's actions on the territory of this republic. Also, after the amendment of the law on national defense, the enlistment system in most of B-H is no longer controlled by the army, but rather by the obcina secretariats for national defense. Army enlistment notices are thus not even being sent out in the non-Serbian obcinas, and also the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina has issued a proclamation that soldiers and reservists are not to respond to direct army enlistment notices. Even the population of Serbia, however, is no longer prepared to fight for Milosevic's inflated Serbia. We must not forget that during the war in Croatia, thousands of Serbian reservists fled from the battlefield, that the male population, especially in the cities, hid en masse, and that those who were able even fled abroad.

In spite of all sorts of intimidation, the army has also been abandoned en masse by soldiers who performed their regular military service. That is why the army was forced, even during the war in Croatia, to man itself with volunteers, who came mostly because they received payment for it. There really are few volunteers who are willing to fight. What the morale of the uniformed "Lumpenproletariat" is like was best demonstrated in eastern Slavonia. Many militant Serbs live there, and at first, when many Greater Serbian heads were still very hot to extend their empire through battle, even though virtually about 30 percent of the entire "Federal" army and even the most elite guard division unit were employed there, in four months they only advanced from 20 to 25 kilometers. Let us not forget that according to the technical criteria that the "Yugoslav Army" wrote in its own military regulations on the basis of its experiences from maneuvers, the anticipated tempo of an attack and advance by motorized infantry and armored units is from 30 to 50 kilometers a day. This does not require any comment. After the establishment of the military balance in Croatia, many military and Greater Serbian heads in B-H began to cool off and think more rationally about how a possible conflict in this republic would end and what would happen to the "Yugoslav Army" afterward.

Taking these facts into account, the "Yugoslav Army" in B-H, in spite of the enormous amounts of weapons that have been brought in, only has a few brigades that are actually manned for combat, but even these have not become combat-ready. That is why so far not a single corps has been able to establish a complete organizational unit, and cannot even be expected to be able to act as a unit. This whole strong army that has been assembled in B-H has extremely dubious capabilities. It is manned by extremely few soldiers, and its units primarily consist only of Bosnian Serb and Montenegrin reservists from the ranks of the Lumpenproletariat and the volunteer extremists who have to be paid for serving in the reserves. These are units of ordinary frightened mercenaries, who have not been used to having so much money in their hands each month for a long time now, and are consequently more drunk than sober. Even in the first serious conflict in which they would have to make an attack, this drunken army would scatter, and there is no force that could assemble it again. This was already apparent at the end of the war in Croatia.

In addition to this, this army is being led by many disillusioned and demoralized officers, concerned about their own future. Not even the daily military brainwashing through internal military information is helping any longer. These people have begun to think about their actions in Croatia; they are bothered about what will happen to them tomorrow, who will finance them, what they will live on, where they will live, and what will happen to their families, many of which are living like refugees in common rooms in barracks. They are slowly realizing, like General Simovic, the former Serbian defense minister, that they have been exploited for one-time use. It is increasingly more difficult to buy their loyalty, even with extremely high monthly wages. The only question is how long this will be possible. In such a situation, it is no longer possible to establish an effective military organization. The General Staff is trying to relieve officers in the combat zones in turn, whereas they cannot relieve the reservists, because there simply are no others, and even if there are, they do not want to come. Nevertheless, in spite of the replacements of officers, a lack of will prevails in the units; they lack order, discipline, and morale. That is why the commands have less and less control of their units and subordinate officers every day, and the realization that these units are not reliable for any serious conflict is growing stronger and stronger. Perhaps the most accurate statement is still that from a functional standpoint, only the commands and the corps headquarters, which do not have direct daily contacts with the units, are still operating. The units are disintegrating in terms of morale; they are short of food, fuel, several types of ammunition, and even some very important spare parts.

Such a disorganized one-nationality army with poor morale needs several months of respite. As it is now, from the standpoints of organization, functionality, and morale, it is not yet capable of handling a single military conflict, even if it is one of low intensity.

Its combat readiness varies considerably, and is therefore extremely questionable as well—from the tactical to the operational level. The larger tactical units are essentially completely disorganized, without appropriate technical personnel, and thus we cannot even speak of any sort of coordination among the branches of service in carrying out military operations.

Even the method of conducting offensive and defensive military operations with which the officers' heads have been filled for years would be completely unusable and

ineffective in B-H. In terms of doctrine, the units are built on mistaken foundations, and are organizationally and structurally unadapted to the types of conflict characteristic of B-H. Even operationally, such units cannot accomplish anything, if we exclude the occupation of a specific area. They are not capable of it from the standpoint of morale, while any serious military operation in B-H would mean spreading the civil war as well to Serbia, which would simply "swallow up" the "Yugoslav Army," and it would thus disappear forever.

It is precisely for this reason that Milosevic and Adzic are trying to get the blue helmets to come as soon as possible, in order to gain time for a respite and for the reorganization of the army and of military doctrine.

This is also the reason why the JA [Yugoslav Army] has been trying for so long to put on the mask of a protector of the interests of all peoples. It has started itself to criticize several generals, especially Mamula. It is accusing them of being to blame for the muddled war, and for the JA's muddled policy, and it is announcing that the responsibility will be determined. There are more and more statements about the transformation of the JA, and it is constantly emphasizing in public that any political option is acceptable to it, if it is reached by peaceful means. All of this sudden peacemaking activity on its part is a consequence of its position and the fact that the level of its readiness above the battalion level is very questionable. It also has a political dimension—specifically, it would like to improve its image in the eyes of the international public.

What They Would Wage a New War With in B-H

What the strategists of the Greater Serbian policy have realized concerning the capabilities of the Yugoslav Army is probably similar, and that is why they have decided that by means of a show of force and violence, causing unrest, political extortion through barricades, and intimidation along the lines of "now there will be war," they will use nonmilitary means, actually under the guise of the fear of a military conflict, to draw B-H into the sphere of influence of Greater Serbia. For a long time now they have been very deliberately destroying B-H, not by war, but rather economically, with respect to transportation, financially, and socially. They will finally try to destroy B-H by starvation and thus tie it to Greater Serbia. They think that B-H, completely impoverished, will join Yugoslavia again. That is why they first blocked the Ploce harbor from the sea, as a result of which entire economic sectors found themselves on the brink of survival, and approximately 70,000 people were left without jobs. Later, by means of the zones of military operations, they cut them off completely from transportation links with Croatia, and finally also blockaded them with the transportation blockade of Mostar and Sarajevo, and with the destruction of several bridges. B-H has thus become a ghetto, which is furthermore being accused by Serbia of reexporting; it has banned imports of vital necessities, including even food (Bosnia-Hercegovina itself only produced 18 percent of its own requirements).

Furthermore, most defense production has been withdrawn from the republic, and thus another (approximately) 42,000 people have been left without work. In order for the economic and social heart attack to be complete after this, all the rest of the inflationary Yugoslav money was also sent to B-H, while at the same time they changed the color of the new "Serbo-Topcider" dinars for the territory of their own Serbia. Of course, the entire strong Yugoslav Army and its paid reserves are full of worthless Yugoslav dinars, and so the army is also buying what little there is in B-H. A worker's pay is about 12,000 dinars, or about 50 marks, but a colonel's pay, with the military bonus, is already about 350,000 "Yugoslav dinars." The population of B-H can withstand such pressure only for at most another two months, and then they will have to call for help from the world and beg for food if they do not want to die of starvation. Milosevic has literally robbed this republic with his financial transactions. It is not superfluous to recall that Serbia, which loaded the worthless Topcider money into railcars, used them even earlier to buy up all the more important enterprises in B-H.

Since Milosevic no longer has the former convertible federal money, with which a war in B-H could still be financed, he has decided on a strategy of robbery and exhaustion. Because a war in B-H is too dangerous, he is doing it through financial transactions and the unrestricted printing of inflationary money. He is destroying B-H's transportation, and he is destroying it economically, financially, and socially, and because the Serbs cannot do without force, they are reinforcing everything by constant terrorist provocations, and by causing incidents, disorder, and unrest through the barricades that have been set up.

Even though the Yugoslav Army and the "warriors" of Greater Serbia have succeeded in terrifying the population of B-H, the equilibrium in the coexistence of the three peoples has not been disrupted, and they are not fighting among themselves, but are rather seeking a peaceful solution. Extremists exist, and many of them are in the Serbian ranks in particular, but so far they have not succeeded and will not succeed, through their methods of barricade revolution, terrorism, and ethnic unrest, in throwing B-H into a civil war, even though they are already blowing up cafes and post offices, mining automobiles and houses, killing cabdrivers and mailmen, shooting at passersby, setting up barricades and carrying out provocations with firearms, and redeploying Arkan's forces, the White Eagles, etc., to B-H. No one really will start a war in B-H, and that is why they will develop terrorism there to a high degree, intensify its brutality, cause disorder, sabotage, commando raids, etc., and involve the army in protecting the borders of Serbian cantons and extending the Serbian area through ethnoregionalization. They will go up to the very brink of war.

We must be aware that after the failure to extend Greater Serbia to the Memorandum borders, Milosevic will do everything in his power to keep at least Montenegro and most of B-H in its sphere of influence. He would thus establish a bridge to Krajina, which will certainly obtain the status of a Serbian autonomous province in Croatia. This is necessary for Milosevic, since that is the only way that he can survive politically. Of course, he will be assisted by the paranoid army, which in fear of its own natural collapse and the recognition of B-H is still fighting just for survival and a solution for its social status.

That is why the purpose of the present ethnic unrest in B-H is to win the JA the role of a peacemaking factor and the protector of the Muslims. Since the Greater Serbian political goals cannot be achieved through aggression, they are to be achieved through ethnoregionalization. That is why it is very important to portray Croatia as an aggressor against B-H and to cause general hysteria throughout all of B-H, especially in Sarajevo, where an attempt was made to establish Yugoslav fundamentalism on the political scene and to set up a committee of national salvation. It was supposed to use the army to achieve the political goals of the Greater Serbian policy in the role of a peacemaker and protector of the Muslims, in order to prevent the massacres of which Arkan's forces are guilty (it was the Yugoslav generals who armed them just a few months ago).

Ethnoregionalization Does Not Bring Lasting Peace

Bosnia-Hercegovina is the last hostage of Yugoslavia, and at the same time it is also proof that it is simply impossible for the interests of Belgrade and Zagreb to be fulfilled within the same state. To be sure, B-H has apparently managed to achieve recognition by Europe and the United States, but in the background Belgrade policy is still thinking about how to take advantage of B-H's sovereignty and the demand for immutability of the borders. In such a situation, internal negotiation is virtually worthless. In spite of the international recognition, a solution will only be possible for B-H when an intergovernmental agreement has been reached between Serbia and Croatia. Of course, the basic issue in this regard is whether it is even possible to reach such an agreement by peaceful means, without terrorist massacres, major interethnic disorder, and incidents, even if everyone is already afraid of embarking upon an interethnic war. We can only call what individual Bosnian quasi-national leaders are now doing, as an extension of Belgrade policy, preparations for a later partition of B-H through ethnoregionalization.

This further course of ethnoregionalization on the political scene has not yet been prepared in detail and is concealed by the cantonization of B-H. The Serbs, as a people representing one-third of B-H, would like to spread out to 65 percent of the republic's territory under the army's protection, and in many areas conflicts are already occurring because of this. Both of the main transportation routes, from Slavonski Brod to Capljina and from Zvornik to Banja Luka, and so on, have already been brought under control through military occupation. Even now—again by force and intimidation with the Yugoslav Army's weapons—they are trying to reduce as much as possible the powers of the central authorities in B-H, and transfer them to the ethnic units, structured as national cantons, and also to impose the present military system for the next eight years, even though the JA became a foreign military force on B-H's territory when the latter was recognized. In order to keep the Yugoslav Army in B-H, they have now developed the thesis that more than 90 percent of its members are from this area, which, according to the data that they published themselves a year ago, is not even true, since Bosnian Muslims and Croats have been deliberately ignored in this army for many years.

When the Serbs want to implement their empire of "united Serbian states" and link themselves physically with Krajina through a new Banja Luka Serbian state, many people are not aware that this solution would only result in about 40 percent of the population's virtually becoming an ethnic minority in their own state, and that from 600,000 to 800,000 inhabitants of non-Serbian nationality would have to leave their homes or simply be driven out, because they are not Serbs. It would be most tragic precisely in the northeastern part of B-H, where a Serbian transversal is supposed to be established among Serbia, the Bosnian Krajina, and the Knin Krajina, and along the Serbian border for the sake of ties through Romania with eastern Hercegovina and onward to the sea. Of course, such a resettlement would not take place without force, without the use of the army and terrorism. That is why the army quickly joined in the political games and occupied territory up to where the Serbian ethnic region is supposed to extend, and through the self-appointed committee of national salvation, it assumed the role of ruler and arbiter, in the role of a protector. Furthermore, in order to cut off certain transportation routes, it has in effect occupied several cities. And once again everything is being repeated: People are already fleeing with some sort of certificates that they left voluntarily of their own will, but behind them villages are burning in the flames kindled by the "People's Army" through the Serbian paramilitary units.

Of course, there is little likelihood that this insane project will succeed. It is more likely that all of this will only lead to weariness to the point of exhaustion, and then will come either a sobering or a final settling of accounts, with unforeseeable consequences. The B-H political space is being reduced for the Serbs with every day that passes, since Serbia is not capable of ensuring modern development and a better future for any of the peoples in B-H. Everything that it does is more or less illusions of the extremists; and what it achieves is extorted, false, and coerced. It is precisely because of this that the political possibility has already been lost that B-H would remain in some sort of alliance with Yugoslavia, and in exchange Serbia would recognize the sovereignty of a B-H in which Serbs would be guaranteed

some sort of autonomy, in which Belgrade's laws would be valid. Since this is not acceptable to the other two peoples, everything is stuck in a sort of stalemate situation, even though the referendum was successful and B-H has already been internationally recognized. That is why the question of B-H cannot even be settled without international mediation, and without coercion and an international demand that the Yugoslav Army be finally disbanded. There is no other way to motivate the Serbs to recognize B-H, Croatia, and Macedonia. One should not have any illusions that this can be achieved just by halting international loans and cutting off certain trade flows. The only effective method is monetary intervention against Belgrade, and putting the Serbian national bank, which is printing Yugoslav dinars day and night, under international control. That is the only way in which it is possible to prevent and interrupt the robbery of everyone else through the monetary system, and the aggression with the Topcider inflationary dinars, through which the Yugoslav Army is being artificially supported.

It should be clearly conveyed to them that inheritance of the name of Yugoslavia only represents a political declaration, which the international monetary institutions will never accept. B-H has to introduce its own currency as soon as possible, and ensure the necessary foreign exchange reserves and backing for it with international assistance. That is the only way in which a reversal in the Greater Serbian policy can be achieved. If this measure were adopted, Milosevic's political space would be drastically narrowed. If Karadzic's militant Serbs continued to shoot at their neighbors, he would not have any other choice but publicly condemning adventurism; if a broader hysteria developed from this, the only thing left for Milosevic to do would be recognizing B-H before witnesses as an independent and sovereign state, even though something like this does not even occur to him now. International monetary control over the Yugoslav dinars would also halt Muslim and Croatian radicalism, and at the same time a solution would be found for drawing B-H out of the customs and transportation isolation by its neighbor, which is so lethal to it. Even the Yugoslav Army cannot survive international monetary control of Serbia. Only then would it be possible even to speak of establishing an internal tripartite authority, alleviating ethnic passions, and more stable prospects or peace, which is now ensured solely by the mutual balance of fear. I am afraid that without the introduction of these measures, the Greater Serbian policy has too many possibilities for undermining the new sovereign state of B-H.

[Map reproduced in JPRS-EER-92-052, 28 April 1992.]

International

Adzic Letter to B-H Presidency Urges Talks

LD2904104892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0956 GMT 29 Apr 92

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Apr (TANJUG)—The information office of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (SSNO) has been authorized to publicize a letter sent today by Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, acting federal secretary for national defense, to the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The following is the text of the letter:

"Your unilateral decision to call for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] units from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the conditions you attach to it is a hasty move in our view that is unlikely to defuse the situation but, rather, will lead to a further escalation of the conflict with unpredictable consequences. What surprised us particularly was the fact that you made the above decision despite your promise to continue a dialogue with us about the JNA status on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Gentlemen, you are aware that the JNA did not come to Bosnia-Hercegovina from abroad. It was born in Bosnia-Hercegovina where it has existed for 50 years as the common armed force of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. JNA units helped to build numerous industrial, transport, and other capacities. They were ready to help the people whenever needed. Since the onset of armed clashes in Yugoslavia, the army has acted as a factor of peace. Its role in Bosnia- Hercegovina is the same.

All this gives us the moral right to ask for a correct attitude toward resolving the status of the Army on the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina—through negotiations and agreements, not through the imposition of unilateral solutions and conflicts, even less so through armed conflict.

While drawing up a plan for the withdrawal of the JNA units from the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina you ignored the fact that 90 percent of its members are Serbs, which is not the Army's fault, and over 80 percent of its members are citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Therefore, they cannot, as you demand, withdraw to Serbia and Montenegro. Certainly, they will refuse to come under the control of government bodies in which there are no representatives of their nation.

Acknowledging the internationally recognized status of Bosnia-Hercegovina, we find it necessary to draw your attention to the real state of affairs. In light of the aforementioned, bearing in mind our recent agreement in Skopje on the continuation of talks on the JNA status in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the SFRY Presidency order issued on 27 February, and a letter sent to you on 28 April by the SFRY Presidency, I am calling on you to continue and further intensify our talks so that we can arrive at mutually acceptable solutions."

[Signed] Acting Federal Secretary for National Defense Col. Gen. Blagoje Adzic.

Europe, U.S. Differ in Resolution of Crisis

92BA0783C Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 92 pp 52-53

[Article by Ranko Petkovic: "Disentanglement in a Collision of Interests"]

[Text] Up to now, there have been both similarities and differences in the way Europe and the United States looked upon the Yugoslav crisis.

In their fundamental approach to resolving the Yugoslav crisis, Europe and the United States have emphasized almost equally the following issues and demands:

—Frustrating the activity of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] as an "instrument of the former communist system;"

—No changes of existing internal, i.e., republic, borders by force;

—Respect for human rights, the rights of minorities and ethnic collectivities;

—Support of the right to self-determination;

—Resolution of all disputes through negotiations;

—Establishment of diverse institutional or economic ties between the new governmental entities on the space of the former Yugoslavia.

There were no major differences between Europe and the United States concerning these and certain other similar issues. We should add to this that in the early going the United States delegated to Europe the right to resolve the Yugoslav problem on its own, because mainly it concerned the interests of peace and security in European space.

However, as the Yugoslav crisis developed, certain differences in views and interests between Europe and the United States did become evident with respect to events in Yugoslavia:

—Even during the proceedings of the Hague Conference the European countries decided to recognize the sovereignty and independence of the republics which favored leaving Yugoslavia, which the United States did not want to do, arguing that their "premature" recognition could adversely affect the action of the United Nations and political resolution of the Yugoslav crisis;

—The European countries adopted economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro because of their alleged uncooperativeness in the proceedings of the Hague Conference, while the United States opted for sanctions against all the principals in the Yugoslav crisis.

Conflict or Common Interests?

The impression could have been gained that Europe was in a hurry to dismantle Yugoslavia, while the United States still was not letting go of the possibility of survival of the constituent elements of Yugoslavia in some common framework, albeit a loose one.

The fundamental similarities in the approach of Europe and the United States to the Yugoslav crisis might naturally have been interpreted in terms of common vital interests of the West concerning all the countries of former East Europe, not excluding even Yugoslavia.

The differences with respect to certain essential elements in resolving the Yugoslav crisis could have arisen from the evident conflict among certain European countries over their presence and role in the geopolitical space of Yugoslavia, and also a conflict of interests between Germany, as a power which ipso facto is becoming more and more dominant in European space and, accordingly, is decisively influencing the views and behavior of the European Community, and the United States, as a world superpower which following the descent of the USSR from the world political stage is advancing the expectation that its views and interests will be respected in all parts of the world, including Europe.

Serious analysts have never felt that the case of Yugoslavia, regardless of its importance to Europe and the world, would threaten the global strategic interests of the West, but they wondered how far the United States would go out of step with the European Community concerning the ways and means of resolving the Yugoslav crisis.

Those who were inclined to exaggerate the differences in the approach of Europe and the United States to the Yugoslav crisis went so far as to suggest the possibility that certain Yugoslav republics would be placed under the protection of the European Community, and others under the protection of the United States, and they even foresaw a serious crisis in the Euro-Atlantic alliance.

Has the United States Capitulated to Germany?

The recent meeting between James Baker, the American secretary of state, with his counterparts from the circle of the European Community, showed or confirmed that differences in the approach of Europe and the United States to resolving the Yugoslav crisis have reached a point where they could become a political problem in the Western alliance and that through coordination of views and interests concerning the Yugoslav crisis the United States and Europe want to preserve the unity of global interests and at the same time to act effectively in resolving it.

But it would be hasty to assert that one meeting of James Baker with the ministers of the European Community could erase differences in their views and interests, which arise out of objective historical, geopolitical, economic, and other circumstances which arose after the end of the cold war (and particularly the unification of Germany) and which found one of their first points of departure precisely in the Yugoslav crisis.

However, it would be still more unforgivable to take the view that Europe and the United States will not make efforts to preserve "unity of action" as much and as long as possible in resolving not only the Yugoslav crisis, but also the crisis in the Soviet Union in their common interest.

We can anticipate, then, that in the coming period the United States will pay more respect to the views and demands of Europe concerning Yugoslavia. In practice, this means that we can expect that the United States will recognize the sovereignty and independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and, together with the European Community, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia as well. We can likewise expect the United States to offer more explicit support to the further work of the Brussels Conference.

In abandoning some of its views held previously, has the United States capitulated to the European Community, that is, to Germany? At first glance, it seems that the United States has been Mohammed who has gone to the mountain: It has changed its position, while Europe has not. However, that would be a superficial judgment, at least in part. In essence, by hinting that he will bring his approach to the Yugoslav crisis more into line with the European Community, James Baker implicitly let it be known: (a) that Europe itself has so far not managed to untie the Yugoslav knot, and (b) that in case the United States by some chance is not ready for coordination in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, it might be resolved in a different way!

James Baker demonstrated in Brussels that the United States is the only large world power and that without its direct participation not a single regional crisis can be resolved, including the one in Yugoslavia.

The Case of Bosnia and Hercegovina

From the beginning of the broad interethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, everyone feared the possibility that they could carry over to the soil of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Given the intermixing of the Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian population in that republic, it was felt that conflicts in Bosnia-Hercegovina would surpass the horrors of the war in Croatia. At the same time, they would probably pull into their whirlpool the neighboring republics of Serbia and Croatia as well, and also regions inhabited by Muslims.

There are reasons why the view can be taken that the extremely tense situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina will nevertheless not explode:

—All three nationalities and their ethnic parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina have advanced their programs and demands, institutionalized their respective ethnic

entities, and established mechanisms for negotiation toward establishing mutual relations in the future;

—The European Community has delegated Portugal, as the presiding country, to organize a conference with leaders of the Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to find solutions for the future design of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with consent of all interested parties;

—All the most important international factors, including the European Community and the United States, have indicated that they will not allow a change of borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina by force;

—Sizable contingents of the JNA which had withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia are on the territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina;

—The main headquarters of the UN peacekeeping forces has chosen Bosnia-Hercegovina for its location.

All of these elements on the one hand show how complicated and dangerous the situation is in Bosnia-Hercegovina, while on the other that there are factors and mechanisms which are being kept under control.

Out of that entire complex, the following constants should be drawn because of their particular importance:

First, that the declaration of the leading European and world powers in favor of preserving existing borders, that is, of the unified state of Bosnia and Hercegovina, represents a serious obstacle to the realization of the programmatic objectives of those ethnic groups which have declared that they might separate from it and join their parent states. Options of that kind could occur only through negotiation, that is, in the context of an overall solution of the Yugoslav crisis, for which there is little prospect, at least at the present.

Second, the ethnic composition of Bosnia-Hercegovina objectively does not allow the primacy of any ethnic group, but rather encourages cooperation. This means that the ethnic composition of Bosnia-Hercegovina dictates the basic principles of its internal design.

The Only Possible Solution

In spite of those factors which represent a realistic and inevitable framework for resolving the "case" of Bosnia and Hercegovina (that is, that its borders cannot be altered by unilateral acts and that its internal system must be in keeping with the interests of all three nationalities), in the programs of its ethnic parties there nevertheless still are objectives which seem difficult to reconcile:

—The Democratic Action Party (the majority party of the Muslims) is still insisting on some kind of centralized and unitary Bosnia-Hercegovina as a state of citizens, whose sacred objective is complete sovereignty and independence;

—The Serbian Democratic Party (the majority party of the Serbs) has abandoned its maximalist goal (that is, that a Serbian state of Bosnia-Hercegovina separate from the framework of Bosnia-Hercegovina if the Democratic Action Party insists on its sovereignty and separation from Yugoslavia), but it has stuck by its demand that Bosnia-Hercegovina be a confederal community created by a coalition of three sovereign states;

—The Croatian Democratic Community (as the majority party of Croats) stipulates for Bosnia-Hercegovina that the Croats (especially in western Hercegovina) remain in the body of Bosnia-Hercegovina through the establishment of an internal confederal model.

It is quite certain that at the conference on Bosnia-Hercegovina, it is over synchronization of these goals that swords will be crossed and that the explosive situation in that republic will endure until what for now is the only possible solution is adopted at the negotiating table: establishment of an independent and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina with some form of internal federal-confederal system, similar to the Swiss model, with a position in the Yugoslav environment that will afford communication of Serbs and Croats with their parent states.

With the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia, one phase is ended in development of the Yugoslav crisis, that phase given its decisive features by the war in Croatia.

A new phase is coming in which the supervision of the UN peacekeeping forces over the truce in Yugoslavia should create a more favorable atmosphere in general and for continuation of the Brussels Conference in particular.

Izetbegovic Asks Muslim States for Recognition

92AE0338B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
15 Apr 92 p 4

[Text] Riyadh—Informed diplomatic sources in Riyadh said yesterday that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is following with great interest and concern the development of events in the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the massacres and calamities to which they are being subjected at the hands of the Serbian forces.

Riyadh has held important political and diplomatic contacts with a number of capitals in order to intervene and stop the fighting going on there. It was learned that Custodian of the Two Holy Places King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz is personally following this matter, in view of the special responsibility the kingdom shoulders in protecting the Muslims' interests and affairs in the world.

The same sources said that he received a telephone call from Turkish President Turgut Ozal yesterday during

which, according to the Saudi News Agency [SNA], "the present situation was reviewed, and ways to support and strengthen joint cooperation in all that serves the causes of the Islamic nation and the achievement of its objectives to seek a better future were discussed."

In Mecca late last month, King Fahd received Bosnia and Hercegovina President Alija Izetbegovic. In a related item, President Izetbegovic accused the Serbian forces of seeking to rearrange the demographic map in the republic's border areas, in an attempt to erect a security belt that would stretch about 40 km into Bosnian territory along the Drina River.

In a telephone interview with AL-HAYAH from Riyadh, Izetbegovic said that the Serbs are perpetrating massacres against Muslims in the border areas, and that all the Bosnian towns along the border with Serbia were attacked in the last few days. He added that the attack on those areas resulted in the death of a large number of Muslims and in thousands of them fleeing to areas in the middle of the republic. He said his country is now facing the problem of providing accommodations for those refugees.

The president of Bosnia and Hercegovina said that just before the contact with AL-HAYAH he talked to those defending the city of Foca. They told him that fire is raging in the heart of the city and that the Serbian attackers have raised their flags over the mosque's minaret. They broadcast their songs and hurl insults at Islamic holy places through the mosque's loudspeakers and call for liquidating the Muslims. But he stressed that the extremist Serbian Chetniks are in control of only half of the city, and that other than Bijeljina, the Muslim forces in Bosnia have lost no cities.

He said the massacres to which the Muslims in the region are being subjected are no different from those to which they were subjected during World War II, with the difference that the Muslims have now been resisting for seven days, while during that war, they were slaughtered like sheep.

Izetbegovic expressed his confidence that the EC and the United States, who announced their recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, will not stand idly by in the face of what the Serbian forces are perpetrating against his republic, and that they will not allow changing the borders between the Yugoslav republics by force. He said the Serbian forces twice shelled the television tower in Sarajevo in an attempt to impose a news blackout and disrupt all news sources and press agencies. But he stressed that the tower was repaired both times after the shelling stopped. Speaking about the poor living conditions in his country, the president of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina said that the disruption of road communications has led to hospitals running out of food and medicine, and to factories and shops closing down because of the war. He said he received a report saying that mental patients in the hospital have had nothing to eat for two days.

Izetbegovic said the danger of demolishing the high dam in Visegrad still exists. He pointed out that Murad Sabanovic (a Muslim from the area accompanied by some men) is still threatening to blow up the dam if massacres and attacks do not stop immediately and, in fact, he has drilled a hole in it.

He said the water behind the dam will wash away and kill everything in its path if the dam is blown up. President Izetbegovic appealed to the Muslim countries to "quickly extend a helping hand to the Muslims in his country, especially food, medicine, and arms to defend themselves."

He called on the Islamic states to recognize the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina as soon as possible, in order to boost the Muslims' morale there. He appealed to Saudi Arabia in particular.

Europe Bears Responsibility for War in Bosnia

92BA0783A Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 92 p 5

[Article by Ivan Matovic: "Europe Is Tailoring Bosnia's Cap, but the People's Head Is Bursting"]

[Text] What any man with any political wisdom, with any ability to see behind the tricks of diplomacy, and with any background in history rightly feared has unfortunately happened: On 6 April in Luxembourg, the Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted a decision to recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] as an independent and sovereign state, which was immediately followed by the anticipated reaction of the Assembly of the Serbian People in B-H—proclamation of the independence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which "may enter into communities with other entities in Yugoslavia."

We allude to the memory of history, because Europe, and especially a chauvinistic, revanchist, and militantly pro-German wing, has for the fifth time in the last 100 or more years tailored a cap for Bosnia-Hercegovina under which the head of the people has always burst, especially the Serbian people: In 1878, when at the Congress of Berlin and as part of resolution of the "Eastern question" it was passed from the steely embrace of one tyrant into the hands of another; in 1908, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, alluding to acquired rights, annexed it; in 1914, when in a game of the central powers it was brought into the war against Serbia, Montenegro, and the rest of the democratic world; in 1941, when it was presented as a gift to Pavelic; and again now, when in great haste, supposedly in order to avoid still greater chaos, it is being proclaimed an independent and sovereign state. This decision unilaterally determines the future of Bosnia-Hercegovina in the face of the strong warning that this permanent and fateful decision could be given a basis only by political means, through an agreement among all three of its constituent nationalities.

From the political, legal, and ethical standpoint, this is the worst solution that the selfish, frustrated, and opinionated European Community could have opted for as it could and should have been warned by the results of the referendum on the sovereignty of B-H, which was pushed through on 1 March, when the Serbian people, representing a third of that republic's 4,364,574 inhabitants, did not go to polling places; and the unconstitutional decision of the B-H Presidency adopted on 5 April in the absence of the two representatives of the Serbian nationality to mobilize TO [territorial defense], civil defense, and the police reserves, which resulted in dramatization of the already tense interethnic relations and was an introduction to the terror implemented through the state of the majority Muslim population and the Croat people, armed to the teeth even earlier, considerably augmenting the already enormous number of 600,000 armed citizens, thereby representing a kind of call for civil war, which in Bosnia and Hercegovina must at the same time be a war between faiths, a war between nationalities, and a war between parties; and the fact that war is raging through Bosnia-Hercegovina, mostly as the consequence of that kind of unilateral act and the irrational decision of a presidency cut in half, a war in which the first casualty is the Serbian people in settlements, in fields, and on roads from Bosanski Brod to Mostar, from Kupres to Zvornik; and that, now that the EC is appealing to international law and is guided by justice, the sovereignty of a state can be recognized only when it possesses not only territory and a people, but also has effective legal power and controls the entire space, which has not been the case in our central republic for a long time.

There were clear warnings in good time of the tragic consequences of the decision of the EC, the persistent advocate of premature international recognition of the sovereignty even of our republic, announced back on 2 March, but that decision, supported by the United States and blind and deaf to all the utterly bad consequences of recognizing the secessionism of Slovenia and Croatia, has stuck to its position, and the harsh reality of life has for these three days now been confirming the most unacceptable choice. Truth, as the supreme criterion of practice, is demonstrating that not a single problem of Bosnia-Hercegovina is solved by this forced decision. On the contrary—they are all becoming broader, more complicated, and more acute, individually and together deepening the Yugoslav crisis. Thus, this one-sided act and extremely unsuitable decision have brought about an escalation of the tension and a spreading of armed conflicts, threatening the blaze of general war, which makes it impossible for the problems to be resolved by peaceful means, rather than by force of arms, by political means, not by forceful means, by recognition of legal rights and demands of all three constituent nationalities and all the citizens of the republic, not by trampling on them, and then by seeking and finding the future status of B-H through constitutional transformation, not by imposing arrangements.

For months now, in these parts we have been hearing proposals, suggestions, demands, and warnings about how to preserve peace—by reason, by agreement, and by cooperation—in a multiethnic, multifaith, and multiparty B-H, where there are paramilitary formations and hundreds of thousands of long- and short-barrel weapons. Those factors which are essentially contributing to the breakup of Yugoslavia, whether they have come from outside or have been operating from within, have not listened to those voices and at the same time have been behaving extremely improperly toward the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] as well, when it is the sole legal armed force even in this part of the country, a social factor which has been constantly in a state of full combat readiness, protecting the freedom, the lives, and the property of citizens, has been warning of the danger of interethnic conflicts and assaults of paramilitary formations, protecting the people against both, advocating by its acts, frequently even risking its own life, peace instead of bloodshed, resolution of disputes by political means, in a democratic and civilized way. That voice of reason and those peaceful efforts of the army, along with the other progressive forces, have not been respected, just as they were not in the other secessionist communities, and the consequences are that today the world is following the bloody drama of the Serbian people all over B-H, with no prospects for it to be moderated quickly and essentially, and in addition to that there is the extremely complicated position of units of the JNA, which has come to and remained with the disenfranchised and threatened people of all nationalities and faiths. They have been engaged on a part of the battlefield over this broad region, in resistance to the HOS [Croatian Armed Force], in breaking up the aggression of the Croatian army from the west and north, in preventing broader interethnic conflicts, in protecting the freedoms, lives, and property of citizens, in protecting its own personnel and guarding military facilities—and it has been sharing with the people all of the anxiety resulting from military and every other violence and the desire for peace, sharing the destiny of the concerned and threatened population.

Also on the soil of B-H the army has been referred to as an occupier, as fascist, paramilitary, treasonous, and Serbo-Chetnik, by forces that are turned against everything that is Yugoslav and progressive; its units, deployed over an area of 51,129 square kilometers, have been and have remained targets of attacks, its personnel have been exposed to provocations, violence, and danger to their lives, and the facilities they are guarding have been threatened with destruction, but in the name of peace, patriotism, and dignity of their profession, they have remained upright, patient, brave, and ready for sacrifice. At the same time, JNA units, especially because of the failure to report of draftees and military registrants of the Croatian and Muslim nationalities, have remained extremely undermanned, and in the public there has been and still is a great deal of speculation as to the number of its units and its armament, which is supposed to bear witness to their alleged inability,

unreadiness for combat and indecisiveness, the disunity of officers and men, the ineffectiveness of command, and other fabrications. Thus, certain self-styled experts are confusing the public by alleging that there are seven corps of the JNA on the territory of B-H, which is an impressive number, but inaccurate, because objectively one can speak of only three corps of the ground forces extended over an operational area equal to a fifth of the area of Yugoslavia, quite often substantially undermanned, exposed day and night to the strikes of paramilitary and other hostile forces, but with units determined in full combat readiness to remain with the threatened people to the final political solution concerning the constitutional arrangement of B-H, until all three constituent nationalities agree on the future of the army on this territory.

We repeat here for those whose intentions are good and for those others: Units of the JNA and TO on the soil of B-H are mostly made up of soldiers and officers who are natives here, and no one can call them occupiers, much less condemn them to evacuation and expulsion; they are in their home, they are preserving their own home and hearth and family tradition, they are ready to extend to everyone a hand of peace and cooperation, but also resistance to anyone's violence. This sounds like rhetoric, but it is based on the living truth, as confirmed by its commitment and its actions. Anyone who wants to assure himself of this, let him go among the defenders of the Mostar airfield, the "Butmir" Airport, Kupres and its hinterland, the Serbian villages in the vicinity of Bosanski Brod, the garrisons in Travnik, the storehouses around Zvornik, the approaches to boiling Sarajevo in the face of the assaults of the belligerent forces provoked to armed violence by the unconstitutional decisions of the B-H Presidency and the EC. Or let him ask those who have been calling for units of the JNA from all parts of the republic, Serbs and Muslims alike, on behalf of their own protection and encouragement in the face of oppression, which their personnel see as an obligation to the people, who embrace the army and stand beside it—to remain with it and not to give up.

Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia Declaration

LD2804110792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1022 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Belgrade, April 28 (TANJUG)—The participants in the formal session of the Assembly of Yugoslavia of April 27, which promulgated the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro after the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, adopted the text of a declaration which expresses the will of the people in the two republics to continue living together in a common state.

Following is the text of the declaration (unofficial translation):

The people's representatives of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro

—Express the will of the citizens of their respective republics to continue living in a common state of Yugoslavia.

—Accepting all the basic principles as laid down in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki and Paris Charters of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and specifically the principles of parliamentary democracy, a market economy, as well as respect for human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities.

—Remaining firmly committed to peaceful methods for dealing with the Yugoslav crisis.

Wish to lay down in this declaration their views on the basic direct and lasting objectives of policy of the common state and its relations with the former Yugoslav republics.

With this in view, the people's representatives of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro declare that:

1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, perpetuating the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a state, international legal and political entity, shall strictly honour all past international obligations assumed by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

It shall also be prepared to fully respect the rights and interests of the Yugoslav republics which have proclaimed their independence. Recognition of the newly-created states shall follow upon the settling of questions outstanding which are being discussed within the conference on Yugoslavia.

Retaining all obligations to the international organizations of which it is a member, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall not raise obstacles to the newly [words indistinct] membership of these organizations and institutions, specifically the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall respect and carry out the rights and obligations assumed by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the territories of Krajina which, as part of the United Nations' peacekeeping operation, have been placed under U.N. protection.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia further remains prepared to negotiate, within the conference on Yugoslavia, all questions of division of property, including also a sharing of common debts. In case of dispute, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be prepared to accept the arbitration of the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague.

2. The diplomatic-consular missions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia abroad shall continue to function uninterrupted for the representation and protection of the interests of Yugoslavia.

They shall continue to manage the entire property of Yugoslavia abroad.

They shall also give consular protection to all citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when approached by them to do so, until the final settlement of their status as regards citizenship.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognizes full continuity of representation to foreign states by their diplomatic-consular missions in its territory.

3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is interested in the restoration of economic, transportation, power and other links in the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is prepared to make its full contribution to this end.

4. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has no territorial aspirations to any neighbouring state.

Respecting the objectives and principles of the U.N. charter and the CSCE documents, it remains strictly committed to the principle of non-use of force in dealing with all open questions.

5. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall ensure the highest standards of protection of human rights and rights of ethnic minorities as laid down in international legal acts and CSCE documents.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall, moreover, be prepared to additionally recognize to the ethnic minorities in its territory all rights which may be recognized and exercised by the other CSCE member-states to their minorities.

6. In external affairs, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be guided by the principles of the U.N. Charter and the principles set out in the CSCE documents, specifically the Paris Charter for a New Europe.

As a country-founder of the movement of non-aligned countries, it shall remain committed to the basic principles and aims of the policy of non-alignment.

It shall develop relations of trust and understanding with the neighbours, taking as its point of departure the principle of good- neighbourliness.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a state of free citizens, shall be guided in its democratic development by the standards and achievements of the Council of Europe, the European Community and other European institutions, with a view to joining their membership in the foreseeable future.

(Signed by) the participants in the formal session of the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro.

New Federal Republic Viewed

LD2804204692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2016 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Report by Miodrag Djundjerovic]

[Text] Belgrade, April 28 (TANJUG)—The constitution of a new state, enabling the definite setting up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was yesterday adopted by an almost short-cut procedure and despite the disapproval of most of the opposition parties, which did not oppose the right and need for a common state of Serbia and Montenegro, but the method of its founding. The new constitution could become the corner-stone of the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

Participants in the solemn, and, one could even say, historical act, summed up everything they had to say in the declaration, which is oriented towards a peaceful finale of the Yugoslav agony, in which the war alone has lasted for over one year.

There is really nothing to add to or take out of the declaration. It is a kind of freedom, man-centered charter and comprises all the basic principles of the United Nations, the Helsinki and Paris charters, the CSCE.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) has definitely said what it had to say. It intends to resolve its questions by itself, it will be a multi-party, market-oriented state, open to talks. It resumes the continuity of former Yugoslavia and remains open to all who want to join the common state when conditions are ripe.

SRJ continues the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia's (SFRY) state, international, legal and political personality and, as the declaration sets out, it will simultaneously be prepared to fully respect the rights and interests of the former Yugoslav republics which declared their independence.

"The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has no territorial claims to anybody in its surroundings", participants in the solemn session categorically concluded. The third Yugoslavia will also "respect and fulfil all the rights and obligations the SFR of Yugoslavia assumed vis-a-vis the Krajina territories, within the framework of the United Nations peacekeeping operation, under the protection of the world organization."

Unfortunately, the resolution of the whole crisis on Yugoslav lands will not depend on one side only, on the new SRJ, which will be completely constituted by fall at the latest. SRJ will inform the international community of the truth about itself and protect it through diplomatic means. One hopes that all dilemmas and suspicions will be dispelled and that yesterday's absence of a certain number of diplomatic representatives of significant

countries in the Federal Assembly is only an episode in SRJ's diplomatic relations with the international community.

The adoption of the new constitution marks an end to agony and chaos and a beginning of normal work, particularly that of the federal authorities, for the functioning of the economic system and a successful economic policy are not possible without it. The new authorities' first and foremost task seems to be the adoption of an anti-inflationary program.

According to statistics regarding its natural, technical and human potentials, the new state has the chance to speedily revitalize its economy. Many assess that the process of economic and social recovery will last incomparably shorter than the Yugoslav crisis and much shorter than the disintegration of Yugoslavia caused by the secessionism of the four republics of the former state.

However, the new state must count on aspersions and hindrances of all kinds, particularly of those who have so far directly urged separatism, forgetting that the new bugaboo could knock on their door as well.

Finally, the so-called new world order cannot hold Yugoslavia in an inferior position. Its peoples will never be anyone's servants, their fate is in their own hands now, while the ideas and aims of the new state, which ensures the highest standards of the protection of human rights, cannot be a thorn in any well-meaning eye.

Deputy Foreign Minister Maksic Resigns

LD2804124492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1125 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Belgrade, 28 Apr (TANJUG)—Milivoje Maksic, deputy federal secretary for foreign affairs, ceased to perform his duties today at his own request. He is retiring with the agreement of the top federal bodies, a statement which TANJUG received today says. Milivoje Maksic (aged 64) joined the Yugoslav diplomatic service in 1949. He was appointed deputy federal secretary in October 1988. During the past six months he was the head of our diplomatic service.

Until a new federal secretary for foreign affairs is appointed, following parliamentary elections, the work of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs and of the Yugoslav diplomatic service will be directed by under secretaries and by a group of the federal secretary's top aides in the closest cooperation with the two republics, the statement says.

Renewal Movement To Boycott Federal Elections

LD2804185492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1809 GMT 28 Apr 92

[Text] Belgrade, April 28 (TANJUG)—There are no replacements, resignations, and rifts in the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)—the strongest opposition party in the Serbian parliament—as the regime press rumored recently, SPO leader Vuk Draskovic said at a news conference in the International Press Center today.

Draskovic said his party would boycott the federal, but take part in the local elections, on condition that the "regime secures freedom for the media, passes laws on political party funding, a law on the amnesty for citizens who fled Serbia during the war in Croatia, the disarmament of all para-militacy formations and a three-month election campaign."

By boycotting the federal elections, the SPO wants to manifest its opinion of the newly-proclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The first round of local elections will be held in Serbia on May 31, the second round two weeks later. These elections, to have been held last November, were postponed because of the war waged in the breakaway Yugoslav Republic of Croatia.

Draskovic said SPO and the Democratic and Liberal parties would form a coalition headed by a council. Once the council is formed, these parties' delegates are to leave the Serbian parliament and constitute a "government and parliament of democratic Serbia." The Democratic Party is soon to reach a decision on the issue, Draskovic says. According to the latest opinion polls, SPO's rating is dropping because of its frequent change of opinions of the Serbia Government's policy.

Draskovic Proposes New Democratic Alliance

AU2804174892 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian

[Text] At a news conference held today in the International Press Center by the Serbian Renewal Movement, party President Vuk Draskovic said of yesterday's session of the Main Committee that their aim is a democratic Serbia which will become a pillar of rapprochement and unification, not only in our regions, but throughout the Balkans. In this regard, the Main Committee adopted amendments to the Statute. Here is a report by Vladimir Nikolic:

[Begin recording] [Nikolic] We consider Yugoslavia to be an arbitrary creation which will last as long as its rulers last, Draskovic said, and added that the Main Committee decided that elections for the federal parliament should be boycotted. The Serbian Renewal Movement will run in local elections, but only if some conditions are met, and those are, according to Draskovic, that all media should be completely freed from the influence of the authorities, that Serbia should adopt a law on financing political parties, that a law on amnesty for those who fled from war should be proclaimed—and, in that connection, all court proceedings against soldiers, reservists, and officers should be stopped—that all paramilitary formations in Serbia should be disarmed, and that the election campaign should last three months from the day the above-mentioned conditions are met.

The Main Committee of the Serbian Renewal Movement has received with great delight and approval the idea on the formation of SDO, the Alliance of Democratic Renewal [Savez Demokratske Obnove], whose core of initiators would be made up of the Serbian Renewal Movement, the Democratic Party, and the Serbian Liberal Party. The Alliance would be headed by a council of prominent intellectuals and political party leaders. Immediately after the council is founded, these parties' deputies would leave the parliament and form a new parallel parliament which would include Serbia's wisest people. A parallel government would also be formed.

In reply to the question of why they failed to demand a proportional electoral system, Draskovic said that this would complicate the situation too much, because their aim is to run in the elections which they think they will win regardless of the electoral system.

In reply to the question of how the Serbian Renewal Movement thinks the economic problems in Serbia can be solved, Draskovic recalled that the Serbian Renewal Movement had recently presented its economic program, and said the following:

[Draskovic] Well, there exists documentation and financial means exist for everything said there [in the economic program] and resources have been ensured for every project, railroad, apartment, and workplace. These resources have been ensured either by Serb emigrants abroad or by certain international institutions and corporations, and these resources are only waiting for those people who must leave to really leave and for those people who must come to Serbia to come. [end recording]

Dinar Replaced by Transitional Coupons

LD2704201792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1307 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Text] Skopje, April 27 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on Friday began replacing Yugoslav Dinars with transitional coupons on a one-for-one basis. The replacement deadline is Wednesday. The republican parliament on Sunday approved a government proposal for Macedonia to introduce its own currency, the dener, with coupons replacing the Yugoslav dinar during a transitional period of one year. The exchange rate of the currency has been set at 360 deners for one German mark. Macedonia sought international recognition late last year, but has failed in its efforts largely owing to the opposition of Greece. The Yugoslav dinar was replaced with new currencies in late 1991 in the breakaway Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

Vice-Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBJ) Branko Dragas said on Sunday the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which is made up of Serbia and Montenegro) would be ready for a currency replacement on Monday.

Model for Restructuring Serbian Economy Scored

92BA0791B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Apr 92 p 13

[Article by Dr. Bosko Mijatovic: "A System for the Dustheap of History"]

[Text] In BORBA, on 3 April, Prof. Vladimir Stambuk presented his opinions on the transformation of ownership and socioeconomic changes in Serbia in an article entitled "A New Enterprise for a New Society." His view of things is relevant, because Mr. Stambuk is one of the ideologues of the incumbent SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]. It is interesting, then, to see what is being prepared for us, so that we mortals can prepare for the events that are to come and possibly protest in good time.

After emphasizing that restructuring the economy is a "political process" ("everything is politics," Lenin said), the author presented three "models" for restructuring the economy and society, as he sees it. Two are bad, of course, and one is good.

The first model, according to the author, aims at creating a 20-percent stratum of rich citizens, 50 percent at the Balkan standard of living, and 30 percent at the level of the African countries. (Where did the author get these percentages?) Mr. Stambuk calls this model radical, because its advocates favor rapid privatization, and he says that this can be achieved only by violence. It is therefore said to be unrealistic.

The second model presupposes an orientation toward creation of a broad dispersion of ownership, so that 50 percent of the population would own property in small and medium-sized enterprises. Ante Markovic, according to Mr. Stambuk, tried to realize this conception. The unacceptability of this model, the author feels, follows from the fact that its basic prerequisites have not been met in our society—"social, property, and structural," whatever that might mean.

The third model, which Mr. Stambuk prefers, would be based on support of a majority of the citizens, who would find an interest in it, on valuation of all production factors through the market, on corporations and diminished public ownership, on restructuring without high unemployment, on able management, on competition, and on government guidance.

Intimidation of Children

Because I believe that I have faithfully, although briefly, presented pictures of all three models of restructuring according to Mr. Stambuk, it remains for me to comment on them.

First, Mr. Stambuk obviously does not know what the word model means, because he is trying to describe models for restructuring by positing the desirable and targeted states of the economy and society, rather than their constructive elements and mutual ties. This is an

expression of the old and well-known fault of all socialist theoreticians: They describe their "model" through more or less acceptable principles (justice, democracy, equality, autonomy), but they are utterly unable, or unwilling, to represent that model in an operative manner that is clear to all. Just as Marx did not provide a blueprint of a socialist (communist) system, so this has also been left undone by the "critical" philosophers such as Korsc, Lukac, or the PRAXIS people who concerned themselves with the exegesis of orthodox texts, and just as Mihailo Markovic, another ideologue of the SPS, has managed to explain what he means by his integral self-management. Put simply, the socialist theoreticians, among them, Mr. Stambuk, do not have a blueprint of society or of its transformation, but they shower their readers and even poor citizens with their ideas about how society should look, which is quite insufficient for a sound debate, much less political decisionmaking.

Thus, we do not know whether we are dealing here with transformation of ownership or not, who makes the decisions on possible privatization, whether it is a question of selling, who gets the money from that sale, what kind of joint stock operations would be encouraged, and so on? For example, Ante Markovic's model might be nicely described as follows: The sale of enterprises at discount to employees was chosen over gratis distribution of social capital; the decentralized, rather than centralized, approach to decisionmaking was adopted; joint stockholding by employees would be dominant over that of outside owners; an incomplete ownership structure would be created relatively rapidly, and then it would gradually be supplemented. But what Mr. Stambuk attributes to Ante Markovic has nothing whatsoever to do with the actual picture of the model of privatization, which the latter did construct.

Mr. Stambuk is trying to discredit the concept of a rapid privatization of our public property, associating it with extreme inequality and political violence (the first model). This is not only improper, it is extremely inaccurate. Because, as we have already said, Mr. Stambuk has not been able to represent any model of the transformation of ownership in a valid fashion, I will do this with a rather popular model—the one now being carried out in Czechoslovakia and which has been in the program of the Democratic Party for two years now.

Because the main problem with the concept of privatization through sale is the great shortage of capital in the hands of individuals, many people have come to the idea of issuing citizens coupons (vouchers) with which they would "purchase" enterprises and in that way privatize them. The vouchers would be distributed to all adult citizens of Serbia in an equal amount. The state would only designate enterprises to be privatized, and the entire procedure would take place automatically, by means of rules established in advance, or by means of a single auction. Privatization, then, would be rapid (over, say, a year), there would not be any extreme inequality at all, but, on the contrary, every citizen would get an equal chance to participate in public property, and there would not be any violence at all (Mr. Stambuk is using this to frighten little children).

Efforts at Persuasion Without Arguments

Let us also look at the third model, the one which Mr. Stambuk considers the best. Here again we see the targeted states (popularity, competitiveness, low unemployment, able management, and so on), but we do not see how such restructuring would be achieved. Whether through the sale of enterprises to private individuals or to foreigners, whether through nationalization, whether through some new technique of reorganization so dear to the Socialists? Who makes the decisions, to whom does the money go? What is it all about anyway? The Lord only knows. But that does not stand in the way of the SPS ideologue's trying to persuade the reader that the concept is "realistic and feasible," without presenting a single argument.

Many other questions have also been left without answers—Would Mr. Stambuk's model give us capitalism or state ownership, would a liberal bourgeois society arise on its foundation, or a society of universal control, does Vladimir Stambuk support the present concept for transformation of ownership in Serbia, would the "equality" of all types of ownership remain untouched, what about the idea of social justice, and so on? An article that deals with restructuring, if the author claims to be serious, ought to answer these and similar questions. This way it remains extremely confusing—in the best tradition of the old School of Political Sciences and its thinkers.

We see from the additional remarks that restructuring according to this model is "slow" and that "it cannot be accomplished in a year or two." It never occurs to the author to ask what will happen in the meantime, will there be a complete collapse of the public sector, which we are already witnesses to, or not? The important thing to him, it seems, is to dispel the hopes or illusions of those who think that nevertheless they might accomplish something in a short period of time in order to pull Serbia's economy and citizenry out of disaster.

I believe that this is the point of the entire article: Mr. Stambuk wants to tell us that nothing will change in the socioeconomic policy of the Serbian leadership and no changes of direction should be anticipated at all in the institutional structure of Serbia in the direction of privatization and commercialization on any grand scale. As though everything is just fine in the country of Serbia, and we have no reason for changing anything in an essential way: "We have no uncertainty." And actually we do not: Serbia is going to ruin inevitably and faster and faster.